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ABSTRACT
GRACIOUS DISCOVERIES: TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING
OF JONATHAN EDWARDS' PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY,
AND AN ASSESSMENT OF HIS PLACE IN THE 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY
by
JAMES G. BLIGHT
Historians who have dealt with the psychological 
thought of the colonial period, and with Edwards in particular, 
fall into two general categories. On the one hand there are 
the historians of the discipline of psychology who, following 
Edwin G. Boring, have deined the history of psychology as 
that stream of historical thought which proceeded toward, 
through, and beyond Wilhelm Wundt, the first "experimental" 
psychologist. The other group of historians who have con­
sidered Edwards and colonial psychology, however, define the 
history of psychology not as an ideational journey through 
Wundt, but as the record of man's thoughts concerning human 
nature. Since Edwards and his colleagues had much to say 
about man's nature, this approach at least allows a good deal 
of colonial thought to enter the history of psychology as an
xiii
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object of serious thought. Yet this study, serious though 
it has been, has also been remarkably barren. "Human nature" 
is just too broad and unwieldy a term. What are the dimen­
sions of man's nature?
The "Prescriptions" of Robert I. Watson and the 
"Fundamental Issues" of Michael Wertheimer are adopted as 
useful criteria regarding the dimensions of human nature.
They are used principally to elaborate the profound paradoxes 
and complexities in Edwards' psychological theory. Edwards 
held that man is (a) a rational-emotive unity, and (b) both 
proactive and reactive. It is demonstrated that this Syn­
thetic viewpoint implies that man is somehow both free and 
determined, rational and irrational, and he possesses a host 
of other combinations of attributes which are usually held to 
be polar opposites. Until recently, whenever the synthetic 
view has been advocated, as it has by Augustine, Edwards, 
and the American functionalists, the question of how such a 
complex man might function has been left unanswered. The 
synthetic theorists have lacked a model of the mind which 
can accommodate all the diverse characteristics which they 
attribute to it. Recently, however, cognitive theorists have 
constructed such a model, information processing, which holds 
to the rational-emotive and proactive-reactive principles of 
Edwards.
In spite of a number of obvious differences, Edwards 
and many information-processing theorists have asked the 
same basic psychological questions and given answers which 
xiv
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differ only in clarity. What, they have asked, is the nature 
of man’s relationship with the environment? The unified, 
rational-emotive nature of the mind is described by Neisser, 
a leading information-processing theorist, as "multiple pro­
cessing." All purposeful, goal-directed, conscious activity, 
it is held, is actually an elaboration of unconscious, 
emotionally-laden information. Information-processing theory 
represents man's relationship to the world as a cybernetic 
feedback loop— the TOTE unit. Once a person is moved to act 
by a sense of incongruity, he is said to X es't-.0.Pera'*:e-Zes't:- 
Exit from the loop.
Human activity as automatic and mundane as getting out 
of bed and as difficult and complex as composing a poem can 
be neatly described with information-processing concepts and 
terminology. Proactive planning, selecting and execution is 
interspersed with reactive reception of needed insights from 
somewhere on the fringes of the stream of thought. These 
creative discoveries, great and small, are the product of both 
activity and inactivity and of a unified rational-emotive 
process.
The information-processing model is then applied to 
Edwards. In Edwards’ view, the cognitive jaunt through the 
conversion loop consists mostly in two vigorous and tortuous 
periods of planning, scheming, and evaluating surrounding a 
restful, reactive oasis in which God "discovers" Himself to 
the convert. First, the scriptures are read and sermons are 
heard; the individual perceives that he is in need, and he 
xv
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attempts to move sequentially and methodically toward his 
goal of salvation. The actual "discovery" of grace, however, 
requires more than conviction, more than a conscious effort 
to seek God. After the period of "reasoning," of fretting and 
planning to seek the light, the weary seeker must lay his 
plan aside and cease to seek. He receives the light; the 
Lord shouts, as it were, and he listens. It is then that the 
5pirit, the "vital indwelling principle," is fused to the mind 
of the convert.
After traversing these stages, the concerned seeker 
quite naturally wishes to know whether his experience has 
been a genuine conversion or merely a work of the devil. He 
reverts to what Edwards called "reasons," or sequential, goal- 
directed thought as he attempts to evaluate the validity of 
what he hopes has been a valid conversion. For a variety of 
reasons, however, Edwards believed that no conversion, not 
even his own, could be evaluated with any degree of confidence, 
though he did describe the saintly life of the converted per­
son with great clarity.
Finally, an effort is made to briefly trace the fate 
of Edwards' psychology through James. It is contended that 
his doctrine of a unified, rational-emotive mind was gradually 
but decisively overthrown by a coalition of American and 
European positions. His proactive-reactive position, however, 
was clarified and elaborated, and it provided James, Dewey, 
and the other "functionalists" with an American precedent for 
their "new" psychology.
xvi
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
"Time," Emerson wrote, "dissipates to shining ether 
the solid angularity of facts." One of the principal func­
tions of historical scholarship is, I believe, to restore 
some semblance of "angularity" to the past. In intellectual 
history this means that we must sharpen our conception of 
what was said, but more importantly, we must interpret as 
best we can what was meant. Often, what was said appears 
either irrelevant or absolutely inscrutable, or perhaps both. 
This is especially true in the history of psychology where 
the timeless issues have, until recently, been embedded in 
other contexts: philosophical, religious, political, and
medical. Discussion of these issues is polluted with surplus 
and obscure meanings which help identify their historical 
context, but which also make it difficult to see valid his­
torical relationships.
The application of a contemporary model to historical 
data, as has been increasingly done with psychoanalysis, is a 
promising method of focusing the past so that we, in the 
present, can find intelligible meaning in it. Yet in prac­
tice, much "psychohistory" is simply bad history and worse 
psychoanalysis The vagary and uncertainty of historical 
data is often compounded with a nebulous neo-Freudian model
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and a lot of catchy, idiosyncratic jargon. While most his­
torians still reject the conscious application of models onto 
history, many of those who endorse "psychohistory" often find 
psychological terms distasteful. For example, in an article 
entitled "The Use and Abuse of Psychology in History," Frank 
Manuel has stated that he finds psychological jargon "too 
ugly" for direct application to history.^ He favors a more 
subtle use of psychological concepts. His Portrait of Isaac 
Newton is a typical product of the prudent imposition of the
2
psychoanalytic model onto history. Prudence, however, 
normally an admirable trait, has in this area led to con­
fusion over the meaning and appropriateness of psychoanalytic 
terms, and a certain suspicion that the model, however it 
might be defined, has been applied in a very selective and 
haphazard fashion.
Because of the imprudence contained herein, the 
reader may find this study of Edwards and colonial psychology 
"too ugly" to qualify as decent history. It may appear to 
smack of rank scientism, a harbinger, perhaps, of the 
impending positivistic overthrow of the historical profession. 
Two points should be kept in mind, however, before such a 
radical conclusion is drawn. First, recall that the near 
life-long task of Perry Miller, America's greatest literary 
historian of ideas, was, as he put it, to examine "certain
1 Daedalus. Winter, 1971, pp. 187-213, p. 207.
^Cambridge, Mass., 1968.
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3basic continuities [which] persist in a culture."^ The 
great business of intellectual history is, in his view, to go 
as far as possible beyond the information given; to synthe­
size the underlying themes. Likewise, the scientific his­
torian, as I redefine that term in chapter two, he who would 
apply a contemporary model to history, must implicitly accept 
this basic contention of modern American historiography's 
most illustrious literateur: there are basic unifying con­
tinuities which exist beneath or beyond the facts as they are 
known. The "scientist" and "artist" of history differ, in 
other words, only in the extent to which they accede to 
Peirce's admonition that they make their ideas clear. 5econd, 
the humble working hypothesis contained in the following 
pages was born of necessity. The whole enterprise began a 
couple of years ago in response to my utter frustration as a 
historian of psychology interested in the American origins 
of American psychology. My good friend and teacher Rand B. 
Evans has called this the "indigenous American psychology."
It seemed clear that the most important figure of this early 
period was Edwards; any comprehensive study of the indigenous 
psychology must, therefore, begin with him. Almost immedi­
ately after undertaking an intensive study of Edwards it 
became clear that I was confronted by a psychological,thinker 
who was half modern, half medieval, and wholly incomprehen­
sible to generations of psychological commentators. I
3
Errand Into the Wilderness (New York, 1964), pp.
1 84-1 85.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4simply could not understand Edwards or his interpreters. I 
was, as Edwards described his parishioners just before con­
version, "brought to the borders of despair." My choice, as 
I saw it, was to forsake the whole blooming mess or, alter­
natively, to search for an entirely new way to approach 
Edwards, the "indigenous American psychology," and ultimately 
the entire history of American psychology. I may yet regret 
choosing the latter.
There is a curious similarity between the format of 
this book and that of an experimental report. A report 
normally proceeds from the introduction (which contains the 
rationale for doing the study), to the method (including the 
design, apparatus, and procedure), to the results, to the 
discussion, conclusions, and suggestions for future research. 
In chapter two, therefore, the previous work is reviewed. 
Historians who have dealt with the psychological thought of 
the colonial period, and with Edwards in particular, fall 
into two general categories. On the one hand there are the 
historians of the discipline of psychology who, following 
Edwin G. Boring, have defined the history of psychology as 
that stream of historical thought which proceeded toward, 
through, and beyond Wilhelm Wundt, the first "experimental" 
psychologist. Since, as far as I know, no aspect of Wundt's 
system can be said to have originated in the American 
colonies, Boringian historians of American psychology have 
reduced the psychological thought of Edwards and the other 
colonials to the status of a superfluous novelty. "What
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5possible relevance,” they have implicitly asked, "can the 
barely coherent Puritan chatter about devils, angels, God, 
and conversion have for contemporary conceptions of psy­
chology?" Their answer, also implicit, is "nothing whatever!"
The other group of historians who have considered 
Edwards' and colonial psychology, however, define the 
history of psychology not as an ideational journey through 
Wundt, but as the record of man's thoughts concerning human 
nature. Since Edwards and his colleagues had much to say 
about man's nature, this approach at least allows a good deal 
of colonial thought to enter the history of psychology as an 
object of serious study. Yet this study, serious though it 
has been, has also been remarkably barren. "Human nature" is 
just too broad and unwieldy a term. In the relatively undif­
ferentiated form that has been adopted by some historians, 
the history of the psychology (of speculations concerning 
human nature) of Edwards and the colonials is exceedingly 
diffuse, almost incoherent. Most are lumped together as 
"Calvinists," with a couple of Lockeans thrown in for good 
measure, who offered psychological contributions to Perry 
Miller's mythical, colonial monolith— the New England Mind.
What, then, were the psychological views of the great 
Edwards? We simply have not known because his interpreters 
have either cared deeply about modern psychology but not 
about him, or have studied him intensely but armed with the 
vaguest imaginable view of psychology.
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6Chapter three contains theoretical and empirical 
justification for the novel method which follows. The 
principal difficulty with previous analyses of Edwardsean 
psychology is the unreasonable demands they make on the 
intuitive powers of the reader. Historians have left either 
Edwards' thought, or "psychology," or both confusingly vague. 
In an attempt to correct this situation a case is made for 
the usefulness of a revised concept of "scientific history." 
Since history, like science, is an intensely personal and 
highly selective endeavor, the historian should, like the 
scientist, publicly display his theoretical assumptions. 
Boring certainly was "scientific" in this sense: his history
was of experimental psychology, the history of the origin and 
development of a method. Unfortunately for historians of 
psychology whose interests take them outside the Wundtian 
mainstream, those who approach the history of psychology as 
the study of human nature rather than a method, the task of 
being "scientific," or clear about one's assumptions, is not 
so easy. What are the dimensions of man's nature? How many 
things can a man be? Many, obviously. The two most success­
ful attempts made by historians of psychology to distribute 
man's essence into a manageable yet useful scheme of cate­
gories have been made by Robert I. Watson and Michael 
Wertheimer. Their views are described, combined to some 
extent, and adapted in chapter three: they become my public
assumptions regarding the dimensions of human nature.
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7The "Prescriptions" of Watson and the "Fundamental 
Issues" of Wertheimer are useful principally in elaborating 
the profound paradoxes and complexities in Edwards' psycho­
logical theory. Edwards held that man is (a) a rational- 
emotive unity, and (b) both proactive and reactive. It is 
demonstrated that this Synthetic viewpoint, as I call it, 
implies that man is somehow both free and determined, 
rational and irrational, and he possesses a host of other 
combinations of attributes which are usually held to be polar 
opposites. Until recently, whenever the synthetic view has 
been advocated, as it has by Augustine, Edwards, and the 
American functionalists, the question of how such a complex 
man might function has been left unanswered. The synthetic 
theorists have lacked a model of the mind which can accommo­
date all the diverse characteristics which they attribute to 
it. Recently, however, cognitive theorists have constructed 
such a model, Information Processing, which holds to the 
rational-emotive and proactive-reactive principles of 
Edwards.
In chapter four the "apparatus," the synthetic model, 
is described in its contemporary form. In spite of a number 
of obvious differences, Edwards and many information pro­
cessing theorists have asked the same basic psychological 
questions and given answers which differ only in clarity.
What, they have asked, is the nature of the human mind and 
what is the nature of man's relationship with the environment? 
The unified, rational-emotive nature of the mind is described
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by Neisser, a leading information-processing theorist, as 
"multiple processing." While we are only aware of our con­
scious, "sequential" stream of thought, there is a good deal 
of "parallel," or illogical and usually unconscious activity 
occurring at all times. All purposeful, goal-direct, con­
scious activity, it is held, is actually an elaboration of 
this unconscious, emotionally-laden information. Information- 
processing theory represents man's relationship to the world 
as a cybernetic feedback loop— the TOTE unit. Once a person 
is moved to act by a sense of incongruity he is said to X 63^" 
Operate-Test-and Exit from the loop. He engages in an 
oscillating give-and-take encounter with the information at 
his disposal: he receives information but he also selects
those aspects of the information which he perceives to be 
most relevant to his purposes and plans.
We shall see in chapter four that human activity as 
automatic and mundane as getting out of bed and as difficult 
and complex as composing a poem can be neatly described with 
information-processing concepts and terminology. Proactive 
planning, selecting, and execution is interspersed with 
reactive reception of needed insights from somewhere on the 
fringes of the stream of thought. These creative discoveries, 
great and small, are the product of both activity and inac­
tivity and of a unified rational-emotive process.
The procedure follows in chapter five: the model is 
applied to Edwards. Armed with the TOTE unit and multiple- 
processing concepts we plunge into Edwards’ psychology and
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9try to describe it in contemporary terms. In so doing we 
undoubtedly lose a little of the historical Edwards along the 
way, but we gain, I believe, a much more explicit understand­
ing of his marvelous intuitive insights into the nature of 
the human mind and its relation to behavior.
In Edwards' view, the cognitive jaunt through the 
conversion loop consists mostly in two vigorous and tortuous 
periods of planning, scheming, and evaluating surrounding a 
restful, reactive oasis in which God "discovers" himself to 
the convert, A mostly conscious, rational process is involved 
in the developing sense of spiritual inadequacy. There is 
an incongruity between a person's perceived status and an 
ideal converted status that is mulled over, worried about, 
and which serves as an impetus to the design of a plan to 
seek salvation. The scriptures are read, sermons are heard; 
the individual perceives that he is in need, and he attempts 
to move sequentially and methodically toward his goal of 
salvation. The actual "discovery" of grace, however, requires 
more than conviction, more than a conscious effort to seek 
God. After the period of "reasoning," of fretting and planning 
to seek the light, the weary seeker must lay his plan aside 
and cease to seek. He receives the light; the Lord shouts, 
as it were, and he listens. It is then, after the intense 
period of preparation, that the discovery of the divine light 
may occur. It is then that the Spirit, the "vital indwelling 
principle," is fused to the mind of the convert. This 
instantaneous phase is totally reactive; man receives,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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beholds, and relishes the divine beauty and perfection of God 
with a transsummative "sense of the heart."
After traversing these stages the concerned seeker 
quite naturally wishFs to know whether his "experience" is a 
genuine conversion or merely a work of the devil. He reverts 
to what Edwards called "reason," or sequential, goal-directed 
thought as he attempts to evaluate the validity of what he 
hopes has been a valid conversion. For a variety of reasons, 
however, Edwards believed that no conversion, not even his 
own, could be evaluated with any degree of confidence, though 
he did describe the saintly life of the converted person with 
great clarity.
Since there are no objective tests to determine the 
extent of the fit between history and a model, or the overall 
usefulness of the attempt, chapter six contains no firm con­
clusions. The question is asked, "what happened to the psy­
chological theory of Jonathan Edwards?" Some preliminary, 
impressionistic hypotheses are offered. Edwards' doctrine of 
a unified, rational-emotive mind was gradually but decisively 
overthrown by a coalition of American and European positions. 
The Americans usually either objected to his ruthless deter­
minism or did not grasp the subtlety of his arguments. The 
Scottish and Kantian "faculty" psychologies, on the other 
hand, provided papular alternatives to Edwards. His proactive- 
reactive position, however, was clarified and elaborated, and 
it provided James, Dewey, and the other "Functionalists" with 
an American precedent for their "new" psychology.
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In a sense, then, this monograph has to be "ugly."
For though absolute beauty may be, as Coleridge suggested,
unity in variety, one's initial esthetic response is usually
a function of familiarity. And there will be hardly a reader
who does not have to struggle a bit with some unfamiliar
aspects of this little enterprise. That is an unavoidable
consequence of interdisciplinary research. But we have too
long, in my estimation, sacrificed our ambition to provide
some "solid angularity" to history in favor of an unfortunate
devotion to a stylistic, skin-deep beauty which is based
primarily on inertia, departmental provincialism, and in some
cases laziness. This is certainly the case in studies of
Edwards' psychological thought. After two hundred thirty
years of scholarly debate, no one is yet sure what he was
trying to say. In his "Editor's Introduction" to Edwards'
greatest psychological work, the Religious Affections. John
E. Smith has remarked:
. . . the Affections has been praised in vague descrip­
tions; it must now be read and analyzed in a way that is 
consistent with a work of its stature. The highest 
praise of a book should proceed not from uncritical 
acceptance but from a willingness to treat it as impor­
tant enough to be argued about.^
Let the arguments over Edwards' place in the history of psy­
chology begin here. He thrived on controversy and many of 
his ideas are still controversial and they are being "argued 
about." The purpose of this book, in a sentence, is to demon­
strate that these ideas were also the ideas of one Jonathan
^New Haven, 1959, p. 10.
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Edwards. "Gracious discoveries given in conversion," Edwards 
said over and over again, "are grasped with a sense of the 
heart." This doesn't sound very modern. Edwards' laboratory 
was a raucous frontier hotbed of fundamental religion, hardly 
comparable to the hermatetic, gadgeted cubicles of modern 
experimental psychologists. But Edwards also operated in a 
larger -laboratory, an abstract one that all great psycholo­
gists eventually inhabit: that mystical melding of observa­
tion and imagination known as the study of human nature. It 
is toward an interpretation of "gracious discoveries" and a 
"sense of the heart" for modern psychological sensibilities 
that this study is directed. The reader will discover, I 
hope, that the implications of this interpretation require a 
significant reconsideration of the standard conception of the 
history of American psychology.
But what about the phenomenon of Jonathan Edwards?
Is he not, it might be asked, a very special case, a genius 
whose olympian uniqueness makes studies such as this one 
equally unique? Possibly, but I doubt it. I have tried to 
drop a few hints, here and there, which suggest that the 
entire history of American psychology can, with profit, be 
viewed through the synthetic model. But the foot is hardly 
in the door; this general history cannot be written until 
detailed investigations are carried out within a context that 
accommodates the data and permits historical comparisons. This 
study attempts only to establish an oasis of coherence around 
Edwards, the most important but most misunderstood thinker in
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America before James. Robert Lowell said it simply but 
eloquently in his poem, "Jonathan Edwards in Western Massa­
chusetts." Edwards, he lamented,
. . . stood on stilts in the air.^
We shall now attempt to provide some "solid angularity" to 
what the historian of psychology A. A. Roback has called 
"the nebulous colonial days" by trying to determine just what 
Edwards was trying to say; by removing his stilts and demon­
strating, I hope, that scientific history need not be dry, 
trivial, or unnecessarily confusing. After all, good science, 
good art, and good history are none of these. Neither, cer­
tainly, was Jonathan Edwards.
^In For the Union Dead (New York, 1956), pp. 40-44.
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CHAPTER II
TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO PSYCHOLOGICAL 
THOUGHT IN PURITAN NEW ENGLAND
We live in an age whose thinking is dominated by 
scientific psychology. Modern children are said to experi­
ence oedipal complexes and stages which may or may not be 
subject to various conditioning techniques. The will of God 
and the nature of man, as they were formerly known, have been 
partitioned into countless psychological lieutenants which 
are discoverable only through a process confidently (or some­
times nervously) referred to as "science." There is a strong 
feeling prevailing among psychologists and historians of psy­
chology that the human mind and human behavior represent a 
microcosm of the Newtonian universe, whose laws may be 
revealed only through experimentation, statistical analysis, 
and Baconian induction. This view holds, following E. G. 
Boring, that all psychological thought which did not lead 
directly to Gustav Fechner1s application of psychophysical 
methods to the mind-body problem and Wilhelm Wundt's first 
experimental psychology laboratory shall be conceived as a 
sort of John the Baptist, preparing the way for the advent of 
scientific psychology.^ As one contemporary historian of
See Edwin G. Boring, A History of Experimental Psy­
chology. 2nd ed. (New York, 1950). Chapters 14 and 16 for 
Boring's influential assessment of the importance of Fechner 
and Wundt.
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psychology has put it, "The working psychology of today has 
surrendered its philosophical heritage in fact. It is time 
to surrender it in voiced principle a l s o . P h i l o s o p h i c a l  
thought beginning with Locke, or perhaps Hobbes, and early 
physiological investigations, especially those of Johannes 
Mueller, are seen in this perspective as two tributaries that 
led inevitably into a common stream of thought which culmi­
nated in the founding by Fechner and Wundt of psychology as a 
science.^ These events, the invention of Fechner's psycho­
physical methods and Wundt’s "founding" of experimental psy­
chology, symbolize psychology's birth and are said to obviate 
the 2,000 year European tradition of philosophical psychology 
that came before.
The History of Psychology in America
The dominant view of the history of European psy­
chology may thus be characterized for the most part as 
apocalyptic and progressionist. The history of American 
psychology is usually viewed in a slightly different way. It 
is apocalyptic, without a doubt: American psychology is
usually thought to have been born with the publication of 
William James' Principles of Psychology in 1890.^ It is
2Duane P. Shultz, A History of Modern Ps.vcholoq.v (New 
York, 1969), p. vii.
^See Boring, History, Chapter 2.
4
William James, Principles of Psychology, 2 Vols.
(New York, 1890).
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hardly progressionist, however. James, though an American, 
is usually characterized as European in spirit and as the 
American popularizer, critic, and integrator of the European 
(chiefly German) experimental work prior to 1890.^ It is 
quite safe to assume, in fact, that many, perhaps most, con­
temporary American psychologists would be incapable of identi­
fying a single person or publication of psychological impor­
tance in America in the two hundred sixty years of American 
thought before James. Pre-Jamesian, or pre-"scientific" 
psychology in America is thought of, if at all, as a myth.^ 
Reasons for the unwillingness of historians of psy­
chology to consider pre-Jamesian American psychological thought 
(assuming, for the moment, that such a phenomenon exists) are
It is slightly odd that James should continue to 
occupy so prominent a place in the history of American psy­
chology. Although he did apparently found America's first 
experimental psychological laboratory, almost incidentally as 
it were, and he is also responsible for the most comprehensive 
survey of the "new psychology" to 1890, he personally cared 
little for the fledgling discipline. He hated tedious labora­
tory work, and once characterized the new field as a "nasty 
little science." He held many of the German practitioners of 
laboratory psychology in utter disdain, once claiming that 
the only virtue of "brass instrument" psychologists like 
Fechner and Wundt was their affinity for tedious, boring, 
tinkering in labs. See R. B. Perry, The Thought and Character 
of William James. 2 Vols. (Boston, 1935).
^0f the recent general histories of psychology, only 
two give more than the merest mention of American psycho­
logical thought before James and the importation of the "new 
psychology" in the 1880s: Virginia Sexton and Hendryk Misiak,
History of Psychology: An Overview (New York, 1966), and
Gardner Murphy and Joseph K. Kovach, Historical Introduction 
to Modern Psychology. 3rd ed. (New York, 1972), each devotes 
approximately two pages to American psychology from 1630- 
1880.
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abundant. First, American thinkers of the seventeenth, 
eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries were not psychologists. 
Most were theologians whose discussions of psychology were 
ancillary to other theological purposes and issues. Modern 
psychologists look askance at the thinking of a quaint age 
whose "naivete" inclined them to utter dependence upon their 
conception of God. Except among theologians and church 
historians, American colonial theology appears to be a curio 
worthy of only a certain antiquarian respect. The proba­
bility that colonial theologians could have inherited, altered, 
devised, revised and fought over timeless psychological 
issues seems remote to historians of psychology, based on the 
attention thus far afforded the colonials. A barrier exists 
between them and the present; a barrier of assumptions, 
language, and purposes that is formidable. 5econd, the theo­
logians of America's first two and a half centuries were not 
scientific in the sense that psychologists from Fechner to 
the present have defined "scientific." Most did not formu­
late explicit psychological theories, generate testable hypoth­
eses, isolate salient independent variables in experimental 
situations, or attempt to state general laws of thinking and 
behavior based on experimentation.^ Many of them simply but 
carefully observed the conversion experiences of themselves
"^This was reinforced by the development of logical 
positivism bequeathed to psychology from late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century physics. 5ee Herbert Feigl and May 
Brodbeck, eds., Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New 
York, 1953).
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and their parishioners and tried to explain what happen in 
mind and body during a visitation of the Spirit. A few of 
these explanations, such as that of Jonathan Edwards, were 
developed into elaborate theories of the mind and human nature, 
while others remained only intellectual exercises of curious 
ministers. A third reason for contemporary ignorance of pre- 
Jamesian American psychology is that American theological 
thought was not an obvious contributor to either the European 
philosophical or physiological traditions which are generally 
believed to have led directly to Fechner, Wundt and beyond.
The usual interpretation of Wundt, who is usually given pri­
mary credit for establishing experimental psychology as an 
independent science, is that of an industrious German physiolo­
gist whose life's ambition was to discover the elusive mental 
elements of the British Empiricists from Locke to James Mill. 
Implicit in this view is the notion that America was a psycho­
logical backwater whose stagnation was relieved only after 
the Americans, G. Stanley Hall, James McKeen Cattell and 
others, escaped to Europe in the 1880s and later imported the 
new German psychology.
The dominant progressionist or vertical timeline 
approach to the history of psychology successfully condemns 
pre-Jamesian American psychology to a status of non­
existence, or at least superfluousness. Clearly, Fechner 
and Wundt could have claimed if they had wished, that the 
psychophysical methods would have been discovered and experi­
mental introspective psychology founded even if America had
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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still been populated exclusively by food-gathering tribesmen.^ 
It is literal science-fiction to claim that German experi­
mental psychology would hardly have been the same without 
Cotton Mather or Jonathan Edwards. In fact, the narrow pro­
gressionist view of the history of psychology condemns to 
oblivion all thinking that cannot be inserted as a causal 
link in the chain of scientific progress that led through 
Fechner and Wundt to the present. The ancient Greeks, 
Augustine, Aquinas, and numerous others are given short 
schrift because the extent of their "influence" upon Fechner 
and Wundt is too amorphous to be accurately assessed.^ This 
view, though chiefly associated with Boring, is by far the 
dominant one held by contemporary psychologists toward the 
history of their discipline. It is no doubt reassuring to 
twentieth-century psychologists, whose scientific status has
An apocryphal story, however, attributes Wundt's 
staggering productivity to his discovery of the American 
typewriter. Boring's (History. p. 322) authoritative denial 
of this claim destroys America's only apparent opportunity to 
demonstrate that the new German psychology was somehow 
indebted to her.
g
Boring's History. in addition to a number of his 
other historical papers, demonstrates a 'consuming interest in 
influences, i.e., who was so-and-so's student and who were his 
students, etc.; cf. Edwin G. Boring and Mollie D. Boring, 
"Masters and Pupils among the American Psychologists," Ameri­
can Journal of Psychology. 1 948, _61_, 527-534.
The subject of "influences" was sufficiently interest­
ing to Boring that discussions of professionalgeneaology often 
spilled over into non-psychological subjects. He lists, for 
instance, the twenty-five most illustrious students of G. 
5tanley Hall, and points out that "Hall's executive personality 
made him a practical psychologist, and thus an educational psy­
chologist, and thus a president. Do pupils take after their 
"master?" Boring asks. "Well," he replies, "the foregoing 
list contained in 1929 four college presidents, four college 
deans, and one superintendent of schools— a third altogether." 
(Boring, History. p. 546).
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often been held suspect by scientists of older disciplines, 
to believe that one's professional roots are deeply and 
exclusively embedded in a consciously "scientific" tradition.
Curiously, only professional psychologists and a few 
philosophers of science are apt to view the history of psy­
chology as an inexorable quest for a separate, scientific 
discipline. Asked to name history's greatest psychologist, a 
person from outside the formal discipline of psychology might 
reply Plato rather than Freud; Thomas Aquinas, rather than 
Wundt. It might be contended, for instance, that Plato's 
analysis of good and evil is at least as profound as Freud's 
while the Thomistic view of the mind, or soul as he (Thomas) 
preferred to call it, is more succinct and believable than 
Wundt's. While an open-minded contemporary psychologist or 
historian of psychology might be inclined to agree that per­
haps Plato and Thomas may have surpassed Freud and Wundt in 
certain respects, he would still be disinclined to revise 
his approach to the history of psychology. Plato and Thomas, 
though interesting, must remain professionally irrelevant to 
him. Neither did laboratory experiments, handled data, or 
even described clinical cases. Neither contributed to the 
establishment of an independent discipline of psychology 
which might be defined by a body of subject matter and 
methods of inquiry peculiar to itself.
It is obvious that those who claim to compare Plato 
with Freud and Thomas with Wundt "Psychologically" do not 
view the history of psychology as a teleological progression
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toward contemporary "scientific" syntheses. This other
broader, more interdisciplinary approach to the history of
psychology is associated with G. 5. Brett, and it is this
1 0
view which has been adopted in this study of Edwards. The 
three-volume History of Brett, a philosopher, was conceived 
under the assumption that psychology should not be defined in 
terms of the subject matter or methods of twentieth century 
psychology, but rather as a series of questions about human 
nature which have grown out of a variety of traditions of 
inquiry. He loosely divided these traditions into religious, 
medical, and philosophical. This approach might be called the 
human nature of conceptual approach to the history of psy­
chology and man, not a discipline, is the principle object of 
its inquiry.
Human nature is an immense topic to hoard in an 
undifferentiated form under the umbrella of the history of 
psychology. Man, obviously, is or is not many things: he has
free will or he does not; he is good or he is evil; he is 
rational or irrational, etc. Few historians of psychology, 
including Brett, have attempted to clearly delineate the 
types of questions which constitute a religious, medical, or 
philosophical inquiry into the nature of man. Few attempts,
^^G. 5. Brett, History of Psychology, 3 Vols. (London, 
1912-1921). Brett's monument has been compressed into a valu­
able one-volume abridged edition by R. 5. Peters (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1965). An enlightening introduction to and defense of 
Brett's human-nature approach to the history of psychology may 
be found in Peters' introductory chapter, "Theory, Policy, and 
Technology" (Peters, ed., pp. 25-36). The "Human Nature" 
approach is also taken by Robert I. Watson; see The Great Psy­
chologist: Aristotle to Freud (Philadelphia, 1972).
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that is, have been made by historians of psychology to iden-
1 1dify the dimensions of human nature. Thus, much history of 
psychology written from a human-nature point of view, is 
liberal to the point of transparency. It becomes impossible 
to differentiate the history of psychology from the history 
of all thought, a situation which can lead to extreme con­
fusion. A progressionist historian like Boring knows that 
psychology is whatever seems to flow through a historical, 
intellectual hourglass at whose narrow neck stand Fechner and 
Wundt. The added breadth of the conceptual historian is pur­
chased at a price. Neither he nor his reader knows, specifi­
cally, what he is talking about when he speaks of psychology.
Psychology on the Periphery of the New 
England Hind; Perry Miller 
The dilemma of the conceptual historian of psychology, 
of he who views psychology as a series of questions about 
human nature, is that it is extremely difficult to be his­
torically accurate and comprehensible to historically-minded 
behavioral scientists. Ideally, the historian should have 
exhaustive knowledge of his era of special interest and good 
facility with the contemporary psychological jargon and usage
^^The most important exception is Robert I. Watson, 
"Psychology: A Prescriptive 5cience," American Psychologist,
1 967, 2_2, 435-443. Many of the prescriptions which are said 
to characterize psychology represent various dimensions of the 
rather amorphous "human nature" studied by Brett. See Chapter
2 for a detailed summary of prescriptive theory and a demon­
stration of its usefulness in the study of Jonathan Edwards’ 
psychological theory.
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of his readership. Unless some agreed-upon conceptual scheme 
exists which can accommodate the historical theory and the 
modern viewpoint, the conceptual historian should be capable 
of providing the framework on his own. 5ince at present no 
widely-accepted conceptual scheme exists for the historian of 
psychology, the burden of striking a balance between anti­
quarian irrelevance and contextual larceny rests on the 
shoulders of the individual historian. Unfortunately, but 
perhaps not surprisingly, interpreters of the psychological 
views of American Puritanism, the tradition from which Edwards 
emerged, do not satisfy these rigorous and diverse requirements. 
Some, like Perry Miller, were intimately familiar with the 
Puritans and Puritanism but blissfully ignorant of modern psy­
chology and terribly sloppy in their usage of psychological 
1 2jargon. Others, such as A. A. Roback, have been competent
professional psychologists who apparently never read a word 
1 3
written by a colonial Puritan. Still another, J. W. Fay,
seems to have understood little about the Puritans and less 
1 4about contemporary psychology. This unfortunate situation 
must be reviewed briefly, not out of malice toward those 
brave scholars who have ventured wholeheartedly but half 
informed into American Puritan psychology, but because most
"*^Perry Miller, The New England Mind; The Seventeenth 
Century (Boston, 1961).
1 3
Abraham Aaron Roback, A History of American Psy­
chology (New York, 1964).
^ J a y  Wharton Fay, American Psychology Before William 
James (New Brunswick, N.J., 1939).
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of the deficiencies of Puritan psychological scholarship 
generally are also present in the more extensive work on 
Edwards. This review represents the beginning of a demon­
stration that a new approach to pre-Jamesian psychology in 
America is needed, and especially with regard to Edwards, its 
most important and provocative theorist.
It has been remarked that the historian cannot hope
1 5to get inside the "mind" of the Puritans. We believe 
events are caused by atoms, molecules, cells, gravity, Ids, 
Egos, and other unseen substances. The New England Puritan, 
on the other hand, attributed events to God, devils, angels, 
archangels, animal spirits, saintly intervention, and a host 
of other causal constructs.^ Probably no man ever succeeded 
in entering the forbidden ground inside the Puritan mind to 
extent that Perry Miller did. He claimed often, and arro­
gantly, to have read, digested and integrated everything of 
importance ever written by Puritans on both sides of the 
Atlantic. His books and articles are the starting point for 
every aspiring Puritan scholar; they are monuments of erudi­
tion, complexity, insight, creativity, and frustration. The 
density of his convoluted style has much in common with the 
expository form of Finnegan's Wake. Thoreau described Miller
^Herbert W. 5chneider, The Puritan Mind (Ann Arbor, 
1958), pp. 3-7.
^ S e e  Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1936), for the definitive summary of the 
medieval world view which was inherited by the New England 
Puritans.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
perfectly when he issued his dictum that a reader should take 
as long to read a book as it took the author to write it. In 
reading Miller's New England Mind, one simply must follow 
Thoreau's advice or drown in a sea of beautiful words.
Miller's analysis of Puritan psychology is confined
principally to a chapter on "The Nature of Man" in the New
1 7England Mind: The Seventeenth Century. Psychology,
generally speaking, is for Miller "a certain method of the 
soul," used to elucidate "the method of grace" (i.e., con­
version) There were no psychologists in Puritan New
England. There were, however, inventive scholars who were 
willing to employ a scholastic faculty psychology to explain
1 9the dualistic dilemma inherent in the conversion experience. 
Miller summarized the Puritan notion of the mechanics of con­
version in a manner that is more fanciful, yet also more con­
cise than typical Puritan expressions of the topic:
If original sin is a dislocation of the faculties, then 
regeneration must set them right again. If in nature 
the original sequence of sensation, common sense, fancy, 
reason, memory, will, and affection is now broken, it 
follows that in a converted nature the reflex must be 
reconstructed. When conversion was described in the 
vocabulary of psychology it became in effect a realign­
ment of twisted pulleys and tangled ropes, permitting the 
blocks once more to turn freely and the tackle to run
^ Seventeenth Century, pp. 239-279.
1BIbid.. p. 239.
1 9 See J. Rodney Fulcher, "Puritans and the Passions: 
The Faculty Psychology in American Puritanism." Journal of 
the History of the Behavioral Sciences. 1 973, 9_, 1 23-1 39, for 
an account, derived largely from Miller, of the scholastic 
origins of seventeenth-century Puritan psychological views.
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smoothly, in accordance with the first plan of the 
rigging.20
God was said to work through "means," i.e., through 
the mechanical organization of the faculties; and most 
importantly the work of regeneration consisted in a regenera­
tion of the rational faculty. A regenerated reason would be 
capable of rationally comprehending the will of God, although 
God, of course, remained sovereign and need not reveal His 
intentions even to a converted man. Reason was vitally 
important because the will, the passions, and all the other 
numerous faculties attributed to man were said to follow, for 
the most part, the dictates of the rational faculty. Thus 
Miller would hold that the "vocabulary of psychology," as he 
called the various hypothetical faculties, and views con­
cerning human nature, were inextricably intertwined. A 
theorist who emphasized the importance of the faculty of rea­
son in the conversion experience would necessarily hold that 
man is primarily a rational creature. A divine who claimed 
that the reorientation of the will and affections (or emotions) 
was central to conversion might be said to view man as pri­
marily emotional or irrational.
In holding that psychology is concerned with questions 
of human nature, Miller followed Brett. ^  It is unfortunate
that Miller did not go beyond Brett to provide an explicit
20
Miller, Seventeenth Century, p. 2B0.
^Mil l e r  probably derived his implicit view of psy­
chology directly from Brett. Miller's chapter on "The Nature 
of Man" contains more references to Brett than to any other 
secondary source.
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conceptual scheme with which to define and interpret psy­
chological views of human nature. With rare exceptions,
Miller was content to quote and catalogue each theorist's 
arrangement of or comments upon the faculties. The mind is 
portrayed somewhat like a jigsaw puzzle with hundreds of sets 
of directions. The "New England Mind," like any conglomerate 
construct, is complex, and Miller described that complexity 
in remarkable detail. Yet we normally do not need a guide to 
inform us that there are many trees in the forest, all 
slightly different from each other. We would rather be shown 
a path that leads through it. What, one must ask after read­
ing Miller's long chapter on "The Nature of Man," is_ the 
Puritan conception of the nature of man?
Instead of providing a synthesis of Puritan psy­
chology, Miller preferred to offer speculations concerning 
why the Puritan treatises were not very psychological in 
nature. This may appear odd since Miller also claimed that 
" . . .  in Puritan writing there are almost enough passing 
allusions to each part of the psychological reflex to furnish 
the material for extended c h a p t e r s . Y e t  speculation was 
Miller's forte, and his treatment of Puritan psychology is 
riddled with the implication that certain "unconscious" 
motives dictated the alledged scanty volume of Puritan psy­
chological inquiry. He indicates that the Puritans had a 
"vague sense" of the incongruities in their system, especially
“^ Miller, Seventeenth Century, p. 245.
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regarding the manner in which the conversion experience could 
be both "an irresistible seizure and a rational transaction."23 
Miller asked,
. . . was it possibly because they sense, however obscurely,
that there were further difficulties within it [their 
psychology] which, if exposed too openly, would raise 
uncomfortable queries in more important r e g i o n s ? 2 4
Was it, in other words, some vague sense of insecurity which
held the Puritans at arm's length from the systematic and
careful investigation which characterized most of their
intellectual endeavors?
Miller's flights of fancy into the unconscious moti­
vations of the Puritans are both literarily effective and 
intellectually frustrating. His detours far beyond the 
available evidence often are stimulating and productive of 
further investigation.23 The frustration occurs, however, 
when one attempts to evaluate the validity of some of his 
claims. There are two sources of frustration. First, in the 
case of Puritan psychology, the object of inquiry lacks even
23 Ibid., p. 287.
24 Ibid., p. 267.
2 5
Cf. my own response to Miller's innuendoes about an 
alleged "unconscious" conflict between Increase Mather and 
Salomon 5toddard in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries: James G. Blight, "Solomon Stoddard's Safety of
Appearing and the Dissolution of the Faculty Psychology." 
Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences. The usual 
interpretation of the antipathy between these two patriarchs 
involves their differing views over church polity, with Mather 
characterized as the old, hard-line Bostonian and Stoddard 
the rebellious frontiersman who was willing to let almost any­
one join his Northampton congregation. Miller contended that 
the conflict went deeper, down to the frightening (to Mather), 
irrational conception of man sketched in Stoddard's treatise,
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a simple definition. How can psychology, which by Miller's 
own admission is concerned with "The Nature of Man," be 
defined as a "certain method of the soul?" Neither the 
dimensions of human nature, nor the explicit relationship 
between human nature and the "method" is revealed. The 
flights of fancy, then, have no firm base from which to 
embark. When we are told that the Puritans unconsciously 
refrained from indulging in detailed analyses of psychology, 
we do not know what it was that they weren't doing. The 
second source of frustration is Miller's fertile imagination. 
He was attempted a sort of psychohistory devoid of the theo­
retical framework of psychoanalysis (or any other structure). 
Miller knew the New England mind better perhaps than anyone 
will every know it again. Yet Puritan psychology remains 
mostly shrouded in mystery because he lacked a conceptual 
scheme which could define psychology in a way that bridges 
the gap of centuries. He talked around the issues rather 
than to them. Some structure certainly would have helped 
prevent excursions into a historical Alice-in-Wonderland 
where nobody says what he thinks he said and no one's con­
scious motives are the functional o n es.^
The 5afety of Appearing. In my view, there is much evidence 
which supports Miller's interpretation.
^ □ n e  of Miller's most brilliant, and controversial 
students is Alan Heimert. In Religion and the American Mind; 
From the Great Awakening to the Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 
1966), Heimer, like Miller, often prefers to record and inter­
pret what he feels historical figures "meant" rather than what 
they said. This approach strikes some historians as a per­
version of historiography, and one critic's evaluation of
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The New England Mind on the Periphery of 
Psychology; Roback and Fay
Prior to the revival of interest in Puritanism early 
in this century, the very word "Puritan" had an unsavory con­
notation, even among scholars.^ Puritans were those nasty, 
narrowminded forebears of ours who attached scarlet letters 
to the chests of passionate young women, executed so-called 
"witches," dressed in black, and worried a lot about whether 
or not they were going to heaven. Their intellectual pin­
nacle was reached, it was often thought, with Michael Wiggle- 
worth's abominable poem, "Day of Doom," which described the 
road to hell as paved with the skulls of young children.
Perry Miller and his colleagues rejected this simple- 
minded, vindictive approach to the Puritans and attempted to 
meet them on their own terms and treat them as complex indi­
viduals who grappled with some of the most important intel­
lectual issues of their day. If Miller's analysis of the
Heimert might easily be applied to Miller, his mentor.
The world he offers us has been constructed by reading 
beyond the lines of what men said; and what he finds 
beyond the lines is so far beyond, so wrenched from the 
context, and so at odds with empirical evidence, that his 
world, to this reviewer at least, partakes more of fan­
tasy than of history.
From Edmund 5. Morgan in William and Mary Quarterly, 1967,
24, p. 459.
^ T h e  recent rejection of this view of the Puritan 
heritage began with Kenneth B. Murdock's Increase Mather; 
Foremost American Puritan (Cambridge, Mass., 1925), continued 
through the many works of Samuel Eliot Morison, and culminated 
in Miller. See Edmund S. Morgan, "The Historians of Early New 
England," in Ray Allen Billington, ed., The Reinterpretation 
of Early American History (New York, 1968), pp. 41-63.
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psychological system of the Puritans is of limited usefulness 
to a historian of psychology, it is because his approach 
lacks perspective and structure, not because Puritanism is 
perceived as a psychological wasteland, devoid of raw 
material.
No such claim can be made for the two remaining 
analysts of New England Puritan psychology whose work will be 
reviewed in this section: A. A. Roback and J. W. Fay. To
these writers, the Puritan revival never happened; the 
colonial New England intellectuals are objects of subtle 
scorn and curious amazement rather than serious scholarship. 
This is unfortunate because, unlike Miller, Roback was very 
knowledgeable about modern psychology and, had he therefore 
taken the Puritans seriously, he might have provided the con­
ceptual bridge which could have clearly elaborated Puritan 
psychology and presented it in a form comprehensible to con­
temporary historians.
Roback's attitude toward Puritan psychology is best
described as shallow, condescending amusement. There is no
indication that Roback ever read anything written by a colonial
Puritan.^ He mentions a few theses done at Harvard in the
seventeenth century which, along with William Brattles' logic
digest, are said to contain "a sprinkling of psychological
29facts, as they were then known." Just what these "facts"
^ Roback selects most of his information about Puritan 
psychology from the secondary accounts of 5. E. Morison.
29
Roback, History. p. 35.
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are, however, and what makes them "psychological" unfortunately 
remain unknown to the reader. His chief argument against the 
Puritans seems to be that they were religious, and that they 
therefore must have possessed an inferior system of psy­
chology.^ Speaking of the colonial Puritans, he wrote:
If psychology is handed down to us on a golden catechistic 
platter, then what need is there for seeking more infor­
mation? The definitions, vague and hazy, as they were, 
made sense to the students of the time, and saved them 
the bother of thinking . . .
It is clear that no empirical science could advance 
on the basis of postulates and definitions alone. So 
long as psychology remained the succubus of theology, as 
was the case throughout the seventeenth century and dur­
ing the early decades of the eighteenth century, it could 
only rest on the accepted authority of the past.^"1
Roback's conception of the history of psychology is a diluted 
compromise between Boring's progressionist approach and 
Brett's position that psychology should be defined as a series 
of questions concerning the nature of man. Roback was willing, 
like Brett, to consider the thought of many individuals out­
side the mainstream which led through Fechner and Wundt to 
twentieth-century experimental psychology. Yet instead of 
defining the history of psychology as past inquiries into 
human nature, Roback tends to evaluate colonial thinkers in a 
Boring-like fashion: in terms of the extent to which their
Roback also uses this implicit argument against 
contemporary Neo-Scholastic psychology in America (pp. 424- 
446). It is remarkable that he apparently saw no similarities 
between Puritan psychology and Neo-Scholasticism. Both, of 
course, employ a "faculty" psychology that they extract in 
almost unadulterated form, from Thomas Aquinas.
31
Roback, History, pp. 36-37.
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views approximate some trend or other in experimental psy­
chology. Thus, after haranguing "pastoral psychologist"
Cotton Mather for "taking stock in the absurdities of witch­
craft," Roback offers the backhanded compliment that he 
"managed to introduce some observation which could be con­
sidered psychological and which must have particularly 
impressed the listeners.1,32 The nature of the psychological 
views of Mather remains a mystery, for by definition almost, 
in Roback's confused scheme, neither Mather nor any of his 
contemporaries are permitted to have significant psycho­
logical views, Roback wished to elucidate the neglected psy­
chological thought of the "nebulous colonial days," as he 
calls the era, yet the thinkers of the period were religious 
men concerned with, among other things, the nature of man. 
Roback, on the other hand, viewed religion, or Christianity 
at any rate, as a plague on psychology, which he implicitly 
defined in terms of twentieth-century conceptions which pre­
vented him from obtaining even a glimmering of Puritan psy­
chology. Somewhere between these two, but certainly closer 
to Roback, stands J. W. Fay. His monograph demonstrates a 
much more careful reading of the sources than is shown by 
Roback, although it is admittedly sketchy when compared to 
Miller's exhaustive treatment.33 Yet if Miller looked forward 
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modern "Puritans," Fay, like Roback though to a lesser extent, 
looked back in American history in search of colonial "psy­
chologists." Fay states:
. . . the science had not yet taken shape, and ideas
which belong properly to that field [psychology] are 
disguised and hidden beneath a theological terminology 
that is most misleading. Intermidable discussions of 
"predestination," will be found to involve conceptions 
of the will, and the momentus question of "original sin" 
is weighted with consideration of heredity and the trans­
mission of original and acquired characteristics.^
There is a problem with this statement. Theological concerns 
are misleading only to the historian who ignores the theo­
logical context out of which the psychological ideas arose.
Fay, like Roback, attempted unsuccessfully to amalgamate the 
progressionist approach and the human-nature view. Their 
purposes, however, were quite different. Fay sought to prove, 
in effect, that the theological psychology of America's first 
two and a half centuries made important contributions to 
American psychology after William James. These early thinkers, 
Fay holds, were "strong in philosophical insight into some
of the most real and important problems of an empirical sci-
3 5ence, both introspective and behavioristic . . ." Roback's
confused assimilation of the progressionist and human-nature 
viewpoints, it will be recalled, came not to praise the 
religious psychologists, but to bury them.
In Fay's defense, it must be said that, although he 
did little to ameliorate Brett's dilemma concerning the
Ibid., p. 6.
35Ibid.. p. 169.
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dimensions of human nature and although like Boring he looks 
backward for antecedents, his book is far more valuable than 
Roback's. Unlike Roback, Fay was not a psychologist, but a 
philosopher. Like many philosophical students of psychology, 
he viewed modern psychology as in many respects coterminous 
with its philosophical roots. In this view modern psychology 
is just a new method for studying old problems like "will" or 
"the mind-body problem," and it is not the new method but the 
old problems that should occupy the focus of attention.^
Thus, when Fay looked backward into colonial Puritanism, he 
saw old friends where Roback saw only new enemies.
The Centrality of Jonathan Edwards
There are a number of fascinating parallels between
the lives and professional careers of Wilhem Wundt and
Jonathan Edwards. Both were sons of Protestant ministers,
ane each matured into an austere, industrious, combative
thinker. Wundt chose to alienate his most brilliant student,
Oswald KUlpe, rather than bend his own system to accommodate
37the "imageless thoughts" discovered at KUlpe'slaboratory,
Edwards chose virtual banishment to a frontier outpost in 
Stockbridge, Massachusetts rather than "cheapen" the
"^This general orientation toward psychology and its 
history is sometimes referred to as the philosophy of mind.
For a recent outline of this interdisciplinary outlook, see 
Stuart Hampshire, ed., The Philosophy of Mind (New York, 1966).
^ S e e  Boring, History, pp. 396-41 0, for an analysis of 
the differences between Wundt and KUlpe. Wundt's scathing 
denunciation of KUlpe's "School of psychology" is discussed by 
Robert I. Watson, Great Psychologists.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
36
requirements for membership in his Northampton congregation."^ 
Though neither was British, the philosophy of British Empiri­
cism, chiefly that of Locke, played a decisive role in the 
formulation of their mature theories. Wundt saw his task as 
the integration of empiricist philosophy with the experi­
mental methods of German physiology, while Edwards tried to 
unite Lockean empiricism with the Christian theology of 
Augustine and Calvin.
More important than these coincidental similarities 
is the manner in which certain intellectual historians have 
evaluated their importance. The hourglass is the appropriate 
metaphor for historians' judgement of both Wundt and Edwards.
To Boring, all psychological roads lead to, through,
and away from Wundt.
Wundt is the senior psychologist in the history of psy­
chology. He is the first man who without reservation 
is properly called a p s y c h o l o g i s t . ^
J. R. Trumbull's History of Northampton, 2 vols., 
(Northampton, Mass., 1898), provides a detailed account of 
this controversy; see also Dla Elizabeth Winslow, Jonathan 
Edwards (New York, 1940), pp. 241-267. Robert Lowell sees the 
controversy this way:
Yet people were spiders
in your moment of glory,
at the Great Awakening— "Alas, how many 
in this very meeting house are more than likely 
to remember my discourse in hell!"
The meeting house remembered!
You stood on stilts in the air, 
but you fell from your parish.
"All rising is by a winding stair."
From "Jonathan Edwards in Western Massachusetts."
3 9Boring, History, p. 316.
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"Descartes, Leibniz, and Locke on the philosophical side"
are included in Baring's narrative only because "the genetic
account requires the explanation of the new movement in terms
of its a n c e s t r y . L i k e w i s e ,  "almost all the new schools of
psychology have been founded as a protest against some one or
41
another characteristic of Wundt's psychology." Wundt is 
thus seen as a kind of narrow neck of the hourglass, inte­
grating material from diverse strains of thought into an 
intellectual system which became the standard of agreement 
and disagreement for generations.
To most historians of American theology Edwards, like 
Wundt, represents a synthetic culmination of the past who 
became a beacon light of the future. Most would still agree 
with George Bancroft's famous remark that "He that would know 
the workings of the New England Mind in the middle of the
last century and the throbbings of its heart, must give his
42
days and nights to the study of Jonathan Edwards." It has
been contended, for instance, that Edwards' synthesis of
Lockean empiricism and Calvinist theology contributed to the
development of a tradition of American fundamentalism, trans-
43
cendentalism, and even the American revolution. In addition,
^Boring, preface to first edition of the History (New 
York, 1929).
41 Boring, History, op. cit., p. 343.
42 Quoted in Alexander V. G. Allen, Jonathan Edwards 
(Boston, 1889), p. vi.
43
□n Edwards and the fundamentalist tradition, con­
sult William Warren Sweet, Revivalism in America (New York,
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the rise of the "New England Theology," an apologia for
Edwards written by his descendants (chiefly), served much the
same function as Wundt's psychology. Its doctrines were so
complex and its conclusions so objectionable to some that it
44
gave intellectuals something to argue over for generations.
The centrality of Edwards is no accident or bit of
historical fiction perpetrated by historians of theology.
Like Wundt, Edwards understood his mission; he knew what he
was up to. His self-appointed task was to restore New England
45Puritanism to its former purity. This would require stren­
uous disputations against deistic and Arminian types who were 
clamoring that man had a "free will." It would necessitate 
cleansing the churches of those who could not demonstrate 
publicly that they had been visited by the Holy Spirit. And 
most importantly, it would demand a skillful, delicate weaving 
together, in theory and in practice, of the traditional 
Puritan emphases upon heartfelt piety and the rational
1944) and Bernard A. Wisberger, They Gathered at the River 
(Boston, 1958). Perry Miller fills in the gaps between 
Edwards and the transcendental movement in "From Edwards to 
Emerson" in Errand into the Wilderness, pp. 184-203. The 
connection between Edwards "New Light" theology and preaching 
and the American Revolution is explored in Heimert, Religion.
44
Joseph Haroutunian, Piety Versus Moralism: The Pass­
ing of the New England Theology (New York, 1932).
45
This is the so-called "tragic" aspect of Edwards.
In general, this view of Edwards acknowledges his powerful 
intellectual gifts but regrets the alleged time-worn, dead 
issues to which he addressed himself. Edwards, it is held, 
yearned to recreate a medieval Bible commonwealth when he 
might have used his extraordinary gifts to foster the American 
importation of the European Enlightenment. Expressions of 
this view may be found in Peter Bay, A Loss of Mastery:
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intellect. As the storm of the Great Awakening was raging 
around and in Edwards, he recognized that the warring funda­
mentalists and rationalists represented traditional polari­
ties within Puritanism that needed to be united if the faith 
was to survive intact. In order to show that the act of 
faith, and in fact all human perception, is both rational and 
emotional, he needed to go beyond the traditional disjunctive 
faculty psychology he inherited and the Lockean psychology he 
adopted. Paul Conkin has commented upon "Edwards' belief in 
an unending but orderly creativity. This conception of the
universe might also be applied to Edwards himself; all of 
Edwards' thinking resembles an urgent quest for a Bergsonian 
creative synthesis.
The Problem of Describing Edwards 1 
Psychological Theory 
Unfortunately, Edwards' commentators have not been as 
creatively synthetic as he was. A careful analysis of secon­
dary interpretations of the psychological views of Edwards 
results in a loosely-organized confusion. We are asked, in 
effect, to appreciate Edwards for what he tried to say, 
rather than for what he said. Although it must seem odd 
indeed considering the volume of attention given Edwards, it
Puritan Historians in Colonial America (Berkeley, Calif., 
1966) and Vernon L. Parrington, The Colonial Mind (New York,
1927).
46
Paul Conkin, Puritans and Pragmatists (New York,
19 68), p. 52.
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is still unclear just what he said, psychologically. There 
are three principal reasons for the shadowy status of Edwards' 
psychology. First, Edwards' style of exposition is certainly 
no model of grace and clarity. He was groping for a way to 
say what he meant, sometimes expressing himself in the lan­
guage of Augustinian piety, sometimes through borrowed
Lockean terminology, and other times through a confusing 
47
combination of both modes. He lacked the linguistic tools 
which he needed to express his vision of an extraordinarily 
complex yet unified human mind, and human nature. Edwards 
cannot shoulder all the blame, however. Intellectual his­
torians simply have not been very interested in his psycho­
logical system. In most cases, brief discussions of Edwards' 
psychology are decidedly ancillary to other analyses of his 
"theory of beauty," "theology," or "p hilosop hical theology. 
Presumably, these historians have implicitly adopted Brett's 
approach to the history of psychology; Edwards' "psychology" 
is loosely defined as statements about mental constructs which 
reflect a view of human nature. Unfortunately, but not
^ S e e  Paul Ramsey's "Editor's Introduction" to 
Edwards' Freedom of the Will (New Haven, 1957) for a dis­
cussion which clarifies, to some extent, Edwards' confusing 
interchanges of terminology.
48
Clarence Faust and Thomas Johnson, eds., Jonathan 
Edwards: Representative Selections (New York, 1962), hold
that Edwards' psychology ("Edwards' view of human nature") 
provides the base for his system whose apex is his doctrine 
of grace. Nearly all analyses of Edwards' psychology are 
undertaken as footnotes to aspects of his system which lay 
between the base and the apex, such as the doctrines of 
depravity or virtue (p. xvi).
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surprisingly, the dimensions of human nature addressed by 
Edwards' psychology have never been elaborated. A final 
source of confusion over the description of Edwards' psy­
chology has been caused by an apparent misunderstanding of 
the nature of psychological theorizing.
Too often Edwards is treated as if he were merely a 
disputant who thrived on hair-splitting combat. This is a 
half-truth at best. Edwards' theory of psychology was revo­
lutionary and truly revolutionary theories do not merely
refute old views point-for-point, they completely redefine a 
49problem or area of interest. Sometimes, by approaching the 
problem from a different level of analysis, a theorist is 
able to accommodate views which formerly seemed irreconcilable. 
Instead of trying to make theoretical sense out of Edwards' 
apparent and remarkable contentions that man is, for instance, 
static and dynamic, free and determined, etc., the commentators 
have, like Edwards' contemporaries, th
49 This is certainly true in th 
The Copernican and Newtonian revolutio 
hardly be construed as arguments over 
quacies of Ptolemaic astronomy or Aris 
were, instead, complete reorganization 
the universe. They were, in a word, c
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revo________ .
cago, 1970) for an elaboration of scientific creativity in 
this context. More generally, Brewster Ghiselin speaks of 
creativity of the "higher, primary sort" as that which
alters the universe of meaning itself, by introducing 
into it some new element of meaning or some new order 
of significance, or more commonly, both . . . Whatever
its relation to the established universe of thought, the 
higher sort of creative action invariably brings into the 
mind an unfamiliar light.
"Ultimate Criteria for Two Levels of Creativity," in Frank 
Barron and Calvin W. Taylor, eds., Scientific Creativity: Its
Recognition and Development (New York, 1 963), pp. 42-43’. That
rown up their hands in
e natural sciences, 
ns, for example, can 
the empirical inade- 
totelian physics. They 
s of the conception of 
reative. See Thomas S. 
lutions. 2nd ed. (Chi-
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frustration. But in this instance also, the historians 
should not be unduly blamed for they, like Edwards, lacked a 
coherent theoretical structure into which they could appro­
priately place Edwards' psychology. It is a major contention
of this essay that such an appropriate, explicit structure
. , 50now exists.
The Debate Over Edwards 1 
Psychological Theory
Most of the confusion surrounding Edwards' psychology 
concerns two broad dimensions of human nature: (1) Is man a
functional, fully-integrated unity, or a well-oiled collec­
tion of complementary but disjunctive parts? (2) Is man pri­
marily proactive or reactive as he perceives and conceives 
aspects of the universe? It must be pointed out that commen­
tators upon Edwards' psychology have not dichotomized their 
dispute in this way; indeed there is no evidence that dif­
ferences of opinion have even been clearly perceived. This 
is to be expected since one must have some clear notion of 
"psychology" in mind, and a particular view toward that of 
Edwards, before he can determine that his definitional cri­
teria have been violated or his personal position attacked.
Edwards was endowed with extreme creativeness was clearly 
recognized by an early biographer, 5. E. Dwight:
These selections L"Notes on "the Mind"] not only evince 
uncommon clearness of perception, and strength of dis­
crimination, in the mind of Edwards, at that early age; 
but also prove that it had begun to be, in no mean degree, 
what it was afterwards, in a singular degree, CREATIVE. 
(Life of President Edwards. New York, 1830, p. 39).
^ S e e  Chapter 4.
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Those who thus far have presumed to describe and judge the 
psychology of Edwards have lacked both.
Man; An Integrated Unity or 
Collection of Parts?
It is curious that those historians who are least 
acquainted with Edwards have no trouble whatever in describing 
his psychology in a couple of brief remarks, categorizing him, 
and dispensing with him. According to Roback, "Edwards takes 
it for granted that there are only two departments of the 
mind: (1) understanding, or as we would call it, cognition
(2) volition and affection,"^
Fay agrees with Roback; "Edwards follows the scho­
lastic division or mental operations into cognitive and
52
appetent." In classifying Edwards' psychology as "scho­
lastic," Roback and Fay deny, in effect, that Edwards upheld 
the unity or integrity of the self. The Puritan version of 
Thomistic psychology had the human mind (or soul) divided 
into separate, interacting, but functionally autonomous 
entities. This was especially true of the intellect and the 
w i l l . ^  Even today, psychologists speak of emotional people 
51
Roback, History, pp. 46-47.
“^ Fay, American Psychology, p. 43.
53
Norman 5. Fearing, "Will and Intellect in the New 
England Mind," William and Mary Quarterly, 1 972, 24_, 51 5-558. 
This is a valuable article. It contains the only systematic 
attempt to point out the many psychological similarities 
between Edwards and Augustine. Yet Fearing, like the other 
commentators, draws a too simplistic picture of Edwards (and- 
Augustine's psychological views), claiming that Edwards and
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or rational people, but few would claim, as did the Puritans,
that the sources of these human expressions are physiological
globules called "reason" and "will." They would not hold,
with many scholastic Puritans, that there are acts which are
54purely rational or purely emotive. Roback and Fay place 
Edwards squarely in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition.
All people, and especially scholars, love to "explain" 
via classification. Since Adam, men have felt vaguely uncom­
fortable in the presence of a phenomenon until they have 
named it. Scholastic and Kantian psychological categories 
still exert a tremendous influence on psychological thought, 
and ethologists have renewed the old pastime of categorizing 
organisms according to their instincts. A number of his­
torians, however, the vast majority of recent Edwards scholars, 
believe that Edwards was one of those rare thinkers who chose 
to remain uncomfortably ambiguous rather thanapply artificial, 
scholastic-like distinctions to the human m i n d . ^  Yet in his
Augustine merely emphasized will (and emotions) while others, 
from Aquinas to Chauncy, emphasized intellect. See Chapters 
3 and 4 for a treatment of these men and their psychological 
theories in a very different context.
54
Cf. Albert Ellis, Reason and Emotion in Psycho­
therapy (New York, 1962), Peter Lindsay and Donald Norman, 
Human Information Processing (New York, 1972), Chapter 17.
^ Those who would agree that Edwards avoided a scho­
lastic-like dichotomization of the mind include Perry Miller, 
Jonathan Edwards (New York, 1949) and "Jonathan Edwards on a 
Sense of the Heart," Harvard Theological Review, 1 948, 41 , 
123-145; Douglas J. Elwood, The Philosophical Theology of 
Jonathan Edwards (New York, 1960); Roland Delattre, Beauty 
and Sensibility in the Thought of Jonathan Edwards (New Haven, 
1968); Conrad Cherry, The Theology of Jonathan Edwards (New 
York, 1966); Faust and Johnson, Selections: Alan Heimert,
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attempt to preserve the unity of the mind Edwards faced an 
insurmountable difficulty. The very language he used to 
express himself was the disjunctive terminology of faculty 
psychology. Puritan psychological theology had always empha­
sized either the reason or the volition in conversion in 
spite of the conviction that the whole man must obviously be 
involved. Conrad Cherry mentions, for instance, Thomas 
Shepard as a proponent of the reason and William Ames as an 
advocate of the w i l l . ^  Cherry describes Edwards' dilemma 
this way:
Edwards was thus handed by his theological forbears a 
clear effort to account for personal unity in the act 
of faith, but he was also handed a way of accounting for 
that unity which continually frustrated the effort. With 
man so divided into distinct faculties, the temptation 
was to describe the nature of the faith-act in terms of 
their distinct operations rather than in terms of the 
unity of the human subject.57
The "way" referred to by Cherry is, of course, the doctrine
of the separate faculties. It is clear that few could resist
the temptation to break down the mind of man into distinct
parts and to emphasize the importance of one or another of
these quasi-mythological entities. Whether or not their
readership agreed with them was, in a sense, unimportant. At
least writer and reader understood each other.
Religion, and introduction to Heimert and Perry Miller, eds., 
The Great Awakening (New York, 1967); Haroutunian, Piety Ver­
sus Moralism; Conkin, Puritans; and John E. Smith, "Editor's 
Introduction" to Edwards' Treatise on the Religious Affections 
(New Haven, 1 959 ) .
"^Cherry, Theology, pp. 12-13.
57Ibid.. p. 14.
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There have been a few thinkers, however, who have
resisted the temptation to partition man and hence have never
been clearly understood. Augustine and Locke are two of these
brave ambiguous who were important influences upon Edwards.
The doctrines of Augustine had always been an important part
of Puritan piety and he came to Edwards' special attention
through the writings of a Dutch theologican, Peter van 
59Mastricht. Augustine held that the rational and emotive
capacities operate in a unified, inseparable fashion.
For there are some things which we do not believe unless 
we understand them, and there are other things which we 
do not understand unless we believe them.
. . . Our understanding therefore contributes to the
comprehension of that which it believes, and faith con­
tributes to the belief of that which it comprehends.^
Locke, whose terminology is to be found throughout Edwards'
works, also registered his objection to an artifically-
dichotomized human mind. In a famous passage he sarcastically
remarked :
The issue concerning the nature of Edwards' princi­
ple sources is a large and complex one. Those who view 
Edwards' sources as biblical or church oriented generally view 
Edwards as a Medieval man. Others, particularly Perry Miller, 
feel that Edwards' greatest debt is to Locke and Newton. The 
"Medievalist" viewpoint is forcefully advanced by Vincent 
Tomas in "The Modernity of Jonathan Edwards," New England 
Quarterly, 1 952, 2_5, 60-84. The "modernist" interpretation 
is in Miller, Jonathan Edwards.
59 Peter von Mastricht, A Treatise on Regeneration. 
Extracted and translated from the Theoloqia Theoretico-Practica 
(New Haven, 1770).
^Aurelius Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, CXVIII, 
Sermones XVIII, 3, quoted in Elwood, Philosophical Theoloqv. 
p. 113.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
Far, if it be reasonable to suppose and talk of faculties 
as distinct beings that can act, (as we do, when we say 
the will orders, and the will is free,) it is fit that 
we should make a speaking faculty, and a walking faculty, 
and a dancing faculty . . . And we may as properly say
that it is the singing faculty sings, and the dancing 
faculty dances, and that the will chooses or that the 
understanding conceives.^
Locke, and later Edwards, reduced the ponderous list of
faculties to two, understanding and will, which Locke viewed
The group of scholars who believe that, to Edwards, 
the mind is an integrated rational-emotive unity generally 
portray Edwards’ attempt to express this unity as a little 
more comprehensible than Augustine and a little less compre­
hensible than Locke. One theologian has stated that:
He [Edwards] agreed with Locke that we should not attempt 
to divide the mind into separate compartments, but simply 
recognize the several interacting mental processes. But 
Edwards perceived more than this. He saw an aesthetic 
element in every act of understanding as well as a cogni­
tive element in every act of will.63
That is, Edwards went beyond Locke to Augustine in asserting
that mental processes do not only interact but they are
rational and emotional components of a superordinate, unified
mental process.
While Augustine's vision is incisive and vast, his 
explanations are intuitive rather than explicit. Most
61
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
2 vols, ed. by A. C. Fraser (New York, 1959), II, xxi, 17.
63_
Elwood, Philosophical Theology, p. 114.
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scholars give Edwards credit for at least trying to explain 
what he meant. Edwards called the end product of this uni­
fied process "a sense of the heart."
I say, a sense of heart; for it is not speculation 
merely that is concerned in this kind of understanding: 
nor can there be a clear distinction made between the two 
faculties of understanding and will, as acting dis­
tinctly and separately, in this matter. When the mind is 
sensible of the sweet beauty and amiableness of a thing, 
that implies a sensibileness of sweetness and delight in 
the presence of the idea of it.
And yet there is the nature of instruction in it; as 
he that hasperceived the sweet taste of honey, knows much 
more about it, than he who has only looked upon and felt 
of it.64
Ultimately, however, Edwards' concept of "a sense of the 
heart" is not more useful than Augustine's complete reliance 
on the intuitive powers of his reader. Edwards is rigidly 
confined to the faculty language. All the "taste" metaphors 
imaginable do not obviate the fact that "heart" is a simple 
synonym for will-affections, a disjunctive structural unit. 
Metaphors are useful only for providing an intuitive under­
standing of explicit explanations. Without those explnations, 
understanding will never be more than intuitive and con- 
j ectural„
Until now, no scholar has made a serious attempt to 
rescue Edwards from his quandary. To Roback and Fay, of 
course, Edwards is in no dilemma; he fits neatly into the 
traditional faculty mold. This view, however, is very super­
ficial and, as we shall see in chapter 5, wrong. Historians
Jonathan Edwards, A Treatise Concerning the 
Religious Affections, ed. by J. E. Smith (New Haven, 1959),
p. 272.
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who know Edwards have concluded that his vision of a unified 
mind does not at all fit the faculty mold. What mold, then, 
does the unified view of Edwards fit?
Does Edwards represent a Whorfian situation in which 
the language of psychology is devoid of concepts which might 
be used to explicate Edwards' ideas?^^ Dr is the present psy­
chological system a function of historians' failure to notice 
that Edwards is part of a select but old tradition in psy­
chology, and that a relatively more precise and suitable 
language now exists to describe that tradition of psychologi­
cal thought? The latter is more likely.^ Even the convo­
luted, metaphorical brilliance of Perry Miller fails to shed 
any light on the topic:
In Edwards' "sense of the heart" there is nothing tran­
scendental; it is rather a sensuous apprehension of the 
total situation. And what makes an idea in the total 
situation important for man, as the idea taken alone can 
never be, what makes it in that context something more 
than an inert impression on passive clay, is man's appre­
hension that for him it augurs good or evil. It is, in 
short, something to be saluted by the emotions as well as 
by the intellect.67
Miller, and this is true of the other historians, says nothing
that Edwards himself does not say. What is meant to be
explanation is only paraphrase.
^Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought, and Reality 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1956).
^ S e e  chapters 3 and 4.
67
Miller, "Sense of the Heart," p. 127.
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Man: Proactive, Reactive, or Both?
In 1 949 Perry Miller, though hardly a mathematician,
derived an equation which cast Edwards' scholarship into a
state of immediate confusion and controversy. Among the many
remarkable contentions in his "intellectual" biography of
Edwards, Miller claimed that, psychologically speaking,
Edwards equals Locke.
The mind of Edwards . . . was trained by the doctrine of
New England, in which it had always been held that man 
is passive in the reception of grace and that he is bound 
to sin if he tries to earn salvation by his own efforts 
or on his own terms. Was it not precisely here that the 
new metaphysics and the old theology, the modern psychology 
and the ancient regeneration, came together in an exhila­
rating union? The whole reach of the vision unfolded 
before Edwards as he read Locke's innocent observation that 
simple ideas, "when offered to the mind, the understanding 
can no more refuse to have, nor alter when they are 
imprinted, nor blot them out and make new ones itself, 
than a mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the images 
or ideas which the objects set before it do therein pro­
duce . "
The empirical passivity became for Edwards, in the 
context of eighteenth-century New England, not an invita­
tion to lethargy, but a program of action.68
Miller was a historical missionary who spent much of his
career trying to convince his readers that New England
colonial religious thinking is "modern" rather than "medieval."
Thus Miller holds that much of the thinking of the seventeenth
century New England theologicans can be traced to European
Rennaissance Neo-Platonism and that Jonathan Edwards, the
greatest Puritan, derived his world view from Newton and his
psychological views from Locke, "the father of modern
^Miller, Edwards. p. 57.
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psychology. There is a sense in which Miller is justified
in asserting that Locke is "the father of modern psychology."
Locke's central doctrine, his picture of man presented in the
Essay, is that of a passive, reactive creature who merely
responds to impinging stimulation. The mind, to Locke, is
like a sheet of "white paper" which is written upon by
"EXPERIENCE. The "simple ideas" were said to be products
71of the reactive association of incoming sensations. In
some respects a strict "tabula-rasa" associational interpre-
72
tation of Locke is a caricature of his thought. Yet it was 
this view of man that passed from Locke to the British Empiri­
cists (or associationists) , to Wund and into the early psy­
chological laboratories of Germany and America, and perhaps 
even to B. F. Skinner.
69Ibid.. p. 72.
^Locke, Essay, II, i, 2.
^  Ibid., II, xxxiii.
72 Locke's chapter on the association of ideas was not 
added to the Essay until 170D, in the fourth edition; thus it 
may be treated, as Watson puts it, merely "as an appendix to 
the rest of his thinking" (The Great Psychologists, p. 187). 
And, of course, Locke had a great deal to say about the manner 
in which the mind actively constructs complex ideas; cf.
Essay. II, xxii, 2, and II, xiii. Edwards, however, seems to 
have extracted from Locke only the latter's passive sensa­
tionalism. We shall see in chapter 5 that Edwards' proactive 
position goes much further than Locke's admission that the 
mind reflects on data derived through the senses. Edwards 
held that the selective capacity of the "active powers" of 
the mind actually determines which information is eventually 
processed. It seems much more plausible to attribute this 
Edwardsean principle to the Augustinian tradition rather 
than Locke.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
52
In part, William James dedicated his opus to demon­
strating the superficiality of the "'associationist' schools" 
who
seek common elements in the divers mental facts rather 
than a common agent behind them [such as a "faculty"], 
and to explain them constructively by the various forms 
of arrangement of these elements, as one explains houses 
by stones and bricks.73
Clearly, James chose not to conceive of man as an inert
"house" composed of substances which were merely applied by
some external force.
Where did Edwards stand on this crucial issue? On the
one hand is a group of scholars who follow Miller's assertion
that "he [Edwards] adopted the sensational psychology with a
74consistency that outdoes the modern behaviorist." Faust
and Johnson, for example, maintain that neither the "will"
nor the "understanding" described by Edwards is capable of
intiating any sort of physical or mental activity. While the
imposition of the discrete faculty constructs upon Edwards’
system is erroneous (see previous section), their intent is
clear. They wish to prove that Edwards followed Locke in
asserting that man is a passive lump of clay. They maintain
that Edwards held, with Leibniz and Locke, that the mind is
moved by the strongest motive:
Edwards was obviously anxious to exclude any notion 
of independent activity an the part of the will. As he 
saw it, the will was purely passive.^
73 James, Principles, I, p. 1.
"^Miller, "Sense of the Heart," p. 124.
"^Faust and Johnson, Selections, p. XLVI.
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Moreover,
. . . in Edwards’ view the understanding, dependent as
it was upon the senses— natural and supernatural— , was 
purely passive.76
Thus a verbal picture is painted of a man whose actions in 
the world and his perception of it are totally a function of 
external events.
Much of the case for the Edwards-Locke psychological 
equation rests upon Edwards' adoption of some Lockean termi­
nology. Most importantly, Edwards sometimes referred to the 
presence of the divine and Supernatural light of the Holy 
5pirit as a "new simple idea."^ To Locke, a "new simple 
idea" represented the culmination of a passive process, and 
it is assumed that Edwards adopted Locke's essential meaning 
along with the terminology. Thus Edwards is said to have con­
ceived of the conversion experience as a completely passive 
reception of the Spirit. Although the topic is still a matter 
of some conjecture, it seems clear that Edwards viewed the 
faith-act as the prototype of all human perceptual acts 
rather than as an experience which required a unique "super-
Ibid.. p. xlvii.
77r- ■ .For instance:
I say, if God produces something thus new in a mind, 
that is perceiving, thinking, conscious thing; then 
doubtless something entirely new is felt, or perceived, 
or thought; or which is the same thing, there is some new 
sensation or perception of the mind which is entirely of 
a new sort, and which could be produced by no exalting, 
varying or compounding of that kind of perceptions or 
sensations which the mind had before; or there is what 
some metaphysicians call a new simple idea. [italics 
mine ]
Edwards, Affections. p. 205.
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tion may therefore defend the position that Edwards was, in 
all essential respects, a Lockean who merely happened to focus 
his attention on a particular kind of perceptual act, the 
conversion experience.
No one would deny Edwards' emphasis on man as a
reactive,passive creature. In the Calvinist scheme of things
nobody has the wherewithal to save himself. "God . . . holds
you over the pit of hell," Edwards preached in the bone-
rattling sermon for which he is best known, "and yet it is
nothing but His hand that holds you from falling into the 
79fire every moment." It is obvious that a psychological 
doctrine which emphasized man's passivity, such as Locke's, 
would hold tremendous appeal to a Calvinist predestinarian 
like Edwards. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, a number of scholars 
see in Edwards a somewhat muted emphasis on man's active per­
ceptual abilities in addition to the obvious Lockean passivity. 
Although they have experienced great difficulty in expressing
Some scholars believe that the conversion experience, 
in Edwards' view, involved a perceptual process which is 
qualitatively different from that used in mundane perception. 
Some hold the apposite view; that Edwards' saw no qualitative 
differences between the perceptual apparatus' supernatural 
and natural perception. The former viewpoint is expressed in 
Paul Helm "John Locke and Jonathan Edwards: A Reconsideration,"
Journal of the History of Philos ophy, 1 969, _B, 51-61; the 
latter view may be found in Cherry, Theology, pp. 27-33. The 
bulk of the evidence supports the latter view (see chapter 5).
79
"Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God"; sermon 
preached at Enfield, Conn., July 8, 1741. In S. E. Dwight, 
ed., The Works of President Edwards, 10 vols. (New York,
1 830); v. 7, pp. 1 63-1 77.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
55
the precise manner in which Edwards conceived man as both 
active and reactive, each of these commentators rejects the 
view that Edwards 1 psychology can be reduced to that of 
Locke.
Commentary on the thought of Edwards has gone through 
a number of phases. During his own lifetime his contempo­
raries seemed most interested in his emphasis on emotional 
religion. Later, from 1770-1850, many theologians argued 
over haw to counter Edwards' formidable defense of determinism. 
Around the turn of the twentieth century, interest centered 
on the origins of Edwards' early "idealism," especially upon 
whether or not he had read Berkeley. At approximately the same 
time, in 1 889, A. \l. G. Allen offered the first, and in many 
respects still the most successful, attempt to describe 
Edwards' psychological views.^ According to Allen,
What we call psychology was to him [Edwards] an 
unknown science, and yet no modern psychologist could 
have laid more stress upon the importance of observing 
the different phases of human experience. In this study, 
his conception of inspiration or revelation enabled him 
to move with perfect freedom. The same spirit which 
clarified the vision of apostles or prophets was now 
illuminating the minds of the common people with a divine 
supernatural light.
This statement was made the year before the appearance of
James' watershed Principles, before "psychology" began to be
equated, by most educated persons, with the experimental
endeavors of the German, Wundt, and his American disciples.
Allen himself, like Edwards, could "move with perfect freedom"
^Allen, Jonathan Edwards.
81 Ibid.. p. 144.
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in conceiving a system of psychology ("the different phases 
of human experience") existing within and augmenting a large 
theological superstructure ("his conception of inspiration or 
revelation"). This approach is very similar to Brett's, 
especially the manner in which Brett extracts psychological 
ideas from what he calls the "Christian, Ethico-Religious
r i • t • „82T radition."
Allen was, of course, aware of Locke's influence upon 
Edwards, but he minimized its importance. The commentary of 
Allen was written long before Perry Miller had formally 
stated the Edwards-Locke psychological equation.
The intellectual impulse came from the philosophy of 
Locke, whose Essay on the Human understanding Edwards read 
when he was but fourteen years old. The impression it 
left upon his mind was a deep and abiding one. But even 
in his early adherence to the sensational philosophy he 
was still himself, independent, accepting or rejecting in 
accordance with an inward dictum which sprang from the 
depth of his being. Locke was after all the occasion 
rather than the inspiring cause of his intellectual activ­
ity. Had he read Descartes instead, he might have reached 
the same conclusion.^
This is a remarkable contention when one considers that the
Lockean tabula rasa and Cartesian innate ideas are usually
placed at opposite poles. ^
Although Allen's conception of psychology is vague, 
it is clear that he saw in Edwards' psychological system a
^Brett, History (Peters, ed.), chapter VII.
^^Allen, Edwards, p. 5.
®^Cf. Watson, Great Psychologists, pp. 135-216 and 
Richard Lowry, The Evolution of Psychological Theory (Chicago, 
1971), pp. 5-23. Miller also speaks of the "Lockean victory 
over innate ideas" ("Sense of the Heart," p. 125).
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view of man which included far more than the Lockean lump of 
clay. In each of its two phases the conversion experience 
was said to consist of both reaction to the divine light and 
self-initiated action on the part of the convert. Allen 
calls Edwards' first phase "the tragic element in the pro­
cess" or "the realization of an awful danger and the impor­
tance of speedy escape."^ Allen contends that Edwards' view 
of this stage of awakened consciousness "appeared like a 
great struggle with some hostile power, as of a serpent dis­
turbed or enraged. A struggle is hardly a passive reception
of anything; it connotes activity of the most vigorous sort.
Not only must the devil be actively discouraged, however, but 
the Spirit must be actively encouraged. In the second stage 
of awakening, one must perceive his own impotence and a need 
for divine mediation. The struggling convert's eventual 
regeneration is, of course, dependent on God's merciful 
infusion of his Spirit; in that respect, man is passive. Yet 
God treads only where he is made welcome. As Allen reads 
Edwards, "we get a confused picture in which the consciousness 
of sin in the sight of God leads the sufferer in various ways 
to seek relief. "87
The "confused picture" derived from Edwards by Allen 
demonstrates remarkable honesty as well as insight. Allen,
88Allen, Edwards, pp. 1 44-1 45.
86Ibid.. p. 145.
B7Ibid. . p. 146.
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and many others, have been bewildered by Edwards' apparent 
attempt to show that man is both proactive and reactive in 
the act of faith; that he is and is not instrumental in his 
own conversion. Edwards did not state his case clearly and 
neither have his commentators.
Allen wrote in 1889 and, in a sense, his task was 
relatively easy. He did not have to contend with Perry 
Miller and the Edwards-Locke equation. Arguing with Perry 
Miller can be very difficult and frustrating indeed. There 
is an argumentative edge combined with a Madison Avenue 
erudition in much of Miller's work that can produce a streak 
of caution in even the boldest scholar.^ Recently, however, 
Miller's Edwards-Locke psychological equation has begun to be 
qualified, most importantly by Claude A. S m i t h . I t  is 
Smith's stated purpose to "advance the discussion of Edwards' 
relation to the thought of Locke a step beyond the treatment 
accorded it by Perry Miller" by showing that "Edwards was
In what may be the most balanced evaluation of 
Miller yet published, Peter Gay (A Loss of Mastery) openly 
concedes Miller's greatness as a historian while lamenting his 
tendency to over-write, and his "overly" fertile mind. Yet 
Miller's brashness, his bullish approach to writing and his 
often indiscriminate ejaculation of ideas onto the printed 
page, were born of necessity. He almost singlehandedly 
revived Puritan scholarship and, in the process, gave it a 
thousand new directions.
®^Claude A. Smith, "Jonathan Edwards and 'the Way of 
Ideas,'" Harvard Theological Review, 1 966, 5_9, 1 53-1 73.
See also the following for a reassessment of the rela­
tionship between Edwards and Locke in other contexts: Leon
Howard, ed.f "The Mind" of Jonathan Edwards": A Reconstructed
Text (Berkeley, Calif., 1 963); Edward H. Davidson, "From Locke 
to Edwards," Journal of the History of Ideas, 1 963, 2A_, 355- 
372; and Jonathan Edwards: The Narrative of a Puritan Mind
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farced to go beyond Locke's analysis, in order to do full
90justice to the richness of his experience. In Smith's 
view, Edwards saw man as considerably more than tabula rasa; 
the mind had active as well as passive powers. It was 
obvious to Edwards, according to Smith, that neither our per­
ception of the natural nor the supernatural is a function of 
random glances. There are, as Edwards put it, "rules of
harmony and regularity" that may be observed in all per- 
91ceptual actso In other words, perception is selective. 
Conrad Cherry, who finds the sources of Edwards' psychology 
in Solomon Stoddard and Augustine as well as Locke, describes
Edwards' concept of perception rather cryptically as "active
• • „ 92receiving."
Did Edwards follow Locke all the way or didn't he? 
Those who agree with Miller say that he did and that Edwards 
thus conceived of man as a simple, passive creature, waiting 
patiently to be written upon by the pen of God directly, or 
indirectly by the constituents of God's universe. For those 
who have sought to qualify the Edwards-Locke psychological 
equation, either before or after it was formally written, the 
task of characterizing Edwards' psychology is not so easy.
(Boston, 1966); Paul Helm, "Locke and Edwards," in Helm, ed., 
Treatise on Grace and Other Writings (Cambridge, England,
1971 ).
gn
Smith, "Way of Ideas," p. 154.
91
Jonathan Edwards, "Notes on the Mind" (No. 1), in 
Harvey G. Townsend, ed., The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards 
from His Private Notebooks (Eugene, Ore., 1955), p. 26.
^2Cherry, Theology, p. 19.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
60
It is one thing to say that Edwards went beyond Locke, but • 
quite another to explain where, exactly, he went. The problem 
is very similar to that faced by those who characterize 
Edwards' view of man as a rational-emotive unity. In each 
case, attempts to explain Edwards' view of man have resulted 
in redundant paraphrase. Allen maintains that "needs" are 
related to the perceptual "struggle," Smith talks of "rules" 
that govern the process, and Cherry speaks paradoxically of 
"active receiving." The complexity of Edwards1 thought 
requires that his view of man be characterized as a rational- 
emotive unity and as both proactive and reactive. But this 
is speaking in riddles. What is needed is a believable psy­
chological model that will incorporate each pair of seeming 
polar opposites into a coherent scheme. Edwards didn't have 
one and neither have his commentators, but one is needed to 
unravel Edwards, the psychological paradox.
The Problem of Interpreting 
Edwards' Psychology
The problem of describing Edwards' psychological 
views is indeed a difficult one for those commentators who 
have failed to carefully construct an appropriate historical 
scheme of psychology into which Edwards can be inserted. The 
consensus is that Edwards was not a faculty psychologist who 
postulated mythical constructs in an effort to explain human 
behavior. Likewise, there is a rising tide of scholarly 
opinion which holds that Edwards somehow transcended the
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traditional proactive-reactive dichotomy and viewed human 
perception as some sort of active-receiving. Much comment on 
Edwards' psychology has, therefore, resulted in a sterile 
admiration of his uniqueness. We know that he disagreed 
with the psychological views of his contemporaries to such 
an extent that he experienced great difficulty in expressing 
himself intelligibly. The essence of Edwards' psychology, 
and most have agreed intuitively that the essence is very 
profound, must remain a mystery until an implicit adoption of 
Brett's human nature approach to the history of psychology is 
transformed into explicit principles, and until a model of 
human behavior is provided which can incorporate the para­
doxical Edwardsean concepts into a coherent unity.
□ne may wonder, in light of all the confusion and 
ignorance concerning Edwards' psychological system, why any­
one would try to interpret his psychology. Why, in other 
words, would a scholar be inclined to try to place Edwards in 
the overall perspective of the history of psychology and to 
compare his views with modern, non-theological psychologists. 
The answer lay somewhere in the confidence, or foolhardiness, 
of otherwise competent scholars who are blissfully ignorant 
of the precise nature of Edwards' views and of twentieth- 
century psychology. They have been free to rely upon their 
creative imagination to produce farfetched analogies with 
little fear of criticism from their colleagues who, like them­
selves, know little of the ground from which the analogies 
have been fetched.
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Consider Perry Miller. His position as the pre­
eminent Puritan scholar is universally acknowledged and, 
although his writing was often brash, argumentative, and one­
sided, he usually based his arguments on extensive data. In 
his interpretation of Edwards' psychology, however, Miller 
extends his claims far beyond what the data, or even the 
reader's imagination, will allow. In his controversial 
"intellectual" biography of Edwards, Miller's affection for 
mysteries takes on an almost pathological intensity. Strange­
ness is everywhere; Edwards never meant what it seems he 
meant. Hidden meanings abound.
So his second publication ["A Divine and Super­
natural Light . . ."] like his first-and his last-contains
an exasperating intimation of something hidden. There is 
a gift held back, some esoteric divination that the 
listener must make for himself. Edwards' writing is an 
immense cryptogram, the passionate oratory of the revival 
no less than the hard reasoninq of the treatise on the
will.93
Although the language is excessively dramatic, the message is 
sound. This essay represents an attempt to translate the 
psychological aspects of the Edwardsean "cryptogram." Despite 
this confession of ignorance, however, Miller later can claim
. . . though he defeated himself by employing the very
term ["faculty"] he repudiated, his thought was tending, 
as fast as any in the eighteenth century could, toward 
conceiving reason itself, or even logic, as an image of 
temperament; it would have taken him about an hour's 
reading in William James, and two hours in Freud, to
catch up completely.94
93 Cherry, Theology, p. 19.
94Ibid.. p. 183.
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Miller was fond of comparing Edwards with Kierkegaard, 
and it appears that, following the dictum of the Dane, Miller 
himself has taken a "leap of faith." The evaluation of this 
claim depends on Miller's (and the reader's) intuitive feel 
for the nature of psychology and its history, Edwards' psy­
chological views, and those of James and Freud. What is psy­
chology? What did James or Freud say that can be directly 
compared and contrasted with Edwards' (admittedly crypto- 
grammatic and therefore not fully comprehensible) psycho­
logical theory? These questions have no answers, of course, 
until the views of each theorist are translated into a common 
language of the relevant dimensions of human nature, and 
until the understanding of Edwards' views comes to depend less 
on faith than on an explicit model.
Miller would have Edwards become a precursor of 
Jamesian or Freudian psychology but, characteristically, he 
left the detailed investigation of the truth of this assertion 
to "future research." It is almost certain that some budding 
scholar will in the future, or perhaps has already begun, to 
study the Jamesian or Freudian aspects of Edwards' thought. 
Miller's esoteric vices are often, at the same time, heuristic 
virtues.
The other significant attempt to interpret Edwards' 
psychological theory within the context of the history of 
psychology lies poles apart from Miller's ambiguity. To 
Joseph Haroutunian, Edwards was no Jamesian or Freudian, but 
a behaviorist, and unlike Miller, Haroutunian offers a
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detailed explanation of his interpretation.
A modern rendition of this analysis of Edwards is the 
study of human behavior in terms of "stimulus" and 
"response." A stimulus is Edwards' "motive," and response 
is volitional behavior. Such a study is based upon the 
principle that where there is no stimulus, there is no 
response; where there is no action, there is no reac­
tion; where there is no cause, there is no effect. The 
nature of a given stimulus is irrelevant to the fact that 
it acts as a stimulus. An "5-R bond" may be physical or 
it may be moral, and in both cases it is a "certain con­
nection" between a "motive" and an act of volition. 
Edwards' metaphysical principle of necessity is the 
modern methodological principle that all action is reac­
tion. The excellence of Edwards' thought consists in 
that he withstood a careless attribution of mental func­
tions to underlying quasi-physical structures or entities 
(which is also the virtue in behaviorism), and did not 
commit the fallacy of reducing one function into another, 
the mental and moral into the physical (which is the vice 
of modern behaviorism as understood by the "vulgar").
The will is neither a "faculty," nor an uproar in the 
cells of a muscle or a gland. Volition is not caused hy^^ 
the will, because there is no will to cause such an act.
This is an extremely complex statement and it requires 
careful examination. First it is asserted that Edwards is a 
behaviorist. Why? Because of his ruthless hard determinism: 
"where there is no cause, there is no effect." Clearly, 
Haroutunian equates behaviorism and determinism. Perhaps, in 
1932 when Haroutunian wrote, behaviorism was so dominant in 
America that he could not see, for instance, that Freud, 
surely no behaviorist, was also holding that all effects have 
causes. The chief difference between behaviorists and most 
other more cognitively-oriented psychologists is not relative 
adherence to hard determinism. The widest gulf separating 
behaviorists and other scientific psychologists concerns
^ Piety Versus Moralism, pp. 225-226.
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reductionism. Behaviorists have always been hesitant to 
speculate upon or postulate the existence of definable mental
Q g
operations. Observable behavior, they claim, is the object
of their analysis. Many psychologists, including Freudians,
functionalists, and Gestaltists, have objected to this stimulus-
response psychology; i.e., that the mind is not a fit topic
for respectable scientific research. E. C. Tolman expressed
the principle objection to 5-R behaviorism very cogently back 
97in the thirties. Of course, all behavioral events are 
caused, he readily admitted; every response has a stimulus.
But this simple 5-R level of analysis, though convenient, is 
too simple. The organism effectively intervenes between 
stimulus and response. The behavioral sequence is thus S-O-R, 
the "0" standing for "organism." The observable response, to 
Tolman, is a function not only of some specifiable stimulus 
complex, but also of an individual’s assumptions, expecta­
tions, and purposes concerning the s t i m u l i . T o l m a n ,  and
^ A t  least since John B. Watson's behaviorist mani­
festo, "Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It," Psycho­
logical Review, 1 91 3, 20, 1 58-1 77.
97E. C. Tolman, Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men 
(New York, 1 932) .
98
A typical demonstration used by cognitive psycholo­
gists to refute the behaviorist "theory" of mind is as 
follows:
1 . 12 13 14 15
2. A 13 C L
Normally, item No. 2 in line 1 is perceived as a 
"thirteen," while item No. 2 in line 2 is perceived as the 
letter "B." Why are identical stimuli perceived differently? 
Because, it is argued, a person reading line 1 does not have 
the same expectations and assumptions as the person reading 
line 2. Behaviorists do not usually speak of expectations
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other cognitive psychologists, believe that responses are 
constructed within the organism based upon the information 
present in the stimuli and upon what the organism is looking 
f or.
Cognitive psychologists, then, may be characterized 
by their willingness to speculate about mental functioning 
while behaviorists tend to view the organism as empty-headed. 
Certainly, in this context, Edwards is no behaviorist, in 
spite of his uncompromising determinism. Indeed, much of 
the secondary commentary on Edwards consists in trying to 
restate his voluminous, yet vague and unsuccessful, attempts 
to explicate the mental functioning which occurs during the 
conversion experience. In groping for a contemporary label 
for Edwards' psychological views, Haroutunian picked the 
wrong one. Edwards simply lacked the reductionistic mentality 
that would permit classifying him as an eighteenth-century 
behaviorist. After all, Edwards' first serious philosophical 
endeavor, undertaken while a young teenager, was entitled 
Notes on the Mind. ^  The idealistic metaphysics contained in 
this early work would provide nothing but profound embarrass­
ment to an aspiring behaviorist.
Haroutunian's naive conception of modern behaviorism 
leads him directly to contradict himself in a curious manner. 
Edwards, he states, "did not commit the fallacy of reducing
and assumptions because, of course, they are not "behaviors" 
and cannot be observed directly.
99
In Townsend, Philosophy. pp. 21-73.
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. . . the mental and moral into the physical." Therefore,
Edwards is not a reductionist. It is obvious to Haroutunian, 
an excellent church historian, that Edwards' tracts and 
pamphlets are packed with discussions of mental and moral 
"faculties," regardless of what he might have meant by the 
term. Edwards, the S-R behaviorist, therefore, is no behav­
iorist at all. He does not concentrate strictly, or even 
primarily, upon "the physical," or what modern behaviorists 
call "observables." Haroutunian, in effect, offers a sound 
interpretation of Edwards as a cognitive psychologist, while 
maintaining all along that he is a behaviorist.
*
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CHAPTER III
ON SCIENTIFIC HISTORY AND EDWARDS* PLACE 
IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY
Imagine the following situation aboard a Spanish 
galleon in the sixteenth century: The purpose of the voyage
is to search for villages along the Central American coast 
which might have gold in their possession. Land has been 
sighted, and the captain, along with his first and second 
mates, begins to investigate the land through his tele­
scope . This is the first mission for the second mate, and 
he has inadvert ntly inverted his spyglass. He reports that 
he sees what appears to be a city made up of a few buildings 
--he cannot determine how many. He can only guess that the 
"city," if it is a city, does not look much like Barcelona, 
where he comes from. The captain, meanwhile, is also observ­
ing the land through his own telescope, which he is holding 
correctly in aristocratic fashion. He is overwhelmed. He 
reports seeing a massive civilization, huge buildings, people 
of many races and great sailing ships. The captain goes to 
his cabin where he lies down and listens to the palpitations 
of his racing heart. The first mate realizes that his captain 
is in a state of shock. He thus races to the bridge with 
telescope held correctly but nervously in hand. He cannot 
find words to describe what he sees, but he notices another,
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less impressive city beyond the one that forced his captain 
to retire. Although he is incapable of describing either 
settlement, he does record a few comparisons between them:
□ne is taller, the other brighter, etc. Each of the three 
observers returns home to Spain confident that his pseudo­
description of the unexplored territory is the correct one. 
After listening to the three views of the city, the confused 
king decides to make the next voyage himself.
Like the mythical city, Edwards' psychological theory 
has been the object of three types of fallacious inquiry. 
Roback and Fay have inverted their historical telescope.
They assume, a priori, that the dimensions and concerns of 
twentieth-century psychology are ultimate criteria for the 
description and evaluation of psychological views. Thus they 
only skim the surface of Edwards, making a few evaluative 
statements based on how closely he seems to approximate a 
poorly-defined concept of modern psychology. This approach 
to Edwards' psychology has resulted in an analysis which is 
narrow, shallow, and totally unacceptable. It is an example 
of the presentist fallacy in which the past is studied for the
■j
sake of the present. Edwards is not a twentieth-century psy­
chologist. That, in essence, is the message of Fay and Roback.
^The connotations given to "presentism" [and "his- 
toricism"] are derived from George W. 5tocking, who attached 
these labels to two broad historiographic positions outlined 
by Herbert Butterfield in his Whig Interpretation of History 
(London, 1931); See Stocking, "On the Limits of 'Presentism' 
and 'Historicism' in the Historiography of the Behavioral 
Sciences," Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences.
1 965, 1_, 211-217. Many different labels have been attached
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A very different approach is taken by Edwards spe­
cialists, especially Perry Miller. They assume that everyone 
knows intuitively what psychology is and thus it is perfectly 
all right to overwhelm the reader with claims about Edwards' 
"psychology." Their historical telescope works too well.
The result is voluminous speculation about Edwards' psy­
chology, and a deluge of detail offered in support of those 
speculations, neither of which can be evaluated in the absence 
of an explicit psychological criterion. Although these his­
torians assume, albeit implicitly, for the most part, a sensi­
ble Brett-Human-Nature approach to the history of psychology, 
no attempt is made to point out Edwards' view concerning 
relevant dimensions of man's complex nature. Textual exegesis 
is thought to be adequate. This is an unfortunate attitude, 
and it is an example of the historicist fallacy, or studying
2
the past for the sake of the past. Alan Heimert claims, for
instance, that "The central conflict of the Great Awakening
was thus not theological but one of opposing theories of the 
3
human psychology." Yet until the nature of psychology, and 
thus of a psychological controversy, is clarified for twentieth 
century readers, such statements are meaningless.
The commission of the presentist and historicist 
fallacies implies that the historian's telescope into the past
to these two modes of historical inquiry, but I will use 
Stocking's terminology throughout.
^Stocking, "'presentism' and 'Historicism.'"
^Alan Heimert and Perry Miller, eds., The Great 
Awakening (New York, 1967), p. xxxix.
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is out of focus. The presentists are nearsighted; their 
narrow attempts to assimilate the past to some amorphous con­
temporary rubrics effectively blinds them to much of what the 
past has to offer. The historicists are farsighted; although 
they are deeply immersed in many aspects of the past, they 
lack the ability to interpret their findings to a contemporary 
audience. In general, presentists' comments upon the psy­
chology of Edwards demonstrate a substantial, though implicit, 
awareness of psychology, but an inadequate knowledge of 
Edwards. Historicists' evaluations of Edwards' psychology, 
on the other hand, show familiarity with Edwards and ignorance 
of psychology.
The historicists face yet another difficulty which is 
not a problem for the presentists. Edwards was content to 
formulate his psychological theory in the language of Calvinism 
and scholastic faculty psychology.^ Presentists tend to per­
ceive only the formal linguistic aspects of Edwards, such as 
his discussion of "faculties," and thus they see few essential 
differences between the psychological views of Edwards and 
those of his contemporaries. Historicists, however, deny 
that Edwards was a faculty psychologist and they have noted 
what appear to be two extraordinary complications in his 
theory: Man is always and at once a rational-emotional unity,
^Perry Miller has remarked that Edwards "was entirely 
satisfied to express himself, so far as content goes, in the 
received tenets of Calvinism" "He was an artist working in 
a tradition, and for him the tradition was sufficient,"
Miller, Jonathan Edwards, pp. 47-48.
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and he is both proactive and reactive. The historicist's 
problem is this: how to present these complications as some­
thing other than contradictions in a comprehensive scheme 
that makes sense. This difficulty has proven to be insur­
mountable because the historicists lack a psychological model 
which can accomodate the Edwardsean polarities. Instead of 
attacking the problem, the historicists have merely circum­
scribed it by committing what I shall call the neqativist 
fallacy. They assume, in effect, that because we know what 
Edwards did not say— that his psychology was not that of his 
contemporaries— we therefore know and understand what he 
actually said and what the implications of those statements 
are.^ Edwards himself, working within the self-imposed 
restrictions presented by the faculty-psychology terminology, 
could often do no better than explain what he did not m e a n /  
The negativist fallacy, therefore, has usually taken the form 
of paraphrasing Edwards' original negativisms."^ In this 
respect, the plight of the historicists is similar to that of 
the first mate in the fable who, recognizing that he is capa-
5Cf. Miller, Jonathan Edwards, pp. 165-195; Edwin 
5cott Gaustad, The Great Awakening in New England (New York, 
1957), pp. 80-101; Heimer and Miller, Great Awakening, pp. 
xxxv-xliii.
^Cf. Edwards, Affections, p. 272, in which Edwards 
attempts to explain that his notion of a "faculty" is not the 
usual disjunctive one. Locke also found himself repeatedly 
defending and qualifying his use of the term faculty; see 
Essay. II, XXI, 6.
^See Chapter 2, PP« 25-27.
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ble of describing what he sees, proceeds to record a small 
sample of the infinite number of differences between the 
object of his attention and a neighboring edifice. If the 
historicists are to be believed, Edwards' psychological sys­
tem was in many respects startingly unique, and he is there­
fore a great psychological thinker.^ It is a mistake, how­
ever, to equate uniqueness with greatness. Two-headed sheep 
are unique, but hardly great. The positive, as well as the 
negative, aspects of Edwards' psychology must be clearly 
understood before a legitimate assessment can be made.
A Revised Concept of Scientific History
Each of the three fallacies which have been committed 
while trying to describe and analyze Edwards' psychological 
views have in common an over-reliance upon the intuitive 
powers of the reader. Presentists, like Roback and Fay, 
unfairly request that the reader somehow decipher their notion 
of contemporary psychology and assume that their sweeping and 
often unsupported genralizations are correct. Historicists 
assume, implicitly, that psychology is (and always was) such 
a universal discipline, that it needs no definition whatsoever. 
Finally, the historicist-negativists assume that the reader 
is capable of arranging their numerous Edwardsean negativisms 
such that a coherent positive statement will emerge. In each 
case ignorance, lack of interest, or both, have led historians 
to demand that the intuitive skills of their audience compen-
^Cf. Miller, Jonathan Edwards and "Sense of the
Heart."
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sate for their own inability to be explicit. At this point, 
the introduction of a somewhat arbitrary, but explicit and 
comprehensive definition of psychology is needed. Vagaries 
can only be lamented; definitions and models can be accepted, 
rejected, and amended. The negativist fallacy will be 
countered with a concrete model in chapter 4. The intuitive 
presentist and historicist fallacies will be answered with 
Prescriptive Theory which may be interpreted in part as an 
attempt to isolate the dimensions of Brett's "Human Nature" 
which have relevance throughout the history of psychology.
The prescriptive definition of the history of psychology, and 
the model presented in chapter 3, provide the two concrete 
aspects of a modified concept of scientific history which will 
be used as an antidote to the intuitive and often confused 
investigations into the psychology of Edwards.
To issue an endorsement of scientific history, even 
in modified form, is to dive headlong into an intensely 
argued controversy that has raged more or less continuously 
for the past century. The central question of the debate con­
cerns whether or not history is, should be, or can be "sci­
entific." The issue was first vigorously debated in the nine­
teenth century when enthusiasm for science and its methodology 
reached an almost millennial intensity. Buckle, for instance, 
claimed that history should be the search for universal laws, 
while Bury requested that historians maintain a detached,
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9
"objective" posture toward their subject matter. The
positivist faith in the benevolent omnipotence of scientific
goals and methodology appeared to be conquering even history.
Although the positivist conception of science has
proven to be largely a golden calf, loud entreaties to make
1 □history a science may still be heard. Yet even in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when science was 
carrying the day, numerous historians rejected the view that 
history could, or even should be, a science. Dilthey argued 
that historical knowledge, or "understanding," is funda­
mentally different from scientific laws.
So the process of understanding, as here set out, is to 
be understood as a kind of induction. And this induction 
belongs not to the class in which a general law is 
extracted from an incomplete series of cases, but rather
9
Henry T. Buckle, History of Civilization in England 
3 vols. (London, 1899). A short excerpt from Buckle's History 
appears in Patrick Gardiner, ed., Theories of History (Glencoe, 
111., 1959), pp. 105-124; J. B. Bury, "The Science of History." 
In Selected Essays (Cambridge, Eng., 1930), pp. 3-22.
1 0
The contemporary thrust toward making history "sci­
entific" has taken two principal directions. First there are 
those who urge that historians adopt the assumptions and goals 
of a "scientific" psychological theory, psychoanalysis. This 
endeavor is now called psychohistory, and among its leading 
practioners are Erik Erikson and Robert J. Lifton; See Erik- 
son, Young Flan Luther (New York, 1 958), Ghandi1 s Truth (New 
York, 1969), and Lifton's Home from the War (New York, 1973) 
and Death in Life (New York, 1967). The other side of the 
scientific history front is manned by those who would have 
historians imitate the quantitative aspect of science; see 
Lee Benson, The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York
as a. Test Case (Princeton. N.J., 1961) and Charles Tilly,
The Vendee (Cambridge, Mass., 1964).
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in which a structure, an ordered system, is built, which 
gathers the separate instances into a unity.11
Likewise, Trevelyan, countering Bury's pleas for objectivity,
maintained that historians must always subjectively interpret
their data. The simple process of accumulating dusty bits of
data will never, claimed Trevelyan, synthesize itself into
comprehensible history. The individual historian must supply 
1 2the synthesis.
The focal point of the scientific history issue is
science itself. Debaters on all sides of the controversy
have held a view of science which may be summarized as follows:
(1) The scientific method is objective; and (2) the goal of
science is the discovery of laws which yield predictable
behavior. Recently, for instance, Hempel and Popper relegated
history to second-class scientific status because historical
explanations do not satisfy the predictive requirements of
1 3the deductive "covering law" model. Berlin, on the other 
hand, admits history's scientific "inadequacy," but views it
1 1
Wilhelm Dilthey, "The Understanding of Other Persons 
and Their Life— Expressions," in Gardiner, Theories of His­
tory. p. 224.
^ G .  M. Trevelyan, "Clio, a Muse" in Clio, a Muse and 
Other Essays, Literary and Pedestrian (London, 1913). For an 
excellent review of the Bury-Trevelyan debate consult W. H. 
Walsh, "The Limits of Scientific History," in James Hogan, ed., 
Historical Studies III (London, 1961), pp. 45-57.
13
See C. G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "The Logic of 
Explanation," in Feigl and Brodbeck eds., Philosophy of Sci­
ence (New York, 1953), pp. 319-352 , and Karl R. Popper, The 
Logic of Scientific Discovery (London, 1959). A good summary 
of the objectivist, deductive model of scientific inquiry may 
be found in Alan Donagan, "Historical Explanation: The Popper-
Hempel Theory Reconsidered," History and Theory, 1964, A, 3-26.
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as a declaration of independence rather than as cause for 
lamentations over second class intellectual citizenship. 
Paraphrasing Dilthey, he holds that "the objective of all this 
[history] is to understand the relation of parts to wholes."^ 
History is humanistic, an impressionistic weaving together 
rather than a search for laws. And, of course, the weaving 
process is highly subjective, a selection of materials and 
interpretations based upon who knows how many personal and 
cultural factors.
Almost no one claims that history is scientific,
1 5either in its method or its goals. It is significant, how­
ever that those historians and philosophers who hold widely 
differing views concerning whether or not history can or 
should be scientific have not disagreed about the nature of 
science. Still, under the gloomy spell of the logical posi­
tivists, they see in science no more (and no less) than the 
objective search for laws. This represents, at best, an 
extremely limited view of the practice of science, a view 
which has recently begun to be amended by a number of influ­
ential philosopher-scientists. Concerning scientific 
"objectivity," Bronowski has written:
1 4
Isaiah Berlin, "History and Theory: The Concept of
Scientific History," History and Theory, 1961, 1_, 1-31,
1 5 .
Windelband was a notable exception. Writing in 
the late nineteenth century, he believed that history had 
already become a natural science, and he advocated the "reces­
sion" of history from the sciences; see W. Windelband, 
Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft (Strassburg, 1894).
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What a scientist does is compounded of two interests: 
the interest of his time and his own interest. In this 
his behavior is no different from any other man's. The 
need of the age gives its shape to scientific progress 
as a whole. But it is not the need of the age which 
gives the individual scientist his sense of pleasure and 
of adventure, and that excitement which keeps him working 
late into the night when all the useful typists have gone 
home at five o'clock. He is personally involved in his 
work, as the poet is in his, and as the artist is in the 
painting. 1 6
Likewise, the discovery of scientific laws may not be much 
different from the historical tapestry woven by the historian. 
The order found in nature and displayed through laws
. . . does not display itself of itself; if it can
be said to be there at all, it is not there for the mere 
looking. There is no way of pointing a finger or a 
camera at it; order must be discovered, and, in a deep 
sense, it must be created.17
Even the classical physicists and astronomers, whose models 
and laws were long thought to represent the essence of sci­
entific objectivity and predictability, were hardly objective 
in the usual sense of the term. As Kuhn has demonstrated, 
Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo all had a pronounced mystical 
side which led them to formulate theories which were more 
symmetrical or beautiful than the accepted ones.18 The 
heliocentric universe of Copernicus, for example, did not pre­
dict the movements of heavenly bodies any better than Ptolemy's 
geocentric system. It did, however, satisfy the mathematician's
Jacob Bronowski, Science and Human Values, rev. ed. 
(New York, 1965), p. 8.
17Ibid.. p . 14.
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution: Plane­
tary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought (Cam­
bridge, Mass., 1957); see also Kuhn's Scientific Revolutions.
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need for neatness, simplicity, and "beauty"; and that is why 
1 9Copernicus endorsed it. If history's greatest scientists
had to take the positivists' test of detachad objectivity and
evaluation by predictability, it is clear that most would
fail. More than anyone else, Polanyi has given specificity
and legitimacy to the revised, personalist, conception of
science. He has formulated a general system of epistemology,
Personal Knowledge, which subsumes scientific and historical
knowledge, and which is consistent with what is now known
20about the history of science and scientific discovery. 
Polanyi's greatest debt is to Dilthey and the later Gestalt 
psychologists although his theory of Personal Knowledge cannot 
be reduced to theirs. Polanyi holds that man's chief dis­
tinction is his yearning to understand. which is the process 
by which man merges a set of particulars into an awareness of 
their joint significance. We seek clarity, precision, and an 
altogether satisfying solution. That which is held to be true 
is always the most satisfying. Yet we have little or no con­
trol over what satisfies us, any more than does the lowest 
animal, and it is this "tacit dimension" of knowledge which 
we humans share with them.^
1 9
Kuhn, Copernican Revolution, pp. 171-180.
2DMichael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge; Toward a Post- 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago, 1958). This is surely one of 
the most remarkable books written in the twentieth century.
For a psychologist's reaction to it, see Abraham H. Maslow,
The Psychology of Science; A Reconnaissance (New York, 1966).
Personal Knowledge, pp. 132-195; see also Polanyi's 
The Tacit Dimension (New York, 1966).
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This view entails a decisive change in our ideal of 
knowledge. The participation of the knower in shaping 
his knowledge, which had hitherto been tolerated only as 
a flaw— a shortcoming to be eliminated from perfect 
knowledge--is now recognized as the true guide and master 
of our cognitive powers. We acknowledge now that our 
powers of knowing operate widely without causing us to 
utter any explicit statements . . . The ideal of a knowl­
edge embodied in strictly impersonal statements now 
appears self-contradictory, meaningless, a fit subject 
for ridicule. We must learn to accept as our ideal a 
knowledge that is manifestly p e r s o n a l . ^2
Scientific knowing, like all other forms of knowing, is not 
detached or uninvolved. It is indeed objective in the sense 
of establishing contact with a hidden reality," but it repre-
23sents a "fusion of the personal and the objective." The 
personal, tacit (one is tempted to say unconscious) dimension 
is present in every act of scientific understanding, including 
the discovery of laws.
In an essay entitled "Understanding History," Polanyi 
has extended his theory of Personal Knowledge from science to 
h i s t o r y . P o l a n y i  holds, in opposition to debaters on the 
topic from Buckle to Berlin, that "the characteristic features 
of historiography . . . emerge by the continuation of a
development broadly prefigured already within the natural 
sciences."^ There exists an essential unity of scientific 
and historical knowledge. Scientists may study the structure
^Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago, 1 959 ), 
pp. 26-27.
23
Personal Knowledge, pp. vii-viii.
2<^ In The Study of Man. pp. 71-99.
25Ibid.. p. 73.
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of nature, machines, animals, or men, while historians study 
men and their ideas in complex situations. Yet each repre­
sents a search for an integrated understanding of the meaning 
of a set of particulars and each is personal. On the molecu­
lar levels of physics and chemistry, the "passionate intensity," 
as Yeats called it, is a function of the beauty of the formu­
lae and the pleasure derived from predicting correctly. With
history, the personal involvement lay in our encounter with
2 6complex, interesting individuals and their ideas.
If all science and history is an intensely personal
enterprise, what, then, is meant by the term "scientific
history." Simply this: that the historian should attempt to
make explicit the tacit dimension, as much as possible; he
should lay bare his assumptions and pre-conceived points of
view as far as they are known. "History has no meaning,"
Popper has written, "there can be no history of 'the past as 
2 7it actually happened.'" The historian must give it meaning
much as a scientist gives meaning to data with a theory.
Without personal selection history, like science, would be
strangled by superfluous information.
The only way out of this difficulty is . . . con­
sciously to introduce a preconceived selective point of 
view into one's history; that is, to write that history 
which interests us. This does not mean that we may twist 
the facts until they fit into a framework of preconceived 
ideas, or that we may neglect the facts that do not fit.
26Ibid.. pp. 73-85.
2^Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies,
2 vols. (London, 1945), II, pp. 254-256.
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□n the contrary, all available evidence which has a 
bearing on our point of view should be considered care- 
fully and objectively . . . ,2B
By "objectively" is meant with an awareness of one's personal 
viewpoint, not under the naive assumption that one has no 
biases or principles of selection.
History, then, is unavoidably presentist. A man, an 
idea, or an event is what it is only as seen through a pris­
matic point of view. Paradoxically, history becomes more 
scientific when it acknowledges the personal and selective 
nature of its theorizing and data collecting. The assertions 
and conclusions of this kind of scientific history can be 
evaluated in relation to the viewpoint of the historian.
This is certainly the case in psychology, for example, where 
the evaluation of a piece of research is almost always
accompanied by a determination of the writer's status as
29behaviorist, psychoanalyst, existentialist, etc. The
Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism. 2nd ed. 
(London, 1960), p. 150; Popper uses the term "historicism" 
very differently from that employed by Stocking and followed 
here. See also Robert F. Berkhofer's A Behavioral Approach 
to Historical Analysis (New York, 1969) for a plea that his­
torians make clear their biases and assumptions. To Popper, 
"historicism" is "an approach to the social sciences which 
assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the 
'rhythms' or the 'patterns,' the 'law' or the 'trends' that 
underlie the evolution of history" (Poverty of Historicism. 
p. 3). The Marxists, according to Popper, represent the 
epitome of this "poverty-stricken" position.
29
One need only survey a personality theory text such 
as Salvatore R. Maddi, Personality Theories; A Comparative 
Analysis, 2nd ed. (Homewood, 111., 1972) for convincing evi­
dence that the same psychological data can be interpreted in 
widely different but theoretically consistent ways.
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psychologist is aware, or should be, that data collection and 
interpretation is greatly influenced by the assumptions and
r* II • . • . 30purposes of the scientist.
In studying the psychological thought of Edwards 
there is a special urgency to "make our ideas clear," as 
Peirce once put it. Unavoidable presentism needs to be trans­
formed into conscious presentism. The inappropriate and 
ambiguous presentist approach of Roback and Fay clearly twists 
and neglects pertinent aspects of Edwards' ideas in an attempt 
to make him comprehensible to twentieth-century psychologists 
and historians of psychology. The historicists, on the other 
hand, are too naive. "The nature of man" which they use 
implicitly is much too broad a concept to carry any meaning. 
What is needed in the study of Edwards is a point of view, a 
telescopic view into the history of psychology, which neither 
focuses too broadly on Edwards nor emerges too narrowly from 
the present: a psychology for all seasons, true to the dead
and understandable to the living. The point of view known as 
Prescriptive Theory will serve this function.
The Mysterious Zeitgeist of Edwin G. Boring
Just as any student of American Puritanism must begin 
with Perry Miller, a historian of psychology must first deal 
with Edwin G. Boring. Since Prescriptive Theory is in part a
^ T h e  classic demonstration of the importance of 
"demand characteristics" or "experimenter bias" in psychologi­
cal research is by Robert Rosenthal, Experimenter Effects in 
Behavioral Research (New York, 1966).
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reaction, or at least an amendment, to Boring's historical 
point of view, something needs to be said about his histori­
ography. In chapter one, Boring was characterized as a pro­
gressionist historian who viewed the history of psychology as
a series of events which led toward, through, and beyond 
31Wundt. More specifically, Boring held what might aptly be 
called an experimental view of history. Trained in experi­
mental psychology under the rigorous Titchener, Boring
carried the experimentalist's quest for cause and effect rela-
32tionships over into his historical studies. History is the 
Great Experiment, a scientific enterprise in the best posi­
tivist tradition.
To think of the man whose brilliant novel thought 
heads an important development as the originator is to 
abandon scientific psychology and suppose that among all 
orderly lawful phenomena the insights of genius consti­
tute an exception in that they occur without c a u s e s . 33
32 It is significant that Boring's great History is 
dedicated to Titchener, and an engraving of Wundt adorns the 
frontispiece of that volume.
3 3History, p. 745. A typical Boring causal chain is 
his "Nerve Physiology as a Paradigm of Scientific Progress."
He states
(1 ) Progress is continuous when viewed in large perspec­
tive, but intermittent and irregular when examined for 
small intervals of time. There were decades when nothing 
of great importance happened, yet a steady development 
from 1790 to 197G nonetheless.
(2) Discovery depends upon previous discovery. The series, 
Galvani-Volta-du Bois-Reymond-Helmholtz-Berstein-Lucas- 
Adrian-Lillie, labels a continuous development by noting 
eight successful prominent features of it. (History, 
p. 43)
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To Boring, the purpose of the history of psychology, as with 
the history of any science, is to isolate cause-effect rela­
tionships. By his own admission, however, multiple causation 
is the rule in history, hence on numerous occasions Boring 
invoked the term Zeitgeist to "explain" scientific dis­
coveries and events. Boring's "mature" definition of the 
Zeitgeist was "the total body of knowledge and opinion avail­
able at any time to a person living within a given culture."^ 
History is a most imperfect laboratory and the invocation of 
the Zeitgeist concept is really an admission that the causa­
tive variables are unknown.^ It was a hard determinists 1 
way of admitting defeat; for "the Zeitgeist," as Dorothy Ross 
has remarked, is a "truism of historical explanation" which 
"offers only the most elementary kind of causal insight.
Philosophers do not make discoveries in the sense that 
Boring believed scientists discover hidden reality. They do
"Dual Role of the Zeitgeist in Scientific Creativity," 
Scientific Monthly, 1 955, 8_0, 101-106. Quote from p. 106. 
Boring appeared to change his definition of the Zeitgeist 
more than once. Robert A. Friedman, however, has shown con­
vincingly that Boring's view of the Zeitgeist remained rela­
tively constant throughout his long career; see "Edwin G. 
Boring's 'mature' view of the Science of Science in Relation 
to a Deterministic Personal and Intellectual Motif," Journal 
of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 1 967, 3_, 17-26.
35Boring seemed to realize this. He remarked, "His­
tory is a part of nature where multiple causation rules and 
where single effective causes are the over-simplifications, 
devised to bring the incomprehensible complexity of reality 
within the narrow compass of man's understanding" (History, 
p. 744).
^ " T h e  'Zeitgeist' and American Psychology," Journal 
of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 1 969, .5, 256-262;
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not fit neatly into a causal chain because they tend to argue 
over relatively timeless issues across the centuries. They 
are not associated with events. The principle concern for 
Boring was not what fundamental questions a psychologist 
asked about man, but rather his scientific status and his 
role in a causal chain of historical events. An excellent 
example of Boring's de facto avoidance of the fundamental 
philosophical issues in psychology may be found in one of his 
earliest historical papers.^ In 1 927 Boring had not yet 
adopted the Zeitgeist as an explanatory term. Instead, he 
settled for a historical application of James:
The stream of consciousness is sensibly continuous 
in the history of thought as well as in the thinking of 
and individual. Certainly the historian is impressed by 
the fact that almost never does an idea seem entirely
new.3 8
Boring undertook to prove this "by a few psychologists'
39instances." His discussion included analyses of the impor­
tant discoveries of Bell, MUller, Helmholtz, Broca, and other 
contributors to Wundt's founding of experimental psychology. 
He proves, to his own satisfaction, that indeed the mysteri­
ous Zeitgeist (as he would refer to it by 1929) was at work; 
that "'fathers' are necessarily also 'sons' and that the 
'founders' are very apt to be ' promoters.'
^^"The Problem of Originality in Science," American 
Journal of Psychology. 1 927, 39_, 70-90. This paper deals 
with the science of psychology. Oddly, many of Boring's 
statements concerning the Zeitgeist occur in a very general 
scientific context, with little mention of psychology.
3BIbid.. p. 71. 4DIbid.. p. 71.
39Ibid.. p. 71.
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The "psychological" nature of these discoveries rests 
on Boring's belief that they led directly to Wundt's labora­
tory and hence to twentieth-century psychology. A number of 
non-experimentalists are also mentioned, however, including 
Locke, Berkeley, Hartley, Descartes, and a few ancient 
Greeks. According to Boring, these philosophers seemed to be 
interested in matters which also interested the nineteenth-
century "father-sons" but their influence is too amorphous 
41to trace decisively. While scientist-psychologists emerge
from an exasperating fertility, their philosophical forbears
are seen as barren, or orphans, depending on one's preference
for the lineal metaphor. "Philosophy," Boring remarked,
42"becomes common sense slowly, but . . . inevitably." Thus,
one of Kant's chief functions in the history of psychology is
to provide Johannes MUller with the "common sense" foundation
for his scientific discovery of a "physiological counterpart 
43
of a Kantian category." Yet what, psychologically, unites 
Kant and MUller as the unexorable Boringian Zeitgeist moves 
on? What fundamental principles are involved? Boring's 
experimental view of history prevented him from even asking 
the question, much less answering it. On the contrary, he saw
41
Vague relationships did not interest Boring; an indi­
vidual either did or did not "influence" someone else. Boring's 
intense need for closure, historical and otherwise, is dis­
cussed by Julian Jaynes, "Edwin Garrigues Boring 1886-1968," 
Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 1969, 5, 
99-112.
42
"Problem of Originality," p. 74.
^ Ibid., p. 73.
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philosophy and theory as potential enemies which sometimes 
prevented experimental psychologists from going about their 
experimental business.^ Boring's determinism and the 
accompanying lame-duck Zeitgeist concept obscures not only 
the contributors to the Zeitgeist, but also the fundamental 
psychological principles which men argue about, even through 
a radical change in methodology. Boring was a scientific 
historian in the old positivist sense, and in the manner indi­
cated by Polanyi and Popper. He searched for causes and 
effects, if not laws, and he made his assumptions perfectly 
clear. Within the area circumscribed by those biases, his 
histories will probably never be surpassed.^
If his approach has been rewarding to some, it has 
been somewhat stultifying to others who do not share his 
experimental view of history. Unfortunately, few historians 
of psychology who hold to some variant of Brett's Human Nature 
approach to the history of psychology have been as scientific
44 According to Boring,
Psychology has never succeeded in taking philosophy to 
itself or in leaving it alone . . .  A division of the 
mind within psychology is not healthy . . . Psychology
ought to . . . proceed, unimpeded by a divided soul, about
its business (History, p. 742).
Boring's experimental view of history, and its concommitant 
disdain for philosophy, has been very influential. Fred 
Keller, for instance, holds that
Descartes and the "mental philosophers" played an 
early part in launching the young science with which we 
are here concerned. But much more had to be done before 
our modern discipline emerged. Sooner or later, these 
armchair ideas, no matter how insightful, had to leave the 
speculative realm for the world of observation and experi­
ment (The Definition of Psychology, 2nd ed., New York, 1 973).
^ I n  addition to his History, Boring's other classic
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as Boring; that is, they have failed to present their point 
of view explicitly in the form of a usable definition of psy­
chology. The confusing situation among these professional 
historians of psychology is very similar to that which exists 
among serious students of Edwards who have necessarily 
adopted Brett's general viewpoint. By dropping a compre­
hensive definition of psychology into the intuitive lap of 
the reader, they render many of their assertions empty and 
meaningless. Some of Gardner Murphy's historical work exempli­
fies the confusion that may result when a historian discusses 
the "psychology" of men and eras far beyond Boring's experi­
mental mainstream, without offering a replacement for his 
neat, narrow definition of psychology. At one point, for 
instance, he argues for and purports to describe Pythagorean 
psychology. Yet it is quite unclear why Pythagorus is a psy­
chologist, or how he can be included under the same rubric 
as Freud, who is also discussed at length in the b ook.^ In 
another book, Asian Psychology, Murphy moves the farthest 
imaginable distance, both historically and geographically, 
from Boring's definitional territory. ^  Initially, he must
is Sensation and Perception in the History of Experimental 
Psychology (New York, 1942), a volume so thorough and exhaus­
tive that, as Jaynes has pointed out, there was virtually no 
one capable of adequately reviewing it when it appeared; see 
Jaynes, "Edwin Garrigues Boring."
46
Psychological Thought from Pythagorus to Freud 
(New York, 1968).
47 Gardner Murphy &. Lois B. Murphy, eds., Asian Psy­
chology (New York, 1968).
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fortify his position; like those who purport to discuss 
seriously the psychology of Edwards, he must demonstrate the 
possibility of the existence of Asian psychology to an audi­
ence of skeptical Boringians. He accomplishes this task by 
restating and elaborating an important point made by Brett's 
editor, R. 5. Peters.^ He points out that there are two 
reasons why, until very recently, Western universities have 
included philosophy and psychology in the same department.
First, "psychology was a part of philosophy because it was 
49immature." It had not yet asserted the scientific inde­
pendence whose progress Boring was to describe so eloquently. 
Yet there is another important reason for the close relation­
ship between philosophy and psychology, "Namely that the phi­
losopher took universal knowledge and wisdom as his goal and 
he certainly had to include wisdom about the mind . " ^  This
quest for wisdom about the mind, the "especially precious 
51object of knowledge," Murphy believes holds true for all 
literate cultures and times. These countless, timeless 
inquiries into the nature of the human mind, that is human 
nature, constitute what he calls the "universal psychology—  
a psychology that applies wherever mind, or let us say, in 
intuitively accepted terms, wherever mind, heart, and will
48
"Theory, Policy, and Technology."
49 Asian Psychology, p. viii.
50tu..Ibid., p. ix.
Ibid., p. ix.
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52exist." Thus Murphy justifies his volume of Asian psy­
chology and, it might be added, this volume as well.
The result, however, is far from satsifactory because 
he refuses to go beyond "intuitively accepted terms." Like 
Miller, Cherry, Elwood and other Edwards scholars, Murphy 
does not elaborate his conception of the dimensions of human 
nature. For better or worse, the Western mind is an instru­
ment which understands only when it classifies and thereby 
views things in some relation to each other. Without some 
point of view, some superordinate classification scheme, no 
order can be extracted from chaos. We need to know, in other 
words, specifically what kinds of questions have been asked 
about human nature, and what answers have been given. With­
out this scientific addition to a history of psychology, 
which lay outside Boring's Wundtian hourglass, "psychology" 
remains only a convenient elastic label which may be applied 
in a haphazard manner. Calling an idea "psychology" does not
promote the understanding of Confucius any more than it does 
53when it is applied to Edwards.
The Thematic Approach to the History of Psychology: 
"Prescriptions" and "Fundamental Issues"
Neither Brett nor his lineal descendents in the 
history of psychology should be evaluated too critically for
52-ru-uIbid.. p. vi.
5 3That is, "understanding" in the sense meant by 
Dilthey and Polanyi: a perception of the joint significance 
of a set of particulars.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
92
failing to specify their notion of human nature. The under­
taking of scientific history is much more difficult for them 
thr n it was for Boring; they must, in effect, attempt to 
reduce much of the most complex and profound Western thought 
of the past 2,500 years to a few categories. To attempt 
such an intellectual feat requires great courage, or from 
another point of view, great foolishness. The categories 
must be relatively few in number, timeless, as mutually 
exclusive as possible, and exhaustive. The accomplishment 
of this monument of schematization requires both erudition 
and arbitrary decisiveness, arrogance and humility.
It is little wonder, then, that only two serious 
efforts, by Robert I. Watson and Michael Wertheimer, have
54
been made to bring schematic order to the approach of Brett. 
Although there are numerous differences between Watson’s 
Prescriptive Theory and the Fundamental Issues of Wertheimer, 
they have in common the desire to delineate the basic princi­
ples which unify pre-experimental psychology with post- 
Wundtian psychology, to bridge the gap created in part by 
Boring's deterministic and amorphous Zeitgeist. Yet both 
Watson and Wertheimer are also indebted to Boring. Each 
includes not only his components of human nature (contentual
^Watson, "Prescriptive Science: A Prescriptive
Analysis of Descartes' Psychological Views," Journal of the 
History of the Behavioral Sciences, 1971, 7, 223-248; "Pre­
scriptions as Operative in the History of Psychology," Journal 
of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 1 971, 7,, 31 1 -322; 
"Prescriptive Theory and the Social Sciences." Invited 
address delivered at the annual convention of the American Psy­
chological Association, August, 1974; and Michael Wertheimer, 
Fundamental Issues in Psychology (New York, 1 972).
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or substantive issues), but also certain methodological 
principles. There are not only various assumptions about 
human nature, there have also been differing opinions regard­
ing the manner in which those assumptions should be investi­
gated. There are, in other words, methodological issues as 
well as substantive ones.
It is Watson's position that psychology currently 
lacks, and always has lacked a unifying paradigm such as 
exists in sciences like physics or chemistry. He has there­
fore argued that the history of psychology, from Descartes to 
the present, is viewed most profitably in terms of a number 
of themes called "prescriptions."
The overall function of these themes is orientative or 
attitudinal; they tell us how the psychologist-scientist 
should behave. In short, they have a directive function. 
They help to direct the psychologist-scientist in the way 
he selects a problem, formulates it, and the way in which 
he carries it out.^5
Those prescriptions which Watson has isolated are arranged in
contrasting pairs (see Table 1 ) . ^  Note that in this stage
of the history of psychology, some prescriptions are clearly
contentual (e.g., Determinism-Indeterminism), others clearly
methodological (e.g., Quantitativism-Qualitativism), while
there is still another group that may fall in either category
(e.g. , Functionalism-Structuralism).
In contrast to Watson, Wertheimer has no firm theo­
retical base from which to launch his historical scheme. He
“^ Watson, "Prescriptive Science," p. 437.
56Ibid., pp. 4 3 6 - 4 3 7 .
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TABLE 1
PRESCRIPTIVE TERMS ARRANGED IN CONTRASTING PAIRS
Conscious mentalism-Unconscious mentalism (emphasis on aware­
ness of mental structure or activity— unawareness).
Contentual ob.jectivism-Contentual subjectivism (psychological 
data viewed as behavior of individual— as mental structure 
or activity of individual).
Determinism-Indeterminism (human events completely explicable 
in terms of antecedents— not completely so explicable) .
Quantitativism-Qualitativism (stress upon knowledge which is 
countable or measurable— upon that which is different in 
kind or essence).
Rationalism-Irrationalism (emphasis upon data supposed to
follow dictates of good sense and intellect— intrusion or 
domination of emotive and conative factors upon intellec­
tual processes).
Staticism-Developmentalism (emphasis upon cross-sectional 
view— upon changes with time).
Staticism-Dynamicism (emphasis upon enduring aspects— upon 
change and factors making for change).
Empiricism-Rationalism (major, if not exclusive source of 
knowledge is experience— is reason).
Functionalism-Structuralism (psychological categories are 
activities— are contents).
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Inductivism-Deductivism (investigations begun with facts or 
observations— with assumed established truths).
Mechanism-Vitalism (activities of living beings completely 
explicable by physio-chemical constituents— not so 
explicable).
Methodological objectivism-Methodological subjectivism (use 
of methods open to verification by another competent 
observer— not so open).
Molecularism-Molarism (psychological data most aptly described 
in terms of relatively small units— relatively large 
units).
Monism-Dualism (fundamental principle or entity in universe is 
of one kind— is of two kinds, mind and matter).
Naturalism-Supernaturalism (nature requires for its operation 
and explanation only principles found within it— requires 
transcendent guidance as well).
IMomotheticism-Idiographicism (emphasis upon discovering gen­
eral laws— upon explaining particular events or indi­
viduals ) .
Peripheralism-Centralism (stress upon psychological events 
taking place at periphery of body— within body).
Purism-Utilitarianism (seeking of knowledge for its own sake 
— for its usefulness in other activities).
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is simply a man with a problem; he seeks a way to make sense 
out of psychology, a complex science with an even more com­
plex past. Over a period of ten years, he says, he played
a kind of intellectual game, to see if I could find some 
questions that are broad and that are central to psy­
chology and to which no clear-cut answers could be given 
[because then they would stop being recurrent issues]
. . . that anybody else would come up with the same set
of questions is highly unlikely; further, given the set, 
it is improbable that anyone else would group them in the 
same way or present them in the same order.57
Wertheimer is too modest, for he is very knowledgeable about
results of his informal approach show a number of important 
similarities with Watson's more circumscribed, systematic 
approach. Wertheimer's Fundamental Issues are presented in 
Table 2.
Both Prescriptions and Fundamental Issues are pre­
sented as pairs of polar opposites. Each theorist emphasizes 
that this mode of presentation is mostly a mnemonic con­
venience, although most thinkers have aligned themselves 
closer to one pole than to another. Both approaches include 
contentual and methodological dimensions, and each has dis-
books dealing with contemporary psychology and the excellent 
A Brief History of Psychology (New York, 1970).
59
Wertheimer, however, complicates his presentation 
with many sub, and sub-sub issues, while Watson's prescrip­
tions are relatively discrete and (it is claimed) exhaustive.





(1) Man as Master versus Man as Victim cf his Fate
(2) Man as Good versus Man as Evil
(3) Andsum versus Transsum (the whole of man is merely, or 
more than, the sum of his component parts)
(4) Mind versus Body
(5) Subjectivity versus Objectivity
(6) Past versus Present
(7) Nature versus Nurture
(8) Simplicity versus Complexity
The Methodological Issues
(9) Richness versus Precision 
(10) Theory versus Data
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There are, however, several differences between 
Prescriptive Theory and the Fundamental Issues approach 
which suggest the greater systematic usefulness of prescrip­
tions. The Fundamental Issues are admittedly haphazard and 
idiosyncratic; a potpourri whose pre-twentieth-century mate­
rial is derived largely from secondary sources. It has a 
practical underpinning rather than a theoretical one; it was 
written as an organizational text for students and that is 
why much of the terminology is catchy but rather imprecise 
(e.g., Master-Victim; Good-Evil). Prescriptions, on the 
other hand, though unavoidably idiosyncratic, to some extent, 
represent the condensation of a long and continuing study of 
the history of Western psychological thought. In addition to 
Watson's own work, a number of dissertations have recently 
applied content analysis to various aspects of Western 
thought in an attempt to work toward a prescriptive history 
of psychology.^  Importantly, the prescriptive framework 
seeks to describe someone's psychological thought specifically 
so that prescriptive comparisons can then be made. In the 
Fundamental Issues approach, however, no attempt is made to
Watson, "View of Descartes." For other practical 
applications of prescriptive theory to the history of psy­
chology, consult the following dissertations done at the 
University of New Hampshire: Barbara C. Ross, "Psychological
Thought within the Context of the Scientific Revolution,
1 665-1 700,"' (1 970); Kenneth R. Gibson, "The Conceptual Bases 
of American Psychology: A Content Analysis of the Presi­
dential Addresses of the American Psychological Association, 
1892-1970" (1970); and Ronald H. Mueller, "The American Era 
of James Mark Baldwin (1893-1903)" (1974). See also the 
recent study by G. Kawash &. A. H. Fuchs, "Prescriptive Dimen­
sions for Five Schools of Psychology," Journal of the History 
of the Behavioral Sciences. 1 974, 1_0, in press.
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describe a thinker in terms of Issues. Rather, each indi­
vidual is simply used as an example of this or that issue.
The Prescriptive framework requires that one specify which
prescriptions are salient, dominant, and counter-dominant 
61
for a given thinker or period. Obviously, the concerns of 
one age are not necessarily those of another. Finally, 
Prescriptive terminology is relatively precise, if jargonesque, 
compared to the somewhat esoteric Fundamental Issues.
None of this should be construed as a condemnation of 
Wertheimer or his Fundamental Issues. In fact, two of his 
issues, Master-Victim and Andsum-Transsum, are used exten­
sively in the analysis of Edwards. The discussion simply 
serves to demonstrate that the present purpose, a clear syste­
matic description of the heretofore inscrutable psychology of 
Edwards, is more consistent with the prescriptive approach
than with the more informal and somewhat less historically 
62
oriented Fundamental Issues. Both represent laudable, use­
ful attempts to provide a schematic framework for writing a 
scientific history of psychology which lie inside and outside 
Boring's experimental territory.
^ S e e  Watson, "Prescriptive Science."
^Although Wertheimer spans much of Western history in 
search of examples for his various issues, most come from the 
twentieth century. This is consistent with his purpose: to
integrate the field of psychology historically for contempo­
rary students; see also W. D. Hitt, "Two Models of Man," 
American Psychologist. 1 969, 24_, 651 -659 , for an attempt to 
specify the dimensions of human nature implicit in two impor­
tant contemporary positions, behaviorism and phenomenology.
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A Prescriptive Description of Previous 
Research on the Psychology of Edwards
It was noted in chapter one that Edwards' thought 
nearly always tends toward synthesis and unity. He was 
extraordinarily adept at extracting ideas from such diverse 
thinkers as Augustine, Calvin, Locke, and Hutcheson, and uni­
fying them in a way that suited his purposes. His urgent 
need to discover unity in man's magnificent diversity is per­
haps the principal contributor to Edwards' inscrutability.
The language of his expositions is very logical and apparently 
simple, while the underlying implications of those statements 
are incredibly paradoxical. In order to raise the under­
standing of Edwards' psychological theory above the intuitive 
level, his theory must be integrated into a coherent model 
which depolarizes the paradoxes. Yet, as was pointed out 
earlier, the immense complexity itself is not clearly under­
stood. It is easy to say that Edwards believed that man was 
a rational-emotive unity or that man is both proactive and 
reactive, when one is ignorant of what he is saying. The 
chief function of Prescriptive Theory and the Fundamental 
Issues is to make explicit the rather astounding implications 
of Edwards' paradoxical theory.
Nearly every commentator on Edwards' psychology dur­
ing the past forty years believes that though Edwards used 
disjunctive faculty terminology, he meant to describe man as 
a rational-emotive unity.^ This unified view of the mind was
^Except, of course, for Roback and Fay. Roback's 
treatment is too superficial to be taken seriously while, as
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usually, though not always, expressed in Edwards' numerous
analyses of the conversion experience. The phrase which
Edwards most often used to express the unity was "a sense of
64
the heart," and a host of supportive "taste" metaphors.
A "sense of the heart" is certainly composed of a rational 
and an emotional component (what Edwards misleadingly 
referred to as "faculties"), but it cannot be reduced to the 
simple additive sum of reason plus emotion. The whole, in 
other words, is far more than the sum of its parts; it is 
what Max Wertheimer called a gestalten, or a Transsumative 
Whole.^
In a gestalt, the parts are not indifferent to each 
other, but are mutually related; they interact and influ­
ence one another. In an andsum, one part may be changed 
without other parts of the whole being affected in any 
major way, but in a gestalt or transsum, change of one 
part,may produce a radical change in other parts or in 
the entire whole —  as in a soap bubble.66
Edwards' "sense of the heart" is thus a particular expression
of a unified psychological view which shall be referred to as
transsummative man, an integrated coordination of apparently
diverse components.
Fearing has pointed out, Fay "misinterprets Edwards' psy­
chology, which he thinks is Aristotelian and scholastic 
because Edwards speaks of only two rational faculties, under­
standing and will ("Will and Intellect," p. 553).
^45ee Chapter 2, pp. 43-59.
^ A  clear expression of Gestalt may be found in Max 
Wertheimer, Productive Thinking. Michael Wertheimer, ed. (New 
York, 1959). Although he did not invent the term gestalt, 
Wertheimer is generally credited with founding the formal 
school of gestalt psychology.
^Michael Wertheimer, Fundamental Issues, p. 69.
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The important prescriptive implications are that 
Edwards' transummative view of man, as his commentators have 
described it is (1) vitalistic, (2) supernaturalistic, (3)
molar, and (4) dynamic. Clearly for Edwards the explanation 
of the activities of living beings requires a vitalistic, 
emergent phenomenon, "a sense of the heart." Yet it is 
vitalistic in a special sense. Edwards' psychological 
laboratory was his parish and his subject matter was religious 
conversion. Thus the "sense of the heart" did not simply 
emerge from man's inherent rational and emotive capacities, 
it required transcendent guidance. Edwards' emergent princi­
ple was, in other words, supernaturalistic as well as vital­
istic .
Wertheimer points out that transsummative explana­
tions are usually relatively molar rather than molecular.^ 
This is certainly the case with Edwards. Puritan psychology 
before and after Edwards often found itself embroiled in scho­
lastic debates concerning the sovereignty of this or that 
hypothetical faculty. Minute analyses were undertaken to 
demonstrate that the reason or the will is the "dominant" 
f aculty.^ Edwards never involved himself in molecular 
debates of this sort. His transsummative view of the facul­
ties as integrated aspects of a superordinate whole led him 
to an entirely different, relatively molar level of analysis.
6 7 Ibid.. pp. 7 8 - 7 9 .
^Analyses of the "faculty" debates are in Miller, 
Seventeenth Century. Fulcher, "Puritans and Passions," and 
especially Fiering, "Will and Intellect."
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It is almost a truism to state that "a sense of the 
heart" is a dynamic concept, yet the obviousness of the rela­
tionship should not be allowed to obscure it. The emergence 
of man's transsummative whole, "a sense of the heart," was 
said to represent the culmination of the most significant 
change ever undergone by man, his conversion from sinner to 
saint. Edwards often used his theory to defend his involve­
ment with emotional revivalism in the Great Awakening. His 
opponents in the controversy, Charles Chauncy and the "old 
light," objected to both the emotionality of revivals and to 
the soliciting of converts. Their psychological view, a 
reason-oriented scholastic approach, emphasized the "reason"
rather than rational-emotive involvement, and stability rather
■ i , 69than change.
Edwards' view of transsummative man as a vitalistic, 
molar, dynamic whole is represented in Figure 1. God is
responsible for the "indwelling principle," within Trans-
, • 70summative man.
Characteristically, Edwards was not content merely to 
describe, as best he could, a paradoxical view of man.
Instead he went much further to describe how the transsum­
mative man he sketched might behave in his relationship with
6 9This debate had important political and social con­
sequences; see Joseph Tracy, The Great Awakening; A History 
of the Revival of Religion (Boston, 1842); Heimert, Religion, 
and Gaustad, Great Awakening in New England.
^ " A  Divine and Supernatural Light . . ." in 5. E.
Dwight, ed., The Works of President Edwards. 10 vols., VI, 
p. 174.
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Figure 1. Edwards' transsumative 
view of man.
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God. One might object to including this issue in a considera­
tion of a system of psychology; theology usually subsumes 
man-God relationships. Yet Edwards clearly viewed the man- 
God relationship in psychological terms, sometimes Lockean 
and at other times, Augustinian. A theology-psychology dis­
tinction is false to Edwards' view of the universe, which he 
saw as operating in a moment-to-moment dependence upon God. 
Thus man's relationship to God can be viewed as a type of 
perceptual psychology in which man is seen in relation to the 
Holy Spirit or a social psychology in which he is seen in 
relation to the Holy Spirit or a social psychology in which 
he is seen in relation to God's universe. This does not 
represent an inappropriate stretching of the term "psy­
chology" as used by Brett and followed here. Until very 
recently, psychological thought has always been embedded in 
other contexts. For Edwards, the context was God, always and 
everywhere.
Investigations into Edwards' conception of the man- 
God relationship has led, as we have seen, to a debate 
between those who endorse an "Edwards-Locke psychological 
equation" and those who do not. The former group believes 
that Edwards followed Locke in asserting that man is passive 
or merely reactive. The latter holds that Edwards fashioned 
a view of man who is both proactive and reactive. Wertheimer 
has aptly labeled this fundamental issue "Man as Master versus 
Man as Victim of His Fate.""^ A prescriptive summary of the 
71 Wertheimer, Fundamental Issues, pp. 27-53.
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Edwards-equals-Locke view of a totally-reactive Man ("Vic­
tim") emphasizes (1) Unconscious Mentalism, (2) Contentual 
Sub.j ectivism, (3) Determinism, (4) Empiricism, and (5)
Structuralism.
(1) Unconscious Mentalism. The British empiricist 
tradition emphasizes the combination or association of mental 
elements in a manner that is neither controlled nor observed 
by the individual. Simple ideas, the heart of Locke's empha­
sis upon passivity, became associated with each other accord-
72ing to various "laws" such as contiguity or continuity.
Edwards sometimes referred to the "indwelling principle" 
resulting from a conversion experience as a "new simple
..73idea."
Contentual Subjectivism-Structuralism. To Locke, and 
hence to Edwards, psychological data is viewed as the mental 
structure or activity of the individual. Both Locke and 
Edwards derived much of their evidence from personal intro­
spection. In fact, Locke is often seen as one of the fountain- 
heads of the introspectionist school of psychology known as 
"structuralism," though the structuralists owe more to James 
Mill's mental-chemistry notions than to Locke. A psycho­
logical view which emphasizes contentual subjectivism-
7^This is a cornerstone of the school of philosophical 
psychology known as "associationism," from Hobbes to Bain; see 
Howard C. Warren, A History of the Association Psychology (New
73Cf. Affections, p. 205.
7<^ The classic statement of the "structuralist" posi­
tion is Edward Bradford Titchener, "The Postulates of a
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structuralism is also consistent with the earlier Puritan 
"structuralism" whose advocates delighted in airy specula­
tion about "faculties" which they regarded as physiological 
structures located somewhere in the mind."^ Edwards' concern 
over the mental morphology of conversion is said to place him 
squarely in both structural traditions.
Determinism. Psychological theorists from Locke to 
Skinner who have viewed man as a passive, reactive organism, 
have had little patience with the nation of free will. 
According to Locke, human action is determined by "the great 
motive," or "some uneasiness" which renders man "ultimately 
the passive subject of a natural necessity consequent upon 
'uneasiness. It is also very easy to show that Edwards'
diatribe against the Arminians is chiefly directed toward 
demonstrating that there are no acts which are devoid of
Structural Psychology," Philosophical Review, 1 898, _7» 449- 
465; see also Edna Heidbreder, Seven Psychologies (New York,
1 933), pp. 11 3-1 51 .
^Th e r e  is a sense in which the "faculty" concept is 
functional: a "reason" or a "will" implies the execution of
some sort of activity. Normally, however, "faculties" were 
thought of as semi-independent entities or elemental struc­
tures of the mind rather than as complementary functions of 
a total act, as the American school of functional psychology 
would have it. The term functional is confusing, as was 
demonstrated long ago by C. A. Ruckmick, "The Use of the Term 
Function in English Textbooks of Psychology," Arnerican 
Journal of Psychology. 1913, 2_4, 99-1 23. On the school of 
American functionalism, consult James R. Angell, "The Prov­
ince of Functional Psychology," Psychological Review, 1907,
14, 61-91, and Heidbreder, Seven Psychologies, pp. 201-233.
^ Essay, II, xxi, 29. A. C. Fraser, the editor, 
points out that this was not Locke's original view but that, 
in any event, he viewed the will as fully determined, whether 
by the "greater good," or "some uneasiness," see Essay, I, 
p. 330.
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motivation, that is of antecedent causes.^ Although a 
reactive view of man need not be mentalistic like Locke's 
(or Edwards' by virtue of the Locke-Edwards equation), it is 
necessarily deterministic.
Empiricism. Locke is synonymous with empiricism: 
all of man's materials for reason and knowledge, he stated 
simply, come "from EXPERIENCE."7  ^ In this view, man is held 
to be more complex but not fundamentally different from a 
popcorn kernel. Only when heat (sensational experience) is 
applied does it behave the way popcorn kernels are supposed 
to behave. Without "experience," it is inert; after the 
imposition of foreign stimulation it functions, but only
reactively. It has been claimed that Edwards joined with
79Locke in the latter's "victory over innatism." The pre- 
scriptively summarized Lockean, reactive view of man is repre­
sented in Figure 2.
The popcorn-kernel man, buffeted by the stimulating 
heat of God's universe, would certainly appear to be con­
genial to a Calvinist predestinarian like Edwards who had an 
interest in psychology. It provides the psychological founda­
tion for belief in a God who is omniscient and omnipresent.
A growing number of Edwards' modern commentators, however, 
have expressed the view that the Edwards-Locke psychological
77See Will.
7BEssav. II, i, 2.
7^Miller, "Sense of the Heart," p. 125; see also 
Jonathan Edwards, pp. 43-68. Locke's view, of course, is far 
more complex than a mere "sensationalism," but it is this 
passive aspect of his thought that Edwards borrowed from him; 
see Chapter 2, footnote 72.
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Figure 2. The Edwardsean reactive man. Prescriptions and 
accompanying arrows indicate that transsummative man is inert 
until impinged upon by outside stimulation which, in Edwards' 
view, always originated with God himself.
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equation does not tell the whole story.^ Edwards' theory, 
this view holds, claims that man in his relationship with 
God is proactive as well as reactive; he can initiate activity 
as well as respond to impinging stimulation. Cherry refers 
to this paradoxical Edwardsean view as "active-receiving," 
and the evidence is overwhelming that Edwards did not respond 
to Locke with Lockean passivity.*^ Edwards appears not to 
have been a sheet of white paper in his encounter with the 
Essay; he brought with him an interest in man's "active 
powers" which he may have gotten from Hutcheson and from the 
Cambridge Platonists. ^
"Active-receiving" is a deceptively-simple phrase.
A prescriptive summary demonstrates the extent of the decep­
tion, for instead of one paradox there are many; "proactive 
man" represents a prescriptive inversion of 'teactive m an."^
^ 5 e e  Chapter 2, pp.
^ S e e  Cherry, Theology, pp. 12-24.
^Thomas Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of 
Pur Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (London, 1625); John Smith, 
Select Discourses (London, 1673). The oddity of a genius 
like Edwards inhabiting the cultural backwater of mid- 
eighteenth-century western Massachusetts has aroused a flurry 
of activity among those who wonder where he got his ideas. 
Nearly as much as been written on Edwards' "influences" as on 
Edwards himself. Recent efforts to trace Edwards to his roots 
may be found in John E. Smith's introduction to the Affections 
(Thomas Shepard and Solomon Stoddard, chiefly) and Paul Ram­
sey's introduction to The Will (Locke). Elwood has provided 
a needed antidote to all this lineal speculation by pointing 
out that, no matter where Edwards first encountered some of 
his ideas, he always made creative use of them, thus more 
attention should be given to explicating what Edwards said; 
see Elwood, Philosophical Theology, p. 122.
®^The presentation of this prescriptive summary is 
necessarily shorter and more informal than that for "reactive
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A view of man as proactive is characterized by (1) Conscious 
Mentalism, (2) Contentual Objectivism, (3) Indeterminism,
(4) Rationalism, and (5) Functionalism.
An organism which initiates activity proactively is, 
most importantly, decision maker. Man must deal effectively 
with questions like when, why, and how. The proactive view 
is, therefore, consciously mentalistic; man must be aware of 
his mental activity in order to make appropriate decisions.
For Edwards, the decision to be made was whether or not to
approach God, to prepare oneself for possible conversion.
The decision and conversion are both acts, which indicates
that the proactive view is further characterized by conten­
tual objectivism and functionalism. Psychological data, 
therefore, is behavior which is composed of activities that 
are to some extent a function of the purposes and determina­
tion of the individual.
Since, from the proactive point of view, conversion 
is in part the result of conscious striving and decision 
making, an individual may decide, on a conscious level, to 
change the direction in which he is apparently being led by 
antecedent events. Individuals do make choices and on a
man," since it represents what heretofore has been a vaguely- 
stated point of view, in contrast to the elaborate position 
outlined in the Edwards-Locke equation.
^Edwards, however, claimed that the choices them­
selves are determined by inexorable motives (liking and dis­
liking, pleasure and pain) built into man, who is thus under 
a condition of "moral necessity" to be inclined toward that 
which he likes and away from that which he dislikes; The Will, 
p . 217.
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Figure 3. A prescriptive representation of the Edwardsean 
transsummative, proactive-reactive man.
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Finally, man, Edwards' potential convert, is entirely not 
analogous to a popcorn kernel. Man's decisions concerning 
what to do must necessarily be based upon decisions regarding 
which aspects of the stimulation he should attend to. He 
cannot respond to all of God's unfathomable heat; he must be 
choosy. This suggests that man has built-in "rules of 
harmony and regularity" with which he orders his experience.^
Recall that virtually no one denies Locke's consid­
erable influence upon Edwards. The "proactive" hypothesis is 
presented only as a qualification to the Edwards-Locke equa­
tion. Edwards viewed man not only as reactive, this view 
holds, but also as proactive. The extraordinary complexities 
introduced by this humble amendment are illustrated in Figure 
3.
While Perry Miller may have overstated his case when 
he formulated the Edwards-Locke equation, the proposal has 
an obvious consistency that the amended version lacks. The 
neat, comprehensible, Lockean one-way perceptual street is 
transformed into a confusing, multifaceted conceptual inter­
section. The usually disjunctive prescriptive polarities are
transformed into conjunctions, man is and is not a number of
, , . 86 
things.
^Jonathan Edwards, The Mind, p. 26.
^Watson also speaks of dominant and counter-dominant 
prescriptions and this terminology is sometimes used to 
describe the psychological tendencies of an era. Sometimes a 
position transcends the prescriptive polarities. Logical 
Empiricism, for instance, may be viewed as an attempt to find 
a satisfactory middle ground between Rationalism and Empiri­
cism. See Watson, "Prescriptive 5cience."
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Edwards and the Synthetic Tradition in 
the History of Psychology
If it is true that Edwards' view of man was Trans- 
summative-proactive-reactive, and it appears certain that it 
was, it is apparent that his integration lacks unifying 
principles. To paraphrase Robert Browning, Edwards' reach 
for a unified view of human psychology clearly exceeded his 
own profound grasp of the psychological concepts available to 
him. The use of the Fundamental Issues— Prescriptive Theory 
analysis opens a Pandora's box of theoretical inconsistencies 
and complications.
Is Edwards' view of psychology unique? From a his­
torical perspective, does he alone defend a view which charac­
terizes man as a rational-emotive unity? If he truly stood 
alone, his psychology would probably never be understood 
except in an artifical sense within the context of an ad hoc 
model out of thin air and a historian's imagination.
Fortunately, rather than being a historical oddity, 
Edwards' psychological theory is part of a long tradition, a 
synthetic tradition, in the history of psychology. A number 
of other thinkers, it turns out, have attempted the same sort 
of prescriptive syntheses sought by Edwards: a view of man
who is transsummative, proactive, and reactive.^ Two of the 
synthetic positions which will be discussed briefly, that of 
Augustine and John Dewey, contain a "bohemian" component
' B7This is not a Boringian causative tradition, but a 
Brettian affinitive tradition. "Influence" is not an issue.
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similar to that in Edwards: no one has ever determined with
finality what, exactly, these theorists were trying to say. 
Like Edwards, their visionary reach exceeded their theoreti­
cal grasp. A third and contemporary view, information pro­
cessing , reaches as far as the others but with a much-surer 
grasp. While Augustine, Edwards, and Dewey held that man is_ 
transsummative, proactive, and reactive, information-pro­
cessing theorists have constructed concrete models which 
demonstrate how such a complex man might function. The model, 
or models, will be presented in detail in Chapter 3. The dis­
cussion which fallows in this chapter is designed to provide 
a common context for Edwards and information processing as a 
justification for the presentistic application of the pre- 
scriptively similar but more explicit and coherent contempo­
rary view to Edwards. Information-processing theory, in other 
words, will provide the integrative whole into which pre­
scriptive particulars may be placed as a vehicle to promote 
understanding of Edwards' complex psychological theory.
The reader is now asked to endure a rather lengthy 
and redundant series of quotes in which Augustine, Dewey, and 
contemporary information-processing theory are seen to express 
views which are nearly identical to Edwards: man as trans-
summative and as proactive-reactive. Although Augustine did 
influence Edwards, and Dewey has had considerable impact upon 
information-processing theory, the elucidation of historical 
influence is not at issue here. The point is that for almost 
sixteen hundred years certain visionary individuals, including
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Edwards, have held a unified, prescriptively-paradoxical view 
of man which defied concrete description. Information-pro­
cessing theory differs from the other unified views only in 
its conscious attempt to construct models which are capable 
of explaining how a transsummative, proactive-reactive man 
might function.
Augustine, like Edwards, expressed his psychological 
views almost entirely within the framework of Christian the­
ology and the conversion experience. It is God's universe 
that must be actively received:
'Seek ye God, and your soul shall live" (Ps.. lxviii, 33). 
It is because He is hidden that he must be sought in 
order to be found; and being found He must still be 
sought because of His immensity . . . For He satisfies
the seeker in the measure of his capacity and He makes 
the finder to have greater capacity so that he may againgg 
seek to be filled when his ability to receive has grown.
"Faith seeks," said Augustine, "understanding finds. That
is, there is a reciprocal relationship between a passive cog­
nitive faculty which receives, and faith, or the Will- 
affections which actively seeks God. Only if cognition is 
supplemented by the emotions, or what Augustine called "love,"
is cognition full or complete. Full cognition, therefore, is 
90
re-cognition. Knowledge can never be disassociated from
^ In Joanis Evanqelium tractatus, LXIII, i; in Erich 
Przywara, ed., An Augustine Synthesis (New York, 1958 pp. 75- 
7 6.
89
De Trinetate libri quindecim, XV, ii, 2; Ibid.,
p. 77.
90
The use gf the term re-cognition to describe 
Augustine's proactive-reactive position derives from Robert 
E. Cushman, "Faith and Reason," in Roy W. Battennouse, ed.,
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love, or will, which transforms vague awareness into sharp, 
full cognition.
Augustine's use of faculty terminology is misleading.
The proactive (faith) and reactive (understanding) aspects of
man appear, in certain passages to correspond to Aristotelian
"faculties" of the soul. Yet, as with Edwards, the terms are
used in a conjunctive rather than a disjunctive sense.
Since, therefore, memory, understanding, will, are not 
three lives, but one life; not three minds but one mind; 
it follows as a certainty that they are also not three 
substances, but one substance . . . And hence these three
are one, in that they are one life, one mind, one essence, 
and whatever else they are severally called in respect to 
themselves, they are called also together, not plurally, 
but in the singular number.91
In short, man is transsummative, possessed of different, but
inseparably-related capacities.
It is difficult to say whether John Dewey, writing 
fifteen hundred years after Augustine and one-hundred-fifty 
years after Edwards, had significantly clarified the syn­
thetic view of man beyond the clumsy attempts of Augustine 
□ 2
and Edwards. It is even hard to determine whether Dewey 
had successfully removed the issue from its original theo­
logical context, for Dewey's early expressions of the syn­
thetic viewpoint were strongly influencedby Leibniz and
A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine (New York, 1955), 
pp. 287-314.
91
De Trinitate libri quindecim, in Przywara, ed., 
Augustine. p. 148.
■^See Chapter 2, pp. 42-49 for representative 
expressions of Edwards' transsummative ("sense of the heart") 
and proactive-reactive views.
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carried noticeable traces of the Hegelian world spirit.
Dewey's admiration for Leibniz was in large measure
due to their common attempt to portray man and the universe
as an "organic unity."
The difficulty of Locke is the difficulty of every theory 
of knowledge that does not admit an organic unity of the 
knowing mind and the known u n i v e r s e . 94
Strictly speaking, sensation is an activity of the mind. 
There are no windows through which the soul receives 
impressions. Pure passivity of any kind is a myth, as 
scholastic fiction.z5
"Organic unity" implies a reciprocal relationship between
man and the environmental sources of his stimulation. Dewey
thus sought to alter the level of analysis from the stimulus-
response concept of the reflex arc, to one which viewed
stimulus and response as part of an entire purposive act
which necessarily contains proactive and reactive components.^
In any functional act, both the intellect and the
emotions are involved, and they function as a unity. For
93 In his review of Dewey's Psychology, E. Stanley 
Hall severely criticized Dewey for twisting psychological 
facts until they fit "the [Hegelian] system which is far more 
important than they"; American Journal of Psychology, 1BB7,
1, p. 157.
94
Leibniz'sNew Essays Concerning the Human Under­
standing in Jo Ann Boydston, ed., The Early Works of John 
Dewey, I. (Carbondale, 111., 1969), pp. 253-435. (1888)
Dewey later enlarged on this them in John Dewey and 
Arthur F. Bentley, Knowing and the Known (Boston, 1949).
9 5
Leibniz's New Essays, p. 319.
^ " T h e  Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology" in Boydston, 
ed., Early Works, V, pp. 96-109. Dewey also makes this point 
in How We Think, rev. ed. (Boston, 1933). He states, "The 
nature of the problem fixes the end of thought and the end 
controls the process of thinking." (p. 15).
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instance, if a man encounters a bear
. . . we have but the one organic pulse, the frightful 
bear, the frightened man, whose reality is the whole con­
crete coordination of eye-leg-heart, etc., activity, and 
that the distinction of cold intellectuality and warm 
emotionality is simply a functional distinction within 
this whole one of a c t i o n . 97
Thus, not only is man's relationship to the universe a pro­
active-reactive organic unity, but the various functional 
components within man also operate as an organic unity.
Feeling, knowledge, and will are not to be regarded as 
three kinds of consciousness, nor are they three 
separate parts of the same consciousness. They are three 
aspects which every consciousness presents, according to 
the light in which it is considered; whether as giving 
information, as affecting the self in a painful or plea­
surable way, or as manifesting an activity of self. But 
there is still another connection. Just as in the 
organic body the process of digestion cannot go on with­
out that of circulation, and both require respiration and 
nerve action, which in turn are dependent upon other pro-
ces ses, so in the or gan ic mind knowledge is not possible
without fe eling and will; and neither of the:se without
the other two.98
As an expression of t:ranss ummative man, thi s state-
ment is neithe r more nor less clea r than either Aug ustine's
or Edwa rds ' . While Augu stine and Edwards spoke of "one
essence , " and "a sense of the heart," respective iy, Dewey's
"organic mind" offers little in addition except physio­
logical metaphors. Dewey's revised concept of the reflex 
arc, however, is clearly an attempt to provide a model which 
can describe the precise manner in which man functions as a 
proactive-reactive unity. It was his goal to transform the
97
"The Significance of Emotions," in Boydston, ed., 
Early Works. IV, pp. 169-188. (1895)
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notion of the reflex arc from the age-old conception of "a
mechanical conjunction of unallied processes" to one in which
sensory stimulus, central connections, and motor responses 
shall be viewed, not as separate and complete entities in 
themselves, but as divisions of labor, functioning fac­
tors, within the single concrete whole, now designated 
the reflex a r c . 99
Dewey's "reflex arc" paper was an inspiration for the devel­
oping school of American psychology known as functionalism.
The "Organic Mind" and "the reflex arc" were adopted, in one 
form or another, by the leading functionalists, including 
Dewey, James, Angell, and C a r r T h e y  carried these syn­
thetic principles with them in their battle with behaviorism.
American behaviorism has always represented the 
quintesscence of parsimony; an experimental application of 
the old adage "believe nothing of what you hear and only 
half of what you see." Since neither minds nor introspective 
reports concerning minds can be seen (that is directly 
observed), transsummative man became a dead issue. Man's 
mind is unknowable; he simply behaves, and this behavior is 
reactive— an organism responds to a stimulus.”'^ The
"^"Reflex Arc," p. 97.
^^James was not, strictly speaking, a member of any 
school of psychology but he was in substantial agreement 
with Dewey's transssummative and proactive-reactive princi­
ples; see James, Principles I, pp. 221-223 for James's dis­
cussion of "knowledge of acquaintance," a concept very sim­
ilar to "sense of the heart" and "organic mind." See also I, 
pp. 7-11 for James's position on the proactive-reactive princi­
ple, especially his "Romeo and Juliet" illustration.
1 01
The combination of reactive man and anti-mentalism 
reached a kind of model-building zenith in Clark L. Hull's 
drive-reduction theorv. See Principles of Behavior (New 
York, 1943).
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simplicity of the stimulus-response model, together with 
experimental successes, soon assured behaviorism the dominant 
position in academic psychology. It appeared, for a while, 
as if the synthetic tradition within academic psychology 
would never progress beyond the still-mostly intuitive "or­
ganic mind" and the slightly-more explicit "reflex arc" of 
the functionalist school.
The synthetic theorists, from Augustine to Dewey, 
were too timid. Their excursions into model building were 
always tentative and conjectural. Yet their timidity was 
legitimate-, unlike the behavior is ts they could not see what 
they were talking about, they could only guess, and seldom 
were two guesses in complete agreement. When psychological 
model building reached an unprecedented peak in the first 
half of the twentieth century the synthetic tradition, badly 
in need of an explanatory model, was ignored, although the 
Europeans Bartlett and Piaget continued to postulate mental 
constructs called "schemata .
Recently, however, a remarkable series of events has 
breathed new life into the synthetic tradition. Synthetic 
theorists now have the confidence to build comprehensive, 
working models of proactive-reactive and transsummative man 
because of the invention and development of electronic com­
puting machines, and especially the area known as "simulation."
1 02
Frederick C. Bartlett, Remembering (Cambridge, Eng., 
1932); Jean Piaget, Judgement and Reasoning in the Child, 
trans. by M. Warden (New York, 1926).
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In fact, computers can do far more than add numbers; they 
can recognize complex patterns, solve difficult logical 
problems, and even imitate many of the idiosyncracies of 
human personality.^^ Importantly for the psychologist, it 
cannot only be observed that computers, and, by implication, 
men, accomplish these feats, but how. Thus, while the syn­
thetic theorist cannot see into man any more clearly than 
Augustine, Edwards, or Dewey, he can observe the machinery 
and functioning of devices which are in many respects, very 
man-like. He can build models which, like those of the 
behaviorists, have observable referents.
. . . the "program analogy" (which may be a better term
than "computer analogy") has several advantages over 
earlier conceptions. Most important is the philosophical 
reassurance which it provides. Although a program is 
nothing but a flow of symbols, it has reality enough to 
control the operation of very tangible machinery that 
executes very physical operation.
. . . what kind of a thing is a schema? If memory con­
sists of transformations, what is transformed? So long 
as cognitive psychology literally did not know what it 
was talking about, there was always a danger that it 
was talking about nothing at all. This is not longer a 
serious risk. Information is what is transformed, and 
the structured pattern of its transformation is what we 
want to understand.^
This is hardly a timid or speculative statement, it is a mani­
festo. Cognitive psychology is a model building, and as we 
shall see, a synthetic exercise with an observable base. 
Information, that which facilitates choice by narrowing alter-
See W. Sluckin, Minds and Men (London, 1959) for a 
review of the early work in simulation and Michael J. Apter,
The Computer Simulation of Behavior (New York, 1970) for a care­
ful yet very readable review of recent work in the field.
1 04uiric Neisser, Cognitive Psychology (New York, 194B).
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natives, is processed by equipment which can be seen as well 
as heard. The information processing point of view, as the 
computer program analogue to human cognition is generally 
known, is the first synthetic psychology to provide explicit 
models of transsummative and proactive-reactive man. A 
detailed presentation of the models is given in chapter four 
and applied to Edwards' synthetic but vague psychological 
theory in chapter five. It is enough here simply to indicate 
the manner in which synthetic principles are expressed in the 
language of information processing.
Man's relationship to the universe is included in the
"cybernetic hypothesis," his encounter with the world is best
1 05
described as a proactive-reactive "feedback loop." Man is
said to Test-Operate-Test-Exit (TOTE). This fundamental unit 
of analysis is actually a more confident, explicit, computer- 
based model of Dewey's revised conception of the reflex arc 
(Figure 4 ) . ^ ^
Incoming information is received and if some inbalance 
or incongurity (similar to Locke's principle of "uneasiness") 
is perceived, control is exerted in the form of an operation 
to correct the imbalance. Information is then fed back from 
the operation, if the incongruity has been erased, the indi­
vidual exits from the loop. Proactive control alternates with
"'^Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics (New York, 1 948).
 ^^ G eo r g e  A. Miller, Eugene Ealanter, and Karl H. 
Pribram, Plans and the Structure of Behavior (New York,
1960).
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Figure 4. A simple feedback loop, or TOTE unit.
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reactive reception of information until harmony is achieved.
Transsummative man, a rational-emotive unity, is con-
It is
held that there are two kinds of mental organization, one 
rational and one emotional. Rational functioning is held to 
be analogous to the operation of a sequential computer pro­
gram which "makes only those tests which are appropriate in 
the light of previous test outcomes."''^ Emotional or 
irrational activity, on the other hand, is comparable to the 
operation of a parallel computer program which "carries out
109many activities simultaneously, or at least independently."
The sequential program has many of the attributes of the 
human "stream" of consciousness, while the parallel program 
resembles what is known of the chaotic unconscious. Impor­
tantly, in man these sequential and parallel programs are said 
to function as a complex, integrated, unpredictable unit.
. . . human thinking is a multiple activity. Awake or
asleep, a number of more or less independent trains of 
thought usually coexist. Ordinarily, there is a "main 
sequence" in progress, dealing with some particular 
material in step-by-step fashion. The main sequence 
corresponds to the ordinary course of consciousness. It 
may or may not be influenced by the other processes going 
on simultaneously. The concurrent operations are not 
conscious, because consciousness is intrinsically sin­
gle. n o
^ ^ 5 e e  IMeisser, Cognitive Psychology, Chapt. 11, and 
"The Multiplicity of Thouqht," British Journal of Psychology. 
1 963, 54, 1 -1 4.
 ^^ Neisser, Cognitive Psychology, p. 297.
1 1 0
Neisser, "Multiplicity," p. B.
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The principal function of this unconscious activity is,
according to Freud, to find discharge for emotions which are
1 1 1striving for expression in our minds. Thus all conscious
’’rational" mental activity is influenced by unconscious emo­
tional activity.
The Synthetic psychological viewpoints which have 
been discussed, and their respective expressions of the syn­
thetic principles are summarized in Table 3.
In contrast to what many of his commentators believe, 
Edwards' psychological views have some historical company.
From at least the time of Augustine, a select group of 
thinkers have tried to describe their vision of a man at one 
with himself and with the universe. Unfortunately, these psy­
chological descriptions have been only indifferently success­
ful, and historians' efforts to interpret synthetic psy­
chology have resulted in failure. The thinkers themselves 
can hardly be blamed for the confusion because they lacked 
adequate raw intellectual materials. Augustine, Edwards, and 
Dewey were forced to use the faculty language, hardly the 
ideal vehicle for expressing unified conceptions of anything. 
Historians of Edwards' psychological theory, however, have 
111
Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (New 
York, 1923). Neisser seeks to transform the Freudian concepts, 
primary and secondary process thinking, into information pro­
cessing concepts (parallel and sequential, respectively) which 
are derived from observations of computer hardware. It also 
represents an attempt to discuss Freud in a cognitive rather 
than a strictly motivational context; see Neisser, Cognitive 
Psychology, pp. 3-11, for a clarification of "the cognitive 
approach."
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TABLE 3
SOME EXAMPLES OF THE SYNTHETIC PRINCIPLES
Transsummative Proactive-Reactive
Theorist Man Man
Augustine "one life, one mind, 
one essence"
"re-cognition"
"a sense of the "Active Powers"--
Edwards heart" Lockean Passivity
Dewey "Organic Mind" "Reflex Arc"
Information "Multiple "Feedback Loop"
Processing Processing"
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been sloppy; they have not bothered to define the history of 
psychology in a way that places him in a context. They have 
been content merely to praise his uniqueness and lament his 
fate. Edwards has now been placed in a psychological con­
text; a prescriptive analysis of his views demonstrated the 
immensity of his dilemma and the need for a model to explain 
how man can be so utterly diverse as the synthetic theorists 
claim.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
128
CHAPTER IV
AN INFORMATION-PROCESSING MODEL OF 
HUMAN THINKING AND BEHAVIOR
In spite of proactive-reactive and transsummative 
similarities which place them in a common synthetic tradition, 
Edwards and contemporary information-processing theorists 
seem, on the surface, to be worlds apart. Edwards' world was 
abstract in the extreme, populated by deities, devils, angels, 
saints, and sinners. He yearned for the day when he would 
join his colleagues in supernatural communion in the next 
world. The information-processing theorists, on the other 
hand, hold a view which is throughly mechanistic. Their 
world is chiefly one of the concrete gadgets, programs, and 
printouts that characterize their computers whose yearnings, 
if computers can be said to yearn, would certainly not be 
directed toward the Calvinist God but rather toward an oil 
can which never runs dry or perhaps an infinitely long piece 
of magnetic tape. The aspirations and fate of the theorists 
themselves remains, of course, an open question, although 
many would undoubtedly feel more comfortable alongside their 
machines than in the presence of Edwards' God.
The mechanistic attitude is displayed in both the 
proactive-reactive and transsummative aspects of the infor­
mation-processing approach. Most information-processing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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theorists believe, following Norbert Wiener, that functioning 
cybernetic systems need not even be alive.^ God (for cen­
turies past) or nobody in particular (after Darwin) has set 
up systems, ranging from the molar universe down to molecular 
biology and atomic physics, which run on a homeostatic prin­
ciple.^ An organism always seeks to satisfy a need and when 
equilibrium is achieved, it will rest until a need is again 
manifest. The thesis of much contemporary and motivational
psychology is that one of man's basic needs is to organize,
3
manipulate, understand, and control his environment. Man 
must plan, seek and receive information relevant to his plan, 
execute the plan, and evaluate the extent to which the plan 
has been successfully executed. Lifelong planning is as 
inescapable as death; it is an incontrovertible fact of human 
nature.
The human race at times appears to be such a rational 
lot. We TOTE our plans here and there, testing, operating, 
testing, and eventually exiting from our various loops. If 
man were only a TOTE-er, however, he would be as dull and pre­
dictable as the computers he is alleged to resemble
"'wiener, Cybernetics .
^Loren Eiseley has described in a lucid and com­
pelling fashion the manner in which multifaceted nature 
became detached from the God hypothesis; see Darwin's Century 
(New York, 1958). It might almost be contended that the time 
is ripe for the re-invocation of a modified God Hypothesis, 
now that man has created cybernetic "thinking" machines.
^The classic statement of this position is Robert W. 
White, "Motivation Reconsidered: The Concept of Competence."
Psychological Review. 1 959 , 6_6, 297-333. Early research on
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intellectually. Yet except under extreme or trivial circum­
stances, human thinking and activity is characteristically 
unpredictable. Why? Chiefly, say the information-processing 
theorists, because of the exasperating human propensity to 
choose what we like from among alternatives without actually 
knowing what we like. The choices may be considered 
or fickle but in either case they involve discarding or not 
attending to what is perceived as irrelevant or unpleasurable 
stimulation.^ The conscious and/or unconscious selection of 
alternatives is said to be based on emotional considerations. 
The choices are a function of the total conscious and uncon­
scious history of the organism which, if known(as, of course, 
it can never be), might permit exact prediction of a person's 
next plan and mode of executing it.
Jonathan Edwards; A Computerized Theologian?
How can such utter mechanism be reconciled with 
Edwards' insistence that man operates within a moment-to-
"competence" motivation came from the primate laboratory of 
Harry F. Harlow; see Harlow's "Mice, Monkeys, Men, and 
Motives," Psychological Review. 1 953 , 6J3, 23-32, and R. A. 
Butler, "Discrimination Learning by Rhesus Monkeys to Visual 
Exploration Motivation," Journal of Comparative and Physio­
logical Psychology. 1 953, 4_6, 95-98.
4
Few computer simulators have taken Meisser's cogent 
seriously. He has maintained that all human think­
ing is motivated, often by emotionally-laden desires that are 
unconscious, i.e., outside the focus of attention. See his 
"The Imitation of Man by Machine," Science. 1 963, 1 39 , 1 93 — 
197, and Cognitive Psychology, Chapter 11. Those information- 
processing -theorists who have attempted to incorporate emotion 
into their programs have generally treated it as an "inter­
rupting mechanism," rather than as an aspect of cognition 
which is thoroughly integrated with all intellectual
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moment dependence upon God?"* In fact, in many respects, the 
two views are very similar. Neither scheme can account for 
or predict much of the immense variability in human thinking 
and acting. Edwards and the information-processing theorists 
generally present the motivational determinants of cognition 
and behavior in the form of excuses for their ignorance of 
those determinants. Who, asks Edwards, can pretend to appre­
hend God's will in its totality?
In these [spiritual] things, men that are prudent for 
their temporal interest, act as though they were bereft 
of reason: "They have eyes and see not; ears and hear
not; neither do they understand: They are like the horse
and Mule, that have no understanding" (Mark 8:1B, Ps. 32: 
9). (Jer. 8:7), "The stork in the heaven knoweth her 
appointed times; and the turtle, and the crane, and the 
swallow, observe the time of their coming: But my people
know not the judgement of the Lord."
. . . And how can these things be accounted for, but
by supposing a most wretched depravity of n a t u r e ? ^
It is man's condition of original sin which prevents him from
activity. See especially Herbert 5imon, "Motivational and 
Emotional Controls of Cognition," Psychological Review, 1967, 
74, 29-39. Programs which have this sort of "emotional" fac­
tor built into them include Walter Reitman's "Argus" (Cog­
nition and Thought: An Information Processing Approach, New
York, 1965) and J. C. Loehlin's "Aldous" (Computer Models of 
Personality, New York, 1968). Although computerized "emotion" 
of this sort does interrupt and select, it does not, accord­
ing to Neisser, do even remote justice to the complex, mostly 
unconscious nature of most emotional attraction and replusion.
"'This aspect of Edwards' thought has been elaborated 
by Paul Conkin, Puritans and Pragmatists (New York, 1968), 
Chapter 2, and David Lyttle, "Jonathan Edwards on Personal 
Identity," Early American Literature, 1 972, .8(2), 1 63-1 71 .
The clearest demonstration of Edwards' belief in utter and 
complete dependence upon God is contained in his History of 
the Work of Redemption, in 5. E. Dwight, ed., Works, III, pp. 
165-436. In this unfinished opus Edwards attempted to explain 
the entire history of the world, in Toynbee-like fashion, as 
the expression of God's personal handiwork.
^Original Sin, ed. by Clyde A. Holbrook (New Haven,
1 970), pp. 1 55-1 56. (1 758)
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complete understanding of God's will, and hence, of himself.^ 
No one, claims Ulric Neisser, a leading information-processing 
theorist, can hope to understand completely the remarkably 
complex intermingling of conscious and unconscious processes 
which together form the "main sequence" of consciousness.
The existence of more than one process implies that 
the main sequence may be altered in "unpredictable" ways 
at almost any moment. The change will usually be away 
from immediate adaptation to the external world and 
toward an emphasis on inner needs.^
At this moment I do not know, exactly, what the next sentence
on this fDage will be beca use I am not ah(are of the nature and
strength of many personal inner needs. Like th e will of
Edwards' God , the human mind is far too complex and man's
discernirig power much too inadequate to permit a person's
thoughts and actio ns to be described ahe:ad of time in a per-
sonalized, ideo-motor itinerary.
Edwards and the information-processing point of view 
not only hold proactive-reactive and transsummative princi­
ples in common, each also acknowledges the essential unpre­
dictability of human thinking and action. Edwards sought, 
somewhct arrogantly perhaps, to use his knowledge of the
At one point Edwards hinted that the mechanism of 
depravity is a sort of cognitive laziness combined with the 
extraordinary complexity of the divine stimulation.
Those ideas which do not pertain to the prime essence of 
things— such as all colors that are everywhere objected 
to our eyes; and sounds that are continually in our ears; 
those that affect the touch as cold and heat; and all our 
sensations— exceedingly clog the mind in searching into 
the innermost nature of things.
(The Mind, p. 35).
^"Multiplicity of Thought," pp. 9-1□.
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psychology of mortals as a stepping stone to insight into 
God’s will. Modern cognitive psychologists, distrusting 
supernaturalist "explanations," concern themselves with man's 
mind as an end in itself. Each view, however, is offered as 
an attempt to unravel the old dilemma of St. Paul who, like 
most of us, often had difficulty understanding his thoughts, 
his plans, his behavior and the relationship between each of 
them.
For that which I do I allow not: for what I would
that I do not; but what I hate, that do I. If then I do
that which I would not, I consent unto the law that it is
good. Now then it is no more I that do it, but sin that 
dwelleth in me. . . .  I find then a law, that, when I 
would do good, evil is present with me.9
Here in a theological nutshell lay a central problem in the
history of psychology: the relationship between motivation,
cognition, and action. "How," ask Miller, et al. pointedly
"in the name of all that is psychological should we put the
mind, the heart, and the body together?"”'^
Edwards had the remarkable insight that such a syn­
thetic enterprise was actually necessary. But Edwards did 
not know how this might be accomplished. He only knew that 
human functions which were alleged to be separate and inde­
pendent were really not that way at all. Contemporary infor­
mation-processing theory has taken up the synthetic principles 
where Edwards left them. They have constructed some fas­
cinating models which demonstrate how a proactive-reactive,
g
Romans 7:15-17; 21 (King James Version).
^^Plans, p . 71.
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transsummative rational-emotive man might function. The
principal difference, of course, between Edwards' theory and
information processing is that Edwards looked through man in
search of the first cause while the information-processing
point of view attributes human thinking and behavior to the
more mundane, but hardly less mysterious human mind."^
For a long while after the behavioristic revolution
in American scientific psychology, speculation concerning
complex, interesting, "inner mental processes" slowed to a 
1 2
trickle. For a variety of reasons, including squabbling 
among the introspectionists, the utter simplicity of behav­
ioristic "theory," and the flamboyant leadership of John B.
Watson, behaviorism quickly became the dominant school of 
1 3
American psychology. During this era, from approximately
^Theoretically, Edwards stands on firmer ground than 
information-processing theorists in the area of motivation.
For Edwards., God was at the root of it all. Contemporary 
cognitive theorists, on the other hand, have simply thrown up 
their hands; motivation is simply treated as an "independent 
variable" in cognition research. "Thus," Neisser points out, 
it is no accident that the cognitive approach gives us 
no way to know what the subject will think of next. We 
cannot possibly know this; unless we have a detailed 
understanding of what he is trying to do and why. 
(Cognitive Psychology, p. 305).
12In 1913, John B. Watson first drew the battle lines 
between his cause, behavior, and the "introspectionists," or 
those who purported to be seeking the elements of the human 
mind; see "Psychology as the Behaviorist View it."
^ 5 e e  Boring, History, pp. 620-663, and R. I. Watson, 
Great Psychologists, pp. 406-435, for surveys of the rise of 
behaviorism. For an interesting "inside" view of the early 
days of behaviorism consult J. B. Watson's short autobiography 
in Carl Murchison, ed., A History of Psychology in Auto­
biography , III, (Worcester, Mass., 1 9 3 6 ) , pp .271-281.
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1 920 to 1 950, American psychology truly lost its mind; specu­
lation about mental processes was almost non-existent."^
Late in this period Donald □. Hebb made a valiant attempt to 
prod his colleagues into a reconsideration of central pro­
cesses and the nature of thought."^ Although Hebb's complex 
theory of neural-phase sequences and cell assemblies has 
stimulated the research of an entire generation of physio­
logical psychologists, much of this research has remained 
inconclusive."^ Walter R. Reitman has outlined the diffi­
culties encountered by those whose research is based on Hebb's 
model of central processes, and the manner in which an infor­
mation-processing approach can solve a number of these prob­
lems .
It should be clear that the use of information processing 
programs . . . enables us to state and explore systems of
psychological constructs in a manner not possible either 
with theories framed in words or with direct experimenta­
tion. With verbal models, it is practically impossible 
to be sure that conclusions follow only from explicit 
assumptions and that they in no way depend upon "unpro­
grammed" elements entering formally into the argument.
Of course, Gestalt psychology and Psychoanalysis 
acknowledged the importance of the mind but they were European 
imports which were regarded with suspicion. Edward C. Tolman 
was a notable exception among American behaviorists in that 
he emphasized the importance of mental constructs which he 
called "cognitive maps;" see "Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men." 
Psychological Review. 1 948, 55., 1 89-208. A short historical 
review of the death and rebirth of interest in the mind among 
American psychologists may be found in Robert R. Holt, 
"Imagery: The Return of the Ostracized," American Psvcholo-
qist, 1 964, J_9, 254-264.
15The Organization of Behavior (New York, 1949).
^Hebb has discussed and reviewed research on his 
model in "The American Revolution," American Psychologist.
1 960, 1_5, 735-745 and in his Textbook of Psychology. 3rd 
edition (Philadelphia, 1972), pp. 56-94.
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With laboratory experiments, we cannot get a test of the 
theory in and of itself. We must settle for a test of 
the theory taken together with all the assumptions about 
manipulations, measures, and conditions that couple the 
theory by means of operational definitions to the real 
world. If unexpected results occur, we are unable to say 
whether the difficulty is in the theory, the ancillary 
assumptions, or both. In an information-processing model, 
we can state, manipulate, and deduce implications from 
our theories in a way that is at once sure, unambiguous, 
and yet independent of operations relating the theory to 
data on human behavior.17
One might objectto Reitman's enthusiastic, blanket 
endorsement of the information-processing approach on the 
grounds that virtually nothing ties the analogue (the machine) 
to the phenomenon that is to be explained (the human mind). 
From a skeptic's point of view, information-processing psy­
chology might resemble a metaphorical game played by frus­
trated poets that goes something like: "How might the mind
be like a computer? Let us count the ways!" The mind- 
machine analogy, in other words, is just an analogy. Yet, as 
virtually all information-processing theorists are eager to 
point out, the computer analogies, unlike all previous mind 
models, is composed of hard, functioning, real stuff. The 
information-processing psychologist can not only avoid getting 
bogged down in the interminable warfare over proper experi­
mental designs, demand characteristics, etc., his machines 
can be observed to do many things which humans can also do. 
Computers can be programmed to solve problems in symbolic
17
Cognition and Thought, p. 14. It might be said that 
Hebb's theory has been "framed in experiments," while Edwards’ 
theory is "framed in words." Each type, according to the 
information-processing point of view, can benefit from a con­
crete computer analogue.
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logic, play chess, and recognize perceptual patterns."'^ It 
is interesting, therefore, to determine by what mechanisms 
machines can most efficiently accomplish human-like activi­
ties, and to speculate that, just maybe, humans also process 
information in a similar fashion.
In order to transform computer technology into psy­
chology some attempt must be made to investigate human cog­
nition, characterize it, and compare it to information- 
processing models. Do the available data on human cognition 
and behavior indicate that the basic mind-machine analogy is 
reasonably appropriate? In order to answer this question, 
the information-processing theorists must combine enthusiasm 
for experimentation on human subjects with extensive knowl­
edge of computer programming. They must bring themselves to 
apply the principles derived from their clean machines to the 
messy arena of human thinking and behavior. Three such indi­
viduals, George A. Miller, Eugene Galanter, and Karl H.
Pribram, have demonstrated that the computer analogue is a 
very heuristic device which provides a coherent model for
^^Allen Newall, J. C. Shaw, and Herbert 5imon pro­
grammed their "Logical Problem Solver" to solve the symbolic 
logic problems in Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathe­
matics . See "Elements of a Theory of Human Problem Solving," 
Psychological Review, 1 958, 65., 151-166. A. D. DeGroot's 
analysis of Chess is compatible with information-processing 
theory; see Thought and Choice in Chess (The Hague, 1965). 
Oliver Selfirdge and Ulric IMeisser have programmed a computer 
to recognize a wide variety of shapes such as the letter 
"A"; see "Pattern Recognition by Machine," Scientific American, 
1960, 203, 60-68.
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1 9much of what humans think and do. Their unit of analysis, 
the TOTE unit, is compelling, and the analogue from which it 
is derived, the cybernetic information-processing machine, 
really is and does something.
As they have attempted to establish the legitimacy 
and develop the potential of the mind-machine analogy, the 
expositions of many information-processing psychologists 
have become increasingly esoteric. To the uninitiated, their 
semi-official organ of publication, Cognitive Psychology, 
probably bears a closer resemblance to an astrological 
epheiwermus than to recognizable discussions of the human 
m i n d . ^  While the details of computer programming and simu­
lation of human processes may be obscure, their general prin­
ciples are not. The proactive-reactive principles of the 
information-processing approach have never been elaborated 
more clearly than they were by Miller et al.1 s elaboration of 
the TOTE unit. This clarity is one reaon why their dis­
cussion provides much of the substance of the summary account 
which follows below of the proactive-reactive aspect of infor­
mation-processing psychology.
1 9
Plans; see below, section 2. Since 1960, there has 
not been a book written on cognitive psychology which does 
not derive, in part, from this extremely seminal work.
20
Cf. the monograph by Terry Winograd, "Understanding 
Natural Language, . . ." Cognitive Psychology, 1 972, _3, 1- 
191. Like the whereabouts of the mythical Captain Zero, the 
contents of this study must be truly "known only to a few in 
the outside world."
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The other, more obvious, reason for focusing on the 
basic proactive-reactive TOTE unit, along with IMeisser's 
transsummative model, is that this essay is conceived as an 
exercise in historical interpretation. It is essentially 
concerned with Jonathan Edwards' view of man as it was 
expressed in his congitive theory. What is needed, there­
fore, is an approach to information processing which empha­
sizes the model of man implied in it: in essence a philo­
sophical approach to information processing. The thesis is 
that since Jonathan Edwards and contemporary information- 
processing psychologists each holds that man is a proactive- 
reactive and rational-emotive unity, it is appropriate to 
apply the clearer and more explicit modern terminology to 
Edwards ' views.
The attempt made here to map a contemporary psycho­
logical scheme onto a historical theory might be considered 
an intellectual historian's counterpart to psychohistory.
It is the psychohistorian's task, usually, to interpret the
behavior of some famous and enigmatic historical figure within
21the framework of revised, Eriksonian psychoanalytic theory.
21 Although Freud did write history from a psycho­
analytic point of view, the term "psychohistory" is closely 
associated with Erik H. Erikson. See especially Young Man 
Luther and Ghandi's Truth. The life of Jonathan Edwards has 
been psychoanalyzed in two related fascinating studies by 
Richard Bushman. In "Jonathan Edwards and Puritan Conscious­
ness," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1 966, _5, 
383-396, Bushman's use of psychoanalytic theory is very 
vague and the notion of a Puritan Consciousness must remain a 
mystery because of the author's failure to discuss the meaning 
of some general "consciousness." See also Bushman's "Jonathan 
Edwards as Great Man: Identity, Conversion, and Leadership
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
140
It is contended by psychohistorians that certain psycho­
analytic insights, especially "identity crisis," help to
22
explain the behavior of these interesting individuals. In 
this essay, a significant contemporary psychological theory, 
information processing, is used to explain not the personal 
behavior but the intellectual formulations of a historical 
figure. The whole exercise is conceived as an attempt to 
place a set of seemingly rather odd and quaint ideas into a 
context which permits their psychological significance to 
become comprehensible to contemporary readers.
Two standard criticisms of psychohistory are also 
pertinent to the current endeavor and these need to be con­
sidered. First, it has been pointed out that the perceived
credibility of psychohistorical research is largely a function
23of one's devotion to revised psychoanalytic theory. If one 
does not believe in the existence of identity crises, for
in the Great Awakening," Soundings; An Interdisciplinary 
Journal, 1 969, 52_, 15-46. This article represents an attempt 
to transpose the Eriksonian model onto Edwards' early life 
and later writing.
^ T h e  classic statement of "identity crisis" is in 
Erikson's Identity, Youth, and Crisis (New York, 1968).
23
A sarcastic, even bitter, but very literate attack 
on the concept of psychohistory is that of Jacques Barzun, 
"History; The Muse and Her Doctors," American Historical 
Review, 1 972, _77, 36-64. Barzun asks a very pertinent 
question:
Why is psychoanalysis in its broadest sense the only psy­
chology favored by the psycho-historian? . . . Certainly
there is no warrant for believing that only psychoanalysis 
can show results in the study of personality (p. 50).
The point of view of the psychohistorians is specifically 
defended by Robert Jay Lifton, "On Psychohistory, in Herbert 
Bass, ed., The State of American History (New York, 1970),
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instance, it is unlikely he can be convinced that he has a 
deeper understanding of Luther because he is informed that 
Luther had an identity crisis. This criticism is both fair 
and unfair. It is fair because, of course, there are vir­
tually an infinite number of ways to interpret theoretically 
a piece of behavior. Why not, it might be asked, employ a 
Jungian, or Adlerian, or Sullivanian, or existential inter­
pretation? After all, psychoanalytic theory has fallen upon 
hard times within clinical psychology and personality theory, 
so why should historians adopt it unquestioningly?^ Yet the 
criticism is also unfair. Traditionally, historians have 
operated as though they inhabited a methodological vacuum
when in fact they have not. They have simply chosen to
25
remain blissfully ignorant of their biases. An important
and by the contributors to Bruce Mazlish, ed., Psychoanalysis 
and History, 2nd edition (New York, 1971).
^^Psychotherapy no longer requires the famous couch 
or references to mysterious, unconscious drives. Many con­
temporary theorists and therapists focus on the conscious 
goals and purposes of a patient rather than aboriginal id 
forces; cf. Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person (Boston, 1961), 
George A. Kelly, The Psychology of Personal Constructs, 2 
Vols. (New York, 1955), and Albert Ellis, Reason and Emotion 
in Psychotherapy (New York, 1962). Behavioristic clinicians, 
on the other hand, see no need to ask a patient about either 
his conscious or his unconscious processes; cf. Joseph Wolpe, 
The Practice of Behavior Therapy (New York, 1969). For a 
good survey of contemporary clinical theory and practice, con­
sult Lawrence A. Pervin, Personality: Theory Assessment and
Research (New York, 1970).
25
David Hackett Fisher calls this the Baconian Fal­
lacy, whose classic examples derive from the nineteenth 
century. Yet it is Fischer's contention that most contempo­
rary historians still implicitly accept the inverted Kipling- 
ism,
"Them that asks no questions isn't told a truth."
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virtue of good psychohistory is that the historian's assump­
tions are relatively clear, like a deck of cards laying face­
up on a table. There is no pretense at "bare description"; 
the psychohistorian seeks to interpret, and if the reader 
believes that his understanding of a historical figure or 
event has been enhanced, then the enterprise has been suc­
cessful.
Psychohistory is, therefore, a form of presentism, or
2 6
the study of the past for the sake of the present. The 
application of information-processing concepts and terminology 
to the psychological theory of Edwards, while presentistic to 
be sure, is presentistic in part for historicist reasons.
In contemporary historiography, there is a tendency not 
to reject this statement in an abstract way but rather to 
accept it in principle and to forget it in practice.
There is an inherited antipathy to questions and hyptheses 
and models which is apt to run below the surface of a 
historian's thought. The results are readily apparent in 
the conceptual poverty of many historical monographs—  
a poverty to be explained not by the stupidity of the 
authors, but rather by their habitual reluctance to give 
sufficient attention to the organization of their inquiry, 
to the specification of their assumptions, and to the 
explication of their intentions.
Historian's Fallacies; Toward a Logic of Historical Inquiry 
(New York, 1970), p. 7.
“^ Actually Stocking's use of "presentism" referred to 
a progressionist interpretation of historical events. Yet 
another form of "the study of the past for the sake of the 
present" is the imposition of contemporary models and cate­
gories on history; see Stocking, "Historicism and Presentism," 
and pp. 6 9 - 7 3  above. Polanyi refers to the misuse of the 
presentistic application of models to history as "the ratio­
nalist fallacy" in which "history may be written by applying 
our own standards, without allowing for the difference in 
the historical setting . . . ," Study of Man, p. 87.
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While it might be argued that Luther or Ghandi did what they 
wanted to cfo, there is clear evidence that Edwards could not 
say what he wanted to say because he lacked a suitable 
vocabulary.^ Edwards' psychological thought cannot even be 
described adequately without the imposition of some addi­
tional concepts that he did not u s e . ^
Theorists may be divided into neologizers and non- 
neologizers, into those who invent new words to fit their 
vision and those who try to stretch or alter the meaning of 
current usage. Edwards clearly falls into the latter cate­
gory. He stretched the meanings of key psychological terms 
like "faculty," heart," and "will" until they broke. This 
creates an odd situation for the historian of psychology who 
studies Edwards. Not only are many Edwardsean concepts 
foreign to contemporary psychology, they also were mostly 
inexpressible in the psychological jargon of Edwards' era.
The information-processing analogue is, therefore, a tool 
which serves a dual purpose: it aids historicist description
and presentistic explanation. To some extent, the reader 
must, in fact, "buy" the information-processing approach to
^ P e r r y  Miller makes this point often; cf. Jonathan 
Edwards, pp. 187-188, and "5ense of the Heart." This situa­
tion represents an interesting inversion of the so-called 
"Whorfian Hypothesis"— that linguistic structure places 
severe limitations upon human understanding. Edwards appar­
ently saw the world differently but could not adequately 
describe it. Very creative individuals must face this problem 
frequently.
^ S e e  Chapter 2, pp. 60 - 6 7, for a discussion of the 
scholarly confusion which has resulted from trying to under­
stand the psychology of Edwards solely on his own terms.
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human cognition in order to react favorably to the interpre­
tation of Edwards' thought in chapter five. Skeptics should 
keep in mind, however, that analogies are all that have ever 
existed for the explication of mental processes. The infor­
mation-processing analogue is, by all estimates, the most
heuristic, and (with certain limitations) believable analogy 
29yet devised. It is certainly an improvement on an analogy
popular in Edwards' era, the "mind of God." Asa Burton, an 
Edwardsean of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen­
turies, for instance, claimed that
the attributes of God are all comprised in three; benevo­
lence, knowledge, and power, answering to the faculties 
in men called the heart, the understanding, and will. . .30
It must have been reassuring to know that one's mind is a bit 
like God's. The analogy is somewhat deficient, however, since 
in order to evaluate the adequacy of the analogy one must 
first die. This would appear to place severe limitations on 
the capacity of the psychologist to convey the results of his 
evaluation to his colleagues.
inability of computers to be sufficiently emotional and 
irrational (Cognitive Psychology, Chapter 11). A recent 
development in the application of information-processing theory 
and technology to irrational processes is the work of Christo­
pher Evans, who holds that dreaming is analagous to taking a 
computer "off-line"; see the interview with Evans in Intellec­
tual Digest, October, 1973, pp. 6-10.
30
Essays on Some of the First Principles of Meta- 
physicks, Ethicks. and Theology, ed. by James G. Blight 
(Albany, New York), 1973.
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The second criticism of psychohistory (and by impli­
cation, the application of information-processing theory to 
Edwards) is in some respects more serious than the first. It 
is claimed that psychohistorians often substitute empty jar-
31
gon and far-fetched analogies for good historical knowledge.
There is no pat response to this allegation. Like any other
historian, the presentist must do his homework; he must
exhaust all primary and secondary information pertinent to
his topic. He must be acutely aware of the complexity of
historical information and not leap into unwarranted, sim-
32plistic, blockbuster flourishes. The use of an explicit
model, like revised psychoanalysis or information-processing
theory, unfortunately provides the temptation to try to map
the model onto history in a perfectly-congruent fashion. The
presentist historian must carefully delineate where the model
fits and where it does not. Jonathan Edwards was hardly a
computer programmer. He had never even heard of anybody
called a "psychologist." There are, therefore, differences
between the contemporary model and the object of historical 
3 3inquiry. It has been pointed out that, for Edwards,
^ C f .  Barzun, "History."
"^Probably the classic piece of sophomoric, second­
hand psychoanalysis is the study of Woodrow Wilson by William 
C. Bullitt and Sigmund Freud, Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Twenty- 
Eighth President of the United States: A Psychological 5tudy
(Boston, 1967).
33
There is never perfect congruence between models 
and whatever it is that is being modeled. As Michael J. Apter 
points out,
If models are essentially explanatory in function . . .
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information if of supernatural rather than natural origin,
and that the operational phase of the TOTE unit consists not
in active manipulation of the environment but in passive 
34reception of the Holy Spirit. In chapter four these dif­
ferences between the theological psychology of Edwards and 
contemporary information-processing theory are not explained 
away or glossed over but, instead, are incorporated into a 
revised model that is appropriate for Edwards. From a psy­
chological viewpoint, however, these differences are minimal 
when compared to the remarkable continuities. Flan, that 
proactive-reactive, rational-emotive unity that Edwards 
observed floundering after God in his Northampton parish so 
long ago, is the same unified being that information-process­
ing theorists envision when they reflect on the human implica­
tions of the structure and function of their computing machines.
The Cybernetic Hypothesis: A Modern Conception
of Man as Proactive and Reactive
According to Miller, Galanter, and Pribram, there are
3 5psychological optimists and psychological pessimists. The
then the criteria used to judge them must be those used 
to judge theories in general. One will never be able to 
prove that a model is "true," just as one can never 
finally prove that a theory is true. The most that one 
can say of both a theory and a model is that it is con­
sistent with the known facts, not that it is true.
Computer Simulation, p. 25.
34
See Chapter 3, pp. 108-112.
^ Plans, pp. 6-8
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optimists are the behaviorists, the stimulus-response men, 
who, following Pavlov, seek to discover sets of environmental 
events which will consistently elicit given sets of overt 
behavior. In the twentieth century, these theorists have 
expressed great confidence that they can, theoretically at 
least, predict and control all human b e h a v i o r . T h e i r  con­
fidence is based on the remarkable belief that the hyphen 
(the human mind) between stimulus and response is a passive 
sieve through which an environment and an organism interact 
with each other. The pessimists, on the other hand, main­
tain that although environmental events do affect behavior, 
the effect is mediated by an organism's image, or "picture of 
itself and its universe," that is, by the manner in which the 
person construes objects and events.^ The pessimists, or 
cognitive psychologists, believe that the conscious and uncon­
scious hyphen of the behaviorists is actually the most impor­
tant determinant of human behavior. In a science which is 
dedicated to parsimony and prediction of behavior, the pessi­
mists clearly violate the rules. They hold that man's nature
The most famous statement of the Behaviorist utopian 
braggadoccio is John B. Watson's:
Give me a dozen healthy infants, well formed and my own 
specified world to bring them up in and I'll guarantee to 
take any one at random and train him to become any type 
of specialist I might select— doctor, lawyer, artist, 
merchant-chief, and yes, even beggar-man and thief, 
regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abili­
ties, vocations; and race of his ancestors.
Behaviorism (New York, 1925), p. 82. More subtle and slightly 
qualified, but similar expressions may be found in B. F. 
5kinner's works, expecially Walden II (New York, 1948) and 
Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York, 1971).
■^Miller, et al.. Plans, pp. 1-2. The concept of
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is not contained in a simple S-R equation but rather he is 
incredibly complex, and therefore that prediction of human 
activity will never be more than potential.
If it is granted that minds make a difference, one 
must inquire into how, exactly, a person's behavior is con­
trolled by his "image'.1. This, of course, is an aspect of the 
ancient mind-body dilemma, and more specifically, the problem 
of the will. The most famous and influential modern treat­
ment of "the psychology of volition" is James's theory of 
ideo-motor action. Actually, the ideo-motor concept is a 
theory of mental life: each defaults by postulating a void.
"Movement," said James, "is the natural, immediate effect of 
feeling . . .  It is so in reflex action, it is so in emotional 
expression, it is so in the voluntary life.38 According to 
James, then, behavior is automatically controlled by a per­
son's internal representation of his universe, and that is 
that. To support this rather abrupt contention he offers a 
persuasive and picturesque example which, he claims, "seems
. . . to contain in miniature form the data for an entire 
39psychology of volition."
We know what it is to get out of bed on a freezing 
morning in a room without a fire, and how the very vital 
principle within us protests against the ordeal. Prob­
ably most persons have lain on certain mornings for an
33William James, Principles of Psychology, 2 Vols., 
(Mew York, 1890), V. II, p. 527.
39Ibid., p. 525.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 49
hour at a time unable to brace themselves to the resolve. 
We think how late we shall be, how the duties of the day 
will suffer; we say, "I must get up, this is ignominious 
etc., but still the warm couch feels too delicious, the 
cold outside too cruel, and resolution faints away and 
postpones itself again and again just as it seemed on the 
verge of bursting the resistance and passing over into 
the decisive act. Now how do we ever get up under such 
circumstances? If I may generalize from my own experi­
ence, we more often than not get up without any struggle 
at all. We suddenly find that we have got up. A fortu­
nate lapse of consciousness occurs; we forget both the 
warmth and the cold; we fall into some reverie connected 
with the day's life, in the course of which the idea 
flashed across us, "Hollo! I must lie here no longer"—  
an idea which at that lucky instant awakens no contra­
dictory or paralyzing suggestions, and consequently pro­
duces immediately its appropriate motor effects.40
Despite the charm and apparent common sense contained in
James's notion of willing, his explanation strikes many con-
41temporary psychologists as inadequate. Dur understanding 
of the relationship between mental activity and behavior is 
hardly enhanced because we are told that volition becomes 
activity at "lucky instants." As Miller, et al., put it,
"The bridge James gives us between the idea and the motor is 
nothing but a h y p h e n . W h y  did James, lying in bed, not
^ Ibid., p. 524.
41 Cf. Gregory A. Kimble and Lawrence C. Perlmuter,
"The Problem of Volition," Psychological Review, 1970, 77, 
361-384, and Rollo May, "William James' Humanism and the 
Problem of Will," in Robert B. MacLeod, ed., William James: 
Unfinished Business (Washington, D.C., 1969), pp. 73-91.
These recent articles examine James' theory of volition from 
very different perspectives— Kimble and Perlmuter are experi­
mental psychologists while May is an existential psycho­
therapist. In each case, however, James' theory of volition, 
of will, is held to be basically sound but in need of elabora­
tion.
42
Plans. p. 12. James' ambiguity was not unique in 
the nineteenth century; nearly all theorists of volition pro­
vided a hyphen "explanation." Cf. William B. Carpenter,
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get up? Why did he eventually arise? Why, after arising, 
did he stay up and proceed with his daily activities? A 
model is needed which can transform the series of "lucky 
instants" into events which appear to occur in some logical 
sequence.
The cybernetic hypothesis, and in particular the TOTE 
theory of Miller, et al.. provides a coherent, computer- 
based model which attempts to characterize the relationship 
between the inner man and the outer world. It can help to 
explain how man is both proactive and reactive: how James
could lie in bed, passively receiving information from inner 
and outer sources and then suddenly get up and stay up; or 
how a backsliding Northampton parishioner of Jonathan Edwards 
could sit in a pew, earnestly seeking his salvation in yet 
another hellfire sermon, and suddenly become completely over­
whelmed by a spiritual experience which later investigation 
would "prove" to be genuine.
The TOTE unit, Test-Operate-Test-Exit, is based on a 
number of key concepts, most of which are derived from com­
puter technology.
Plan —
A plan is any hierarchical process in the organism that 
can control the order in which a sequence of operations 
is to be performed.
A plan is, for an organism, essentially the same as a 
program for a computer, especially if the program has the 
sort of hierarchical character described a b o v e . 43
Principles of Mental Physiology (London, 1874) and Alexander 
Bain, The 5enses and the Intellect (London, 1855).
43|V|iiier> et al. , Plans. p. 16.
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Strategy and Tactics—
The molar units in the organization of behavior will be 
said to comprise the behavioral strategy, and the 
molecular units, the tactics.^4
Execution--
We shall say that a creature is executing a particular 
plan when in fact that plan is controlling the sequence 
of operations he is carrying out. . . . The execution of
a Plan need not result in overt action--especially in man, 
it seems to be true that there are Plans for collecting 
or transforming information, as well as Plans for guiding
a c t i o n s .45
Image—
The image is all the accumulated, organized knowledge 
that the organism has about itself and its world. . . .
It includes everything the organism has learned— his 
values as well as his fact— organized by whatever con­
cepts, images, or relations he has been able to master.^
These concepts are all airy attributes of the human 
mind. No one has ever seen a Plan, a strategem or tactic, an 
Executive, or an Image, just as no one has ever seen a "fac­
ulty" or an electron. Each notion is invoked, following the 
"law" of parsimony, only when it is deemed necessary to help 
explain some observed behavior. It is apparent that until 
very recently few twentieth-century psychologists believed
44Ibid. . p. 17.
45 -
Ibid.. p. 17. Informational Plans constitute 
Edwards' domain when he attempts to explain the interaction 
between the divine and supernatural light and the psycho­
logical mechanisms in man. We shall see that he proposes a 
plan for collecting (that is, for absorbing or receiving) 
the Spirit and a Plan for transforming the Spiritual light 
into an entirely new image.
46
Ibid. . p. 1 7 - 1 8 .
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that the explanatory value of mental constructs was worth 
the speculative confusion they seemed to produce. Thus, as 
Miller et al. lament, "the elementary unit that modern, 
experimental psychologists generally select for their analy­
sis of behavior is the reflex. Man is stimulated and he
responds; no analysis of the mind is necessary to account for 
behavior.
The S-R reflex unit would be ideal if men restricted 
their behavior to running through mazes and eating food when 
they are starved. Most important human activities, however, 
are far more complex activities which require reasoning, 
evaluation of alternatives, decision-making, and in general, 
the processing of a lot of information. Man reacts to stimu­
lation, all right, but his reaction occurs only after he has 
manipulated and transformed the relevant information contained 
in that stimulation into a response that is appropriate to the 
achievement of a goal.
stimulus-response theory. Miller et al. needn't have been so 
historically provincial; Perry Miller has pointed out that 
Elizabethan (and seventeenth-century American Puritan) psy­
chology was also based upon "the reflex"; see Seventeenth 
Century, Chapter 9. Although America's first intellectuals 
were more than willing to speculate about the structure and 
function of mental "faculties," they believed that mental 
activity occurred responsively and inevitably to stimulation. 
Decisions were not made, they just happened. In a sense, 
then, Locke wasn't saying anything new to a Puritan theologi­
cal psychologist like Edwards. The passive, tabula rasa 
notion was implicit in Puritan theory. Remarkably, Edwards 
went beyond Locke, beyond his Puritan forbears, in formulating 
hiw own version of a synthetic psychology that included a 
crude version of what is now called the cybernetic hypothesis.
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The general pattern of reflex action, therefore, is to 
test the input energies against some criteria estab­
lished in the organism, to respond if the result of the 
test is to show an incongruity, and to continue to 
respond until the incongruity vanishes, at which time the 
reflex is terminated. Thus there is "feedback" from the 
result of the action to the testing phase, and we are 
confronted by a recursive l o o p . 48
The feedback loop, "the fundamental building block of the
49nervous system," was presented in Figure 4. It is pre­
sented in a slightly different form in Figure 5. The TOTE 
loop is certainly less parsimonious than the simple 5-R unit; 
Occam's razor has been put aside. That is as it should be 
for this most useful of all scientific dictums has been trans­
formed by some behaviorists into a psychological guillotine 
Psychologists can thank their computers for reminding them 
that men still have minds.
What flows "over the arrows" from one box to another
in Figure 5? Most cognitive psychologists would agree that
(a) information and (b) control link the various phases of 
51
the TOTE loop. An individual receives information from 
many sources which he organizes into a Plan. He will then
48
Miller, et al., Plans, p. 26.
49
Ibid., pp. 2 6 - 2 7 .
^^Behaviorists have vied with one another for the 
figurative title of most behavioristic. When E. C. Tolman 
suggested that his rats constructed hypotheses, Edwin R. 
Guthrie, like Tolman a "behaviorist," derided Tolman for 
leaving his rats lost in thought; see E. R. Guthrie, The Psy­
chology of Learning, rev. ed. (New York, 1 9 5 2 ) .
51 See Plans, pp. 2 6 - 2 7 .  An important publication outlet 
for cognitive psychologists is called simply Information and 
Control.






Figure 5. The TOTE unit.
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exert control in whatever direction seems most appropriate 
for achieving the goal outlined in his Plan. Additional 
information, or feedback, is received after those initial 
operations are completed. After the feedback has been evalu­
ated, a decision is then made to either re-execute or termi­
nate. It is important to note that, although conscious 
decision making is crucial in this model, the decisions or 
choices are themselves determined by a fundamental principle 
which might be called "cognitive hedonism." An individual 
must choose that response which seems most likely to help him 
execute his plan successfully.
The TOTE unit is an attempt to represent the relation­
ship between the Image and action, mind and body. Miller, 
et al. have thereby elaborated the hyphenated will bequeathed 
to twentieth-century psychology by James. The TOTE unit also 
may be said to represent the relationship between a person 
and his environment. Information received from the environ­
ment is actively processed, stored, and generally manipulated. 
Perception is not a strictly passive process, rather it usu­
ally occurs in the service of some purposeful, goal-oriented 
Plan. In fact, the TOTE unit permits no rigid distinction 
between perception and action. We are asked, in effect, to 
consider a stimulus and response not in narrow isolation, but 
broadly, as aspects of a feedback loop.
The simplest TOTE unit may be illustrated by the 
example of hammering a nail. Let us assume than an individual 
feels a compelling need to hammer a nail (see Figure 6).5^
52See Plans, pp. 33-39.








Figure 6. Hammering as a TOTE unit (Adapted from 
Miller, et al., Plans), p. 34.
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First he would test the nail and note that the head sticks 
up. Next he would operate on the nail, hammering it down.
He would then examine the visual feedback and, if he noted 
that the head still stuck up a bit, he would re-enter the 
loop and stay there until his task was completed. After the 
head of the nail is flush with the board, he would exit.
Many human activities, however, are neither as 
mechanical nor as simple as hammering a nail. In the case of 
William James, for instance, lying in bed on a cold morning, 
the process of creating a sufficient need to arise seems to 
involve a complex inner struggle, illustrated in Figure 7. 
James' morning Image is a function of two sorts of informa­
tion, comfort and guilt. When he first awakens, his Image 
is in a state of quilibrium, he feels quite comfortable and 
not even a little bit guilty. It is, after all, very cold in 
the world outside his quilts and surely no one can fault him 
for not working while he is sleeping. As the morning evapo­
rates, however, he feels less comfortable and more guilty.
It is getting colder and colder in the room, his back is 
aching slightly from sleeping on a soft mattress, and even 
philosophers need to use the bathroom in the morning. In 
addition, he visualizes with increasing vividness faces red 
with anger over unkept appointments. For all these reasons 
(represented in subroutines "comfort" and "guilt" in Figure 
7) and probably many others, James' picture of himself within 
his morning universe becomes decidedly unsatisfactory; he 
needs to get up. Time not only heals all wounds, it creates








THE MORNING IMAGE OF
WILLIAM JAMES ■
Figure 7. A TOTE representation of the mental operations 
required to create the need for William James to arise in the 
morning.
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Figure 8. A TDTE representation of the physical operation 
of getting out of bed.
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a few, and when James' Image is sufficiently punctured by 
the passage of time, he will organize a Plan to get up (Fig­
ure 8). Since he is very experienced at getting up, one 
jaunt through the loop will probably be sufficient.
All this talk about loops, TOTE units, routines, and
information processing might lead one to ask what, precisely,
is proved by characterizing a carpenter or William James the
lie-a-bed as computer-like devices. Aren't we, in effect,
stripping them of their humanity by describing their behavior
in terms of the computer analog? Miller et al. believe that
just the opposite is true:
It is so obvious that knowing is for the sake of doing
and that doing is rooted in valuing— but how? How in the
name of all that is psychological should we put the mind, 
the heart, and the body together? Does a Plan supply 
the pattern for that essential connection of knowledge, 
evaluation, and action? Certainly any psychology that 
provides less— that allows a reflex to behave at random, 
or leaves it lost in thought or overwhelmed by blind 
passion— can never be completely satisfactory.^3
They are convinced that man has a mind, a heart, and a body. 
He is a wonderfully complex, paradoxical machine. His "know­
ing" is initially reactive, he receives information from an 
infinite number of sources. This information is then pro­
cessed, evaluated, and organized into a proactive plan of 
action. From one point of view, then, the TOTE unit is not a 
demeaning device at all. Rather it represents a flatfooted 
acceptance of the complex nature of man's reaction to and
53 Ibid., p. 71. Miller et al. seem to havederived 
their immediate inspiration for this notion from Clarence 
Irving Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La 
Salle, 111., 1946).
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impress upon his environment. Moreover, the TOTE unit goes 
far beyond other synthetic concepts, offered by thinkers from 
Augustine to Dewey, in providing an empirically-based, 
coherent model which suggests how such a complex man might 
function.
Multiple Processing: Transsummative Man
in Computer Dress
The TOTE unite provides a model of the relationship 
between man's thinking and his actions. A complex and impor­
tant proactive-reactive device, the mind, is seen to inhabit 
the behaviorists' void between stimulus and response. The 
TOTE unit does not, however, tell us very much about the 
thinking processes which seem to organize and direct much of 
human behavior. Miller et al. have filled in the gap of the 
will rather nicely; thinking and acting progress along a 
cybernetic loop. Yet thinking includes aspects of what Miller 
et al. call the "mind" and the "heart"; values, emotion, and 
motivation are inextricably intertwined with reason and judge­
ment. Man is, in other words, a transsummative, rational- 
emotive unity. Edwards, of course, made a similar assertion 
and, in fact, Miller et al.1_ discussion of mind and heart 
hardly clarifies matters any more efficiently than Edwards' 
"sense of the heart." In short, a model of transsummative 
thinking is needed to supplement the TOTE conception of pro- 
active-reactive man.
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The multiple-processing model which will be employed 
is, like the TOTE unit, derived chiefly from computer-simula- 
tion technology. Its real origins, however, lay not in cold 
steel and magnetic tape but on the warm leather couch of Sig­
mund Freud. As just about everyone knows, Freud's analysis 
of his neurotic, Victorian, Viennese patients led him to 
postulate the existence of sexual and aggressively-oriented 
unconscious processes, in addition to the conscious stream of 
thought. The psychoanalytic tradition which Freud founded 
has since maintained that mental functioning can be dichoto­
mized into two modes, primary-process thinking and secondary- 
process t h i n k i n g . P r i m a r y - p r o c e s s  thinking is said to be 
impluse governed, heavily laden with uncomfortable emotional 
loadings, and in general repressed in the normally-functioning 
adult. In this mode of thinking, logic and reality constraints 
have no place. Secondary-process thinking, on the other hand, 
is held to be conscious, goal-directed, and in conformity with 
ordinary rules of logic. These two modes are by no means 
independent of one another. In fact, "classical" Freudian 
theory maintains that the primary process is the source of 
all psychic energy, thus virtually all we say, think, or do 
is a disguised (by the so-called ego mechanisms) expression 
of the irrational desires of the primary process.
"^Freud's first and clearest expression of this view 
is in Dreams. For more recent views concerning psycho­
analytic approaches to cognition consult David Rapaport, ed., 
Organization and Pathology of Thought (New York, 1951) and 
George S. Klein, Perception. Motives and Personality (New 
York, 1970).
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Freud's model, the id, ego, superego relationship, 
isn't a very good one by information-processing standards.
His constructs are so insubstantial that his "disciples" con­
tinue to emphasize one over the others, delete, or add still 
others. Freud's theory is also far too heavily committed to 
the notion that sex and aggression dominate the primary pro­
cess. Ulric IMeisser has attempted to maintain the basic 
Freudian insight into transsummative multiple-mode thinking 
within the framework of a more concrete, computer-based model. 
Neisser's thesis, like Freud's, is that "human thinking is 
a multiple activity."55 Applying computer programming termi­
nology to human cognition, IMeisser contends that cognition 
may be divided into two modes, sequential processing and 
parallel processing.
The common core of all these theoretical dichotomies 
seems to be the distinction between a relatively well- 
ordered, easily describable, and efficiently adapted 
thought process on one side, and a simultaneous and 
superficially confused profusion of activity on the other. 
Apparently there are two different modes of handling the 
external and internalized information with which the mind 
must deal. It cannot be a coincidence that two corres­
ponding modes have appeared as alternate possibilities in 
the design of "artificially intelligent" systems— that is, 
in programming computers to perform quasi-intellectual 
tasks. In that field, the two possibilities are often 
called "sequential" and "parallel."56
Argumentation over the merits and demerits of sequen­
tial and parallel processing systems has occurred most fre­
quently in the area of computer simulation known as "pattern
55"Multiplicity of Thought," p. 8.
55Ibid., p. 5. See also Oliver 5efridge and Ulric 
IMeisser, "Pattern Recognition."
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recognition."^ We take for granted that literate human 
beings can distinguish an "A" from a "B" no matter whether 
the letters are typed, handwritten, or chicken-scratched.
It is normally such an easy and automatic task that we sel­
dom pause to consider by what means we distinguish one pat­
tern from another. Information-processing theorists, however, 
have seized upon pattern recognition and transformed the 
process into a virtual prototype of human information pro­
cessing. Computers can be programmed to recognize or identify 
patterns that humans can also identify, and a composite model 
of human pattern recognition has emerged which is based upon 
the computer models (Figure 9). A pattern or message is 
received first at the sense organs, for instance the retinas 
of the eyes. It then traverses neural pathways and is subject 
to feature analysis, which is a parallel process called 
"pandemonium," illustrated in Figure 1 0 . ^
Selfridge has called the components of feature analy­
sis "demons"— a term which aptly characterizes their chaotic 
id-like activity. The image demons merely record the image 
of the pattern. Each feature demon searches for a particular
^ F o r  an extensive sampling of the important pattern 
recognition research consult Leonard Uhr, ed.. Pattern Recog­
nition: Theory, Experiment, Computer Simulations, and Dynamic
Models of Form Perception and Discovery (New York, 1966).
^^Dliver Selfridge, "Pandemonium: A Paradigm for
Learning." In The Mechanisation of Thought Processes (London, 
1959). There are other feature analysis schemes, notably 
template matching, but see Neisser (Cognitive Psychology. 
Chapter 3) for a critique of this and other alternative 
theories„












Figure 9. A model of human pattern recognition.





DATA OR IMAGE 
DEMONS
DECISION DEMON
Figure 10. Parallel processing (adapted from Neisser, 
Cognitive Psychology, p. 75.)
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characteristic of the pattern: certain angles, curvatures,
or lines. Each cognitive demon is capable of recognizing one
pattern, for example a letter in the alphabet. Each cognitive
demon looks for features which characterize its particular
pattern. When it finds one it yells out and the more it
finds the louder it yells. The decision demon, listening to
the pandemonium, selects the cognitive demon who is yelling
the loudest as the pattern most likely occurring in the envi- 
59ronment. It is a parallel program because there is no
logical sequence of steps to complete before the pattern is 
recognized. All the information pertinent to the pattern 
bombards the decision-making apparatus "in parallel" or 
simultaneously. No analyzer depends on the course or the out­
come of processing by the others.
The parallel pandemonium feature analysis cannot, 
however, explain the remarkable diversity and speed of human 
perception. If human pattern recognition culminated in pande­
monium it is likely that we should all drown in a din of 
neural demons, we should never recognize patterns and we 
should certainly never understand the meaning of them. Much 
of the information associated with a signal is provided by 
what it ought to be rather than anything contained in the 
signal itself, that is, by the context of the event.
The power of context is clear. Rules can be used to 
reduce the number of possible alternatives that are to be
59
Excellent discussions of the Pandemonium model may 
be found in Lindsay and Norman, Human Information Processing, 
pp. 115-131 and Neisser, Cognitive Psychology, pp. 71-76.
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considered at any moment. This does not imply, of 
course, that perception requires a conscious trial-and- 
error approach to determine the alternative that best 
fits the contextual information . . .  It supplies the 
rules underlying the construction of our perceptual world, 
tells us what to expect, and gives plausible interpreta­
tions of what we are p e r c e i v i n g .60
It is much easier, for instance, to learn strings of words
which follow the familiar rules of English grammar than it is
to learn random arrays of words.^
Our expectations of what will come next (e.g., a 
noun, verb, etc.) change continuously as the information is 
interpreted. This process of moving sequentially through or 
across a pattern while revising expectations is referred to 
as "analysis-by-synthesis"; it is an active, constructive, 
sequential process that proceeds according to rules which may 
or may not be consciously elaborated.^  Memory provides not 
only the rules used in deriving the expectations, but also 
knowledge of the recent sensory events. The sequential, 
analysis-by-synthesis process in pattern recognition is repre­
sented by a simple decision tree in Figure 11.
The combined parallel pandemonium and sequential 
analysis-by-synthesis model of pattern recognition is very 
appealing, once one overcomes his modernist aversion to what 
might appear to be a return to demonology. Computers can be
^Lindsay and Norman, Human Information Processing, 
p p. 1 34-1 35.
^ George A. Miller, "Decision Units in the Perception 
of Speech," IRE Transactions on Information Theory, 1 962, IB, 
81-B3.
^ 0n analysis-by-synthesis in pattern recognition, 
consult Neisser, Cognitive Psychology, pp. 193-198, and















does the last 
letter contain 
a closed loop?
is the first letter 
wider at the top than 
at the bottom?
Figure 11. An example of sequential processin in 
pattern recognition (adapted from Neisser, Cognitive , p. 73.)
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programmed to recognize patterns according to this model and 
human pattern recognition seems to progress in a similar 
manner. It does not, however, adequately account for a per­
son's continued construction of a perceptual, conceptual and 
memorial world into which perceived objects, thoughts, and 
images are placed.
When we first perceive or imagine something, the process 
of construction is not limited to the object itself. We 
generally build (or rebuild) a spatial, temporal, and 
conceptual framework as well . . . little has been said
about this background; "construction" has meant con­
struction in focal attention. But when you see a friend 
across the street, you are not seeing only him. H_e, a 
person of a particular kind with a particular relevance 
to your life, is appearing there, a particular place in 
space, and then. at a certain point in time. Similarly, 
a spoken sentence is not just a string of words to be 
identified, but it has a particular meaning, is spoken 
by a particular person, at a particular time and place.
Human mental activity, then, is characterized by a parallel, 
mostly unconscious phase, a sequential stream of mostly con­
scious thought, and "background processing" of the rubrics 
and categories which permit us to derive intimate personal 
meaning from our percepts and images. Man is a multiple- 
processing organism.
The categories, often called schemas or schemata, in 
the background provide the labels for the constructive, syn­
thetic activity that constitutes human perception and think- 
64
ing. When the background is intact, as it is during normal
Lindsay and Norman, Human Information Processing, pp. 131- 
1 48.
^Neisser, Cognitive Psychology, p. 286.
^Neisser's use of the term "schemata" derives from 
F. C. Bartlett, Remembering and Thinking (New York, 1958). The
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waking consciousness, events are said to be analyzed first 
by the pre-attentive processes. During this brief operation 
stimuli are sorted out in a gross fashion. In line with what­
ever set and strategy he employs, the individual then pro­
ceeds to construct a more-or-less accurate copy of the 
external or internalized stimuli with his focal-attentive 
mechanisms. Much of the potential information, that which is 
not singled out for synthesis in focal attention, fades 
rapidly because it is not verbally encoded and hence is 
unavailable to long-term memory. During the pre-attentive 
phase, information is said to be processed "in parallel," and 
this chaotic activity is in many ways analogous to Freudian 
primary-process thought or the syncretistic thinking of early 
childhood.^ The focal attentive phase, on the other hand, 
is characterized by "sequential" processing which tends to 
follow the conventions of logic and is similar to the Freudian 
notion of secondary process. While the content of sequentially- 
processed information is contained in the conscious stream of 
thought, the information processed in a parallel manner forms 
a semi-conscious to unconscious penumbra of vagueness around 
the conscious object or thought. Because of its immunity
most famous exponent of the importance of schemata is, how­
ever, Jean Piaget; cf. The Construction of Reality in the 
Child (New York, 1954). (1936)
^ 5 e e  Ernest G. Schachtel, Metamorphosis (New York, 
1959) for a brilliant analysis of the unfettered thinking of 
childhood and its transformation into the predominantly uni­
dimensional, goal-directed thinking of adulthood.
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from logical constraints and because of its short duration
in the mind, the information processed only by the parallel,
pre-attentive mechanisms is often experienced as wispy images
or fleeting "feelings." Importantly, in man these sequential
and parallel modes function as a complex, integrated, mostly
unpredictable unit.
. . . human thinking is a multiple activity. Awake or
asleep, a number of more or less independent trains of 
thought usually coexist. Ordinarily, there is a "main 
sequence" in progress, dealing with some particular 
material in step-by-step fashion. The main sequence cor­
responds to the ordinary course of consciousness. It
may or may not be influenced by the other processes 
going on simultaneously. The concurrent operations are 
not conscious, because consciousness is intrinscially 
single.66
The principle function of this unconscious activity is, 
according to Freud, to find discharge for emotions which are 
striving for expressing in our minds. ^  Thus, all conscious 
"rational" activity is potentially or actually influenced by 
unconscious "emotional" activity.
Under normal conditions a person encounters a wide 
variety of constantly changing but still relatively familiar 
stimulation. He uses various perceptual strategies to grossly 
classify a broad spectrum of stimulation and he then actively 
constructs his perception, or that which occupies the focus 
of his attention. That which escapes his attention rapidly 
fades. An important change occurs, however, when the ordinary 
background processing is disrupted. The environment may
^Neisser, "Multiplicity of Thought," p. 8.
^  C f . Dreams and New Introductory Lectures on Psycho­
analysis (New York, 1933).
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become unusually redundant, as in hypnosis; it may be 
impoverished, as in some forms of mediation or sensory depri­
vation; or an individual's will to categorize may be weak,
as when he is falling asleep or under the influence of cer- 
6 8tain drugs. Under each of these conditions the intensity
of the drive to Test-Operate-Test-Exist is diminished. The
individual is simply more inclined to accept the world, rather
than to grapple with it, organize it, and eventually try to
conquer it. He does not pay exclusive attention, as he
normally does, to stimuli that are relevant to a plan because
69
he has, as Miller et al. put in, "relinquished his plan."
Thus he may experience many classical symptoms of a "trance" 
state, such as visions, hallucinations, dreamlike imagery, 
or strange and exotic ideas which normally lie outside his 
narrow, plan-oriented focus of attention.
All this abstract talk of an information-processing 
model of the trance state may have led to the anticipation 
that a new technique is about to be presented which is
*^The best recent single source of empirical data and 
theoretical speculation concerning all sorts of altered states 
is Charles T. Tart, ed., Altered States of Consciousness (New 
York, 1969). The most coherent and colorful examination of 
certain of these states, especially mystic consciousness and 
religious conversion is still William James, The Varieties of 
Religious Experience (New York, 1961).
69Plans. pp. 103-116.
"^The most important theoretical work on the concept 
of trance as a cognitive psychological phenomenon is that of 
Ronald E. 5hor; see especially "Hypnosis and the Concept of 
the Generalized Reality Orientation," American Journal of 
Psychotherapy. 1 959, H ,  582-602.
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capable of hypnotizing a computer. Not quite. The trance 
state, whatever its origin, is simple a special case in which 
usually unconscious, emotionally-loaded "parallel" informa­
tion is obviously involved in conscious, sequential human 
perception and thinking. The important point is that, as
Neisser contends, "all directed thinking is an elaboration of 
71this sort." That is, rational appearing, goal-directed, 
TOTE-type activity in humans draws much of its raw material 
and insights from this vast storehouse of peripheral informa­
tion, and the evaluation of feedback is itself primarily a 
function of barely-conscious or unconscious irrational con­
siderations. Freudian "ego psychologists" have called this
72process "regression in the service of the ego." Conscious 
and unconscious meld into the creative syntheses which charac­
terize man's attempts to order and understand.
The Creative Unified Mind of Man
Nothing better illustrates the transsummative, 
rational-emotive unity of man's mental life, perhaps, than 
the reflections of creative poeple upon the creative process. 
Nearly all of them agree with Pasteur who contended that 
chance favors the prepared mind. Creative insight and dis­
covery, that which yields basic understanding, obviously 
requires considerable learning and preparation. Yet nearly
71 Cognitive Psychology, p. 303.
72
See Ernst Kris, Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art 
(New York, 1 952) .
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every creative artist cr scientist who has taken the time to 
reflect on the nature of creation has attached equal, or in 
some instances, greater importance to "chance," to relaxing 
73and receiving, or waiting. But waiting for what; and from 
where? They wait, of course, for insights whose origin was 
formerly thought to be God, but after Freud has generally 
been labeled, rather vaguely, the unconscious. The poet 
A. E. Housman's recollection of his own creative waiting game 
is a typical expression:
Having drunk a pint of beer at lucheon— beer is a 
sedative to the brain, and my afternoons are the least 
intellectual portion of my life--I would go out for a 
walk of two or three hours. As I went along, thinking 
of nothing particular, only looking at things around me 
and following the progress of the seasons, there would 
flow into my mind, with sudden and unaccountable emotion, 
sometimes a line or two of verse, sometimes a whole 
stanza at once, accompanied, not preceeded, by a vague 
notion of the poem which they were destined to form part 
of. Then there would usually be a lull of an hour or so, 
then perhaps the spring would bubble up again. I say 
bubble up because, so far as I could make out, the source 
of the suggestions thus proffered to the brain was an 
abyss . . . the pit of the stomach. When I got home I
wrote them down, leaving gaps, and hoping that further 
inspiration might be forthcoming another day.74
Virtually every individual whom society has pro­
claimed "creative" has expressed his own creative process in 
these terms; see Brewster Ghiselin, ed., The Creative Process 
(Berkeley, Calif., 1952) for a survey of the introspective 
analyses of a broad range of creative individuals: scientists,
artists, poets, novelists, and mathematicians. For a general 
theory of creative thinking which accommodates the notion of 
a vacillating, active-passive creative process see Graham 
Walls, The Art of Thought (London, 1926) and Herbert Crovitz, 
Galton's Walk (New York, 1970).
74
A. E. Housman, The Name and Nature of Poetry (New 
York, 1933), pp. 48-49.
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The only unusual aspect of Housman's account is his localiza­
tion of the source of his creative insights in the pit of his 
stomach. In presenting this hypothesis to the world, Housman 
offered the raw material to his critics for some insights of 
their own. They might contend, for instance, that what Hous­
man understood to be poetical insights were really unfortu­
nate mental reactions to gas pains produced by his too rapid 
imbibing of beer. His poetry, in other words, is the 
equivalent of a belch.
Surprisingly, Housman and most other reflective, 
creative individuals would probably not object to a compari­
son of their insights with a belch, with its sometimes uncom­
fortably long waiting period and the emotional excitement and 
renewal that accompanies the triumphant expulsion.
Rollo May has criticized Housman's analysis of the 
creative process because of its emphasis on passivity. May 
believes that creativity is an active process and,in support 
of this view, he quotes William Butler Yeats whom, claims 
May, was a far greater poet than Housman; see "Creativity 
and Encounter," in H. M. Ruitenbeek, ed., The Creative 
Imagination (Chicago, 1965), pp. 2B3-291 . May misses the 
point entirely. In groping for support for his existentialist 
views he ignores what he, as a reasonably-creative individual, 
must know from experience: Creativity is both proactive and
reactive. Also, Yeats' greatness as a poet has been disputed 
by scholars who probably know far more than May about poetry; 
cf. Karl 5hapiro, "W. B. Yeats: Trial by Culture." In In
Defense of Ignorance (New York, 1960), pp. 87-113.
^Housman himself compared it to "a morbid secretion" 
(Name and Nature, p. 48). One of the clearest examples of 
the emotional explosiveness of creating is Hart Crane's 
method of writing poetry. Crane, claims critic Malcom Cowley, 
would get roaring drunk on hard cider, lock himself in a room 
and finally
appear . . . his face brick-red, his eyes burning, his
already iron-gray hair bristling straight up from his 
skull. He would be chewing a five cent cigar which he
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Housman's analysis of the events leading up to, including, 
and following a creative explosion contains, in a nutshell, 
a compelling portrait of an integrated proactive-reactive, 
transsummative rational-emotive man. Writing a poem is but 
a special case of planned activity and man, as Miller et al. 
point out, is always executing some Plan (at least while he 
is awake). From a cybernetic viewpoint, the only difference 
between hammering a nail and writing a poem is that the 
farmer requires manipulation of a physical object while the 
latter emphasizes the mental manipulation of ideas. Housman's 
plan to write poetry is presented in an adaptation of the 
TOTE unit (see Figure 12).
Housman, like any other creative individual, did far 
more than drink and walk. He undoubtedly spent his mornings 
studying and writing, and when found himself stymied or 
unproductive he retired to his pub. There he began the busi­
ness of reducing incongruity in his system; he "tested" pro­
activity by drinking and walking. The operation, however, is 
reactive: he waits as he walks. The rhythmic pounding of
the waves and his own footsteps, combined with the alcoholic 
sedation produce a very relaxed man who has, in fact, tempo­
rarily relinquished his original plan. His background
had forgotten to light. In his hands would be two or 
three sheets of typewritten manuscript, with words 
crossed out and new lines scrawled in. "Read that," he 
would say. "Isn't that the qrrrreatest poem ever 
written!"
(Ghiselin, Creative Process, p. 146).
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Figure 12. A TOTE representation of A. E. Housman's 
account of writing poetry.
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process of (probably) poetic rubrics and categories has 
faded; he has assumed a mild trance-like state. The poetical 
problems which confronted him earlier in the day now slip to 
the back, but not out of his mind."^ His attention broadens 
and much external and internalized parallel information is 
no longer ruled out of court because they do not serve the 
purposes of a Plan or goal.
Suppose, for instance, that the poet had pondered 
all morning over the last couple of lines of a poem. No 
matter how he altered the "line or two of verse" he was con­
sidering, they simply would not fit. While walking about 
after his luncheon beer, however, he would have the oppor­
tunity to survey many alternative lines as they bubbled up 
from "the pit of the stomach." Each of a large number of 
alternative poetical demons would be shouting with relatively 
equal intensity (as illustrated in the pandemonium model, 
Figure 10). On what basis, then, is a decision made to 
choose one verse over another. It cannot be a strictly 
rational, conscious choice, since the poet has temporarily 
discard his Plan. The decision, then, must be a function of 
unconscious or barely verbalizable, esthetic considerations.
As Housman states, "a sudden and unaccountable emotion" 
accompanies the mysterious appearance of the verse. The lines 
seem suitable, or true, because they feel that way. Later on,
"^5ee Shor, "Generalized Reality Orientation," for an 
analysis of how and why customary objects of attention fade 
to the background of awareness. See also Neisser, Cognitive 
Psychology, pp. 286-287.
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Figure 13. Some aspects of sequential .processing in 
the construction of a poem.
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the felt insight must be elaborated, altered, and actively 
constructed in the focus of attention. "Sometimes," laments 
Housman, "the poem had to be taken in hand and completed by 
the b r a i n . T h e  logical, sequential integration of the 
lines into a poem is illustrated in Figure 13.
The continued interplay of parallel and sequential
processes, of the emotions and reason, is certainly not
unique to the arts. Scientists from Copernicus to J. D.
Watson owe their intial insights to unconscious, emotional,
79esthetic sensibilities in their discoveries. Virtually all 
purposeful human activity can be understood within the con­
text of the proactive-reactive, transsummative information- 
processing model. Some relatively mechanical activities, 
like hammering a nail or getting out of bed, require mostly 
doing and little waiting for instructions from the uncon­
scious. Other more difficult endeavors, like writing a poem 
or making a scientific discovery, or even changing a tire 
without a tire iron, require as much work but more patience. 
Intense preparation and active integration surround a lonely 
wait for the solution that feels right.
^ " N a m e  and Nature," p. 49.
79 It is well known that Copernicus's insight into the 
heliocentric nature of the universe was founded primarily 
upon the symmetrical beauty of the new conception rather than 
upon its ability to predict the movement of heavenly bodies 
more efficiently (Kuhn, Copernican Revolution). James D. 
Watson was convinced of the accuracy of his double helical 
DNA molecular model because it was "too pretty not to be 
true"; see The Double Helix (New York, 1968).
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CHAPTER V
PROCESSING DIVINE INFORMATION
Applying a model to history is a little like trying 
on a new pair of shoes. One must first put the shoes 
securely on and then walk around to determine whether there 
is discomfort caused by incongruities between the shape of 
the shoes and the shape of the feet which inhabit them. If 
the new shoes don't feel right, then they are rejected and a 
pair which fits better is sought. Likewise, a historical 
model must actually be applied, tried on for size, before the 
fit of the model to the historical data can be evaluated.
But how much congruence between data and model constitutes a 
fit? In fact, there are no objective guidelines to follow.
If the model does not seem to violate any basic assumptions 
present in the data, and if the model seems to place the 
data in a useful new perspective, then the entire venture 
must be judged worthwhile. It is a major contention of this 
essay that the basic psychological assumptions of Jonathan 
Edwards, the data, are precisely those of a much more 
explicit contemporary theory, information processing. This
"'Robert F. Berkhofer, in his groundbreaking Behavioral 
Approach, offers an intriguing chapter on model building and 
historical inquiry (chapter 8). Although he gets rather 
bogged down in abstruse sociological theory, he apparently 
favors the application of models to history. Yet neither he, 
nor anyone else, has determined exactly how this should be 
done.
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chapter is an attempt to demonstrate that information- 
processing theory is an intellectual "shoe” that Edwards can 
wear comfortably and with pride. Like any piece of fine 
apparel this psychological model accentuates rather than dis­
torts the underlying beauty of the wearer.
We have seen that much of the recent commentary upon 
the thought of Edwards has emphasized that the picture of 
man which emerges from his writings is complex and seemingly 
contradictory. 5ometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly, 
the various commentators have characterized the Edwardsean 
model of man as both proactive and reactive; and as a trans- 
summative, rational-emotive unity. We have also seen that, 
for a variety of reasons, Edwards' psychological system has 
remained very mysterious. How might such a complex man 
function? The psychological concepts and jargon of Edwards' 
era were incapable of accomodating the Edwardsean notions 
and scholars have been seemingly ignorant of any other psy­
chological scheme which can maintain the spirit of Edwards' 
thought while at the same time elaborate it and give it 
generality.
In order to fill some gaps in Edwards' psychological 
theory, and to trace his psychological ancestry and posterity, 
he has been place into a context: the synthetic tradition in
psychology which has culminated in contemporary information- 
processing theory. This approach to psychology, like that of 
Edwards, holds to proactive-reactive and transsummative prin­
ciples, and it provides some computer-based models which
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describe how such a complex man might carry on his day-to- 
day activities, or how he might think and behave.
Conversion, the phenomenon which most interested 
Edwards, is both a human activity and more than a human 
activity. It involves the interaction of a human mind with 
a supernatural spirit. According to Edwards, it is God Him­
self who, under the appropriate conditions, can be creatively 
discovered at the fringe of human consciousness. What 
emerges from this chapter is an information-processing 
explanation of conversion that might satisfy most contempo- 
ray cognitive theorists. Remarkably, the information-pro- 
cessing model provides only a new perspective through the 
structuring of the chapter, and some descriptive detail in a 
number of figures and analogies. All else, the synthetic 
principles, the theorizing, and the data, are derived from 
Edwards. He once acknowledged that "there is a vast variety, 
perhaps as manifold as the subjects of the operation [of con­
version]." He quickly added, however, that "in many things
2
there is a great analogy in all." While the details of the 
"great analogy" were beyond his grasp, its main themes were 
not.
2
A Faithful Narrative of the Surprising Work of God.
In C. C. Goen, ed., The Great Awakening (New Haven, Conn., 
1972), p. 160. In his "Editor's Introduction" to the 
Religious Affections, John E. Smith claims that Edwards empha­
sized the "vast variety," while Goen, in his "Editor's Intro­
duction" to The Great Awakening and A. V. G. Allen, in 
Jonathan Edwards hold that Edwards emphasized the "great 
analogy." The latter point of view is probably closer to the 
truth. Edwards often paid lip service to individual differ­
ences as he casted about for an all-encompassing scheme that 
would describe everyone.
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Incongruity; Creating a Need 
for Conversion
The "great analogy" or morphology of conversion was 
presented most clearly and positively in Edwards' Faithful 
Narrative. This remarkable work, an elaboration of a letter 
to his fellow minister Benjamin Colman of Boston, reveals a
3
side of Edwards that is seldom visible in his adult writings. 
It contains an array of first-and secondhand accounts, along 
with Edwards' theoretical commentary, of conversions during 
the early days of the Great Awakening in the Connecticut 
Valley. Edwards organizes his evidence, bit by bit, and 
emerges with a composite formula for conversion which is not 
so much a "how to do it" manual as a simple generalization.
The colorful anecdotes and enthusiastic lack of defensiveness 
easily differentiates this work from his later, relatively 
cold, abstract, argumentative tracts like Original Sin and 
Freedom of the Will.^
In those early days of the Awakening, in 1735 and 
1736, Edwards was convinced that the Holy Spirit had taken up 
temporary residence in the Connecticut Valley. Many "sur­
prizing conversions" had been accomplished and he was eager 
to tell the world exactly how the wonderful work had occurred. 
In the Faithful Narrative he had only to describe what he had
^See Goen, "Editors Introduction," pp. 32-46, for a 
textual history of the Faithful Narrative.
^Goen says that Isaac Watts and John Guyse, who 
collaborated on a preface to the first edition of the Faithful 
Narrative, found it to be too colorful. They carefully
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seen and organize that data as coherently as possible. He 
could thus discuss with feeling and in great detail the 
series of events which usually led up to the cataclysmic con­
version. After he became an apologist rather than a simple 
participant-observer of the Great Awakening he altered his 
emphasis. He pointed out repeatedly that since the devil 
can imitate all the fears, behavioral changes, and despair 
of the immediate pre-conversion period, this period should be 
ignored because it contains no sure signs of grace. It is to 
the Faithful Narrative, then, that we must turn for Edwards’ 
views on the first phase of the conversion sequence.
According to Edwards, God first makes His presence 
felt by creating a need for conversion. People who are satis­
fied with, or uninterested in the state of their soul, will 
not be motivated to seek God, and hence they will never find 
Him. Edwards believed that most of the inhabitants of his 
own town of Northampton, in the period immediately preceding 
the Awakening, were typical of the complacent, corrupt, 
degenerate type who has no room in his life for God.
Licentiousness for some years greatly prevailed among 
the youth of the town; they were many of them very much 
addicted to night-walking, and frequenting the tavern, 
and lewd practices, wherein some, by their example 
exceedingly corrupted others. It was their manner very 
frequently to get together in conventions of both sexes, 
for mirth and jollity, when they called frolics. . . .5
omitted some passages and apoligized for other which might 
offend readers ("Editor's Introduction," p. 39).
^Faithful Narrative, p. 146.
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The validity of Edwards rather stern judgment of the worth of 
"frolicking," while easily debatable, is not at issue here.
The point is that Edwards believed such complacent individ­
uals could never be receptive to the Holy Spirit because they 
perceived no incongruity between their current state and some 
ideal or desired condition. Until they felt a sense of 
spiritual inadequacy, the "licentious" citizens of Northampton 
would continue to frolic rather than organize a plan to seek 
their salvation. Seen through Edwards' cold Calvinist eyes, 
his parishioners were spiritually asleep, and sleeping men 
and women are frightfully unaware of imminent dangers which 
surround them. Clearly, the spiritually slumbering towns­
people would have to be awakened, made aware of their own 
inadequacy, before they would begin to plan for salvation 
rather than frolics.
During the period of what Edwards calls "first awak­
enings," smug self-assurance is transformed into nervous
.. 6 insecurity.
Persons are first awakened with a sense of their miser­
able condition by nature, the danger they are in of 
perishing eternally, and that it is of great importance 
to them that they speedily escape, and get into a better 
state. Those that before were secure and senseless, are 
made sensible how much they were in the way to ruin in 
their former courses.7
This is the rudest awakening imaginable. One suddenly finds
himself, or actually perceives himself, out of favor with God
6 Ibid.. p. 164.
7 Ibid.. p. 160.
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and in imminent danger of burning forever in the devil’s
fiery pit. A wide gulf separates an "awakened" individual's
sorry spiritual status quo and his goal of saving grace.
Clearly, there is serious business to attend to.
By what means does God create the sense or need to
seek conversion? What, for example, moved the degenerate
Northampton youths to religion? Chiefly, according to
Edwards, fear. In the Connecticut Valley, for instance, the
violent death of a youth in Pascommuck in the spring of 1734
"much affected many young people."8 This was followed by the
death of a young woman who, on her deathbed, counseled others
on the means to grace. "This," claims Edwards, "seemed much
to contribute to the solemnizing of the spirits of many young 
g
persons." There was also fear of a more abstract sort in
the form of Arminianism, the traditional New England "Bogy- 
1 □
Man." Edwards, and many of his ministerial colleagues
8 Ibid., p. 147.
9Ibid.. p. 148.
^"Arminianism," remarked Clyde Holbrook, ". . . is a
complex of notions involving an elevated confidence in free­
dom of choice, a sharply upward revised estimate of human 
nature, and a form of common sense moralism . . . "  ('Editor's 
Introduction" to Jonathan Edwards, Original Sin. New Haven, 
Conn., 1970, p. 4). There is a good deal of controversy con­
cerning whether or not "Arminianism" was a real and powerful 
enemy of the congregational way or merely a straw man. Goen, 
("Editor's Introduction," pp. 4-1 8). makes a strong case for the 
reality of the Arminian threat, while the straw-man hypothesis 
is advanced by Edmund 5. Morgan in his The Gentle Puritan; A 
Life of Ezra Stiles. 1727-1795 (New Haven, Conn., 1961), pp. 
15-19, and Gerald J. Goodwin, "The Myth of 'Arminian-Calvin- 
ism' in Eighteenth Century New Enqland," New England Quarterly, 
1968, 41, 213-237.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 89
forcasted the decline of the New England Congregational way 
into chaotic heterodoxy if Arminian principles were not uni­
laterally renounced. If Congregationalism declined, it was 
claimed, the awful fate of all New Englanders would be sealed. 
The point was that all concerned had better act quickly if
the devil and his Arminian army were to be defeated.
Although fear was an especially effective method of
motivating complacent frolickers to act in behalf of their
souls, Edwards also saw God creating spiritual incongruity in
another manner. God sometimes saw fit to convert a few
renowned sinners, thereby focusing attention on the practical
benefits of coming to grace. If one person's life could be
miraculously transformed from a miserable existence into a
vital, useful, secure one, then many people would be moved to
duplicate that transformation. They would be motivated by
attraction to the godly life in addition to being repelled
by the prospect of becoming an eternal cinder. In the Faith-
ful Narrative Edwards describes just such a "surprizing work
of God" which, he claims, had a profound positive impact on
the progress of the Great Awakening in the entire Connecticut
Valley. It involved the apparent conversion of
a young woman, who had been one of the greatest company 
keepers in the whole town. When she came to me, I had 
never heard that she had become in any wise serious, but 
by the conversation I then had with her, it appeared to 
me that what she gave an account of was a glorious work 
of God's infinite power and sovereign grace; and that God 
had given her a new heart, truly broken and sanctified.
I could not then doubt of it, and have seen much in my 
acquaintance with her since to confirm it.11
1 1
Faithful Narrative, p. 149.
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According to Edwards, this remarkable event helped open the 
spiritual floodgates in Northampton and surrounding communi­
ties. It was "the greatest occasion of awakening to others,
1 2of anything that ever came to pass in the town." She was 
convincing and her behavior had changed remarkably. Seeing 
this about face in the "company keeper," many others became 
convinced that God was among them. They quickly made plans 
to seek grace, to reduce the incongruity between their own 
sinful ways and the saintly life as exhibited by the reformed 
"company keeper."
Edwards supports these generalizations concerning 
God's Modus Operandi with two case studies drawn from his 
Northampton parish. One of these, Phebe Bartlet, illustrates 
God's use of the technique of fear to create the need for con­
version. Phebe, a child of four, seemed to be growing up in 
quite an ordinary fashion until her "hopefully converted"
eleven year old brother "seriously talked to her about the 
1 3great things of religion." After these discussions with
her brother she became withdrawn and began spending much time
alone in her room praying. Then one day,
when the child had done prayer, she came out of the 
closet, and came and sat down by her mother, and cried 
out loud. Her mother very earnestly asked her several 
times what the matter was, before she would make any 
answer; but she continued exceedingly crying, and wreath­
ing her body to and fro, like one in anguish of spirit.
Her mother then asked her whether she was afraid that God 
would not give her salvation. 5he answered, "Yes, I am
12 Ibid., p. 149.
13 Ibid.. p. 199.
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afraid I shall go to hell!" Her mother then endeavored 
to quiet her, and told her she would not have her cry; 
she must be a good girl, and pray every day, and she 
hoped God would give her salvation. But this did not 
quiet her at all. . . .14-
In Edwards' view, God, working perhaps through Phebe's brother,
had frightened the youngster into an awareness of her need
for salvation.
In the case of Abigail Hutchinson, God created the 
same need in quite a different manner; He made her envious of 
the "company keeper." Abigail was a frail young woman who was 
dying from some sort of esophogeal blockage. "But her infirm­
ity," Edwards quickly adds, "had never been observed at all
to incline her to be notional or fanciful, or to occasion any-
1 5
thing of religious melancholy." It was probably God, there­
fore, not the "melancholy" which caused her reaction to "the 
news of the conversion of the young woman before mentioned 
[the ' company keeper'] . . . . "1^
This news wrought much upon her, and stirred up a spirit 
of envy in her towards this young woman, whom she thought 
very unworthy of being distinguished from others by such 
a mercy; but withal it engaged her in a firm resolution 
to do her utmost to obtain the blessing."17
"If God sees fit to transform the heart of such a woman,"
14 Ibid.. p. 200.
15Ibid., p. 191 .
 ^^ Ibid., p. 192. On Edwards and the notion of melan­
choly see Gail Thain Parker, "Jonathan Edwards and Melan­
choly," New England Quarterly, 196B, £1_, 193-212.
^ Faithful Narrative, p. 192.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 92
Abigail must have said to herself, "then surely I too can 
reap the benefits of grace." Her next step would be to plan 
a strategy for reaching her goal; that is, to determine more 
precisely the nature of "her utmost."
This, then, is how God begins his dispensation of 
grace: by motivating those who were created in His image
but have gone astray, in order that they eventually escape 
the eternal fires of the Evil One. Man begins to plan and 
act, according to Edwards, only when he perceives an incon­
gruity between here— his current condition— and there— his 
1 8
goal. God does not createa new imbalance; He simply 
"awakens" the individual by providing him with clearer, more 
accurate pictures of both "here" and "there." The person 
becomes fearfully aware that he is in sad spiritual straits 
and if he doesn't do something about it he will burn forever 
in hell. That is his unfortunate status. The pre-convert 
also becomes increasingly aware of the nature of the goal 
through his observations of inspired demonstrations, such as 
the "company keeper." The more the awakening person dis­
covers about his actual and ideal self, the more the gulf 
between them seems to widen. When the discrepancy becomes 
unbearable, the equilibrium is destroyed, and the person 
initiates a plan, or a group of plans, which are designed to 
eliminate the perceived incongruity in his spiritual system. 
The proactive search for God and His grace begins.
18See Figure 8, p. 159 (the TOTE Unit) for a pictorial 
representation of the function of need.
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Test^: The Fruitless Search for
God and Salvation
After being awakened to his precarious spiritual 
state, a person begins casting about in every direction try­
ing, so it appears, to make up for lost time. He becomes a 
pious busy-body, reading scripture voraciously, going to 
church often, and doing good. During this frenzied period of 
what he called "legal strivings," Edwards observed that awak­
ened persons expend nearly all their physical and psycho­
logical energy in pursuit of their salvation. This sudden 
shift from careless complacence to earnest performance of 
good works had ,certain practical advantages, as Edwards, 
minister of an often raucous frontier settlement, was eager 
to point out.
These awakenings when they have first seized on per­
sons have had two effects: one was that they have brought
them immediately to quit their sinful practices, and the 
looser sort have been brought to forsake and dread their 
former vices and extravagancies. When once the Spirit of 
God began to be so wonderfully poured out in a general 
way through the town, people had soon done with their old 
quarrels, backbitings, and intermeddling with other men’s 
matters; the tavern was soon left empty, and persons kept 
very much at home; none went abroad unless on necessary 
business, or on some religious account, and every day 
seemed in many respects like a Sabbath day. And the 
other effect was, that it put them on earnest application 
to the means of salvation— reading, prayer, meditation, 
the ordinances of God's House, and private conference; 
their cry was "What shall I do to be saved?" The place 
of resort was now altered; it was no longer the tavern, 
but the minister's house, that was thronged far more than 
ever the tavern had wont to be.19
^ Faithful Narrative, pp. 160-161.
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The awakened, it seems, are consumed with their plan
for salvation which is, as Edwards notes, comprised of numer-
20ous sub-plans, or sub-routines like reading, prayer, etc.
Each of these sub-routines requires the expenditure of con­
scious effort and each, therefore, may be characterized as a 
21sequential process. The awakened person tries to proceed
toward his goal as quickly as possible. There is, in his
view, no time to lose. Phebe Bartlet, for instance, prayed
alone "five or six times in a day" at the height of her 
22"legal strivings." Abigail Hutchinson, on the other hand,
undertook to educate herself.
. . . she thought she had not a sufficient knowledge
of the principles of religion to render her capable of 
conversion; whereupon she resolved thoroughly to search 
the scriptures; and"accordingly immediately began at the 
beginning of the Bible, intending to read it through.23
This eventually-fruitless decision clearly illustrates the 
philosophy of the newly awakened: it is better to do some­
thing rather than do nothing. The planning and seeking, 
though certainly goal-oriented and consciously directed, often 
appears more like reflexive, spastic, lurching rather than 
smooth progression toward grace. Many activities are carried 
on simultaneously, in the hope that one or more will work.
“^ Compare this with William James' plan for rising 
from bed in the morning (Figure 7, p. 158).
^ S e e  above, pp. 161-165, for a discussion of sequen­
tial processing. Note especially Figure 11, p. 169 and 
Figure 12, p . 178.
^ Faithful Narrative, p. 199.
23Ibid., p. 192.
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Unfortunately, according to Edwards, none of the 
elaborate plans and activities ever work. The newly awakened 
are destined for failure after failure until they become 
wrung out, exhausted, disillusioned, and more convinced than 
ever of their own worthlessness. Why does God lead men 
through such a frustrating, hopeless ordeal? Because, in 
Edwards' view, God is not just there for the taking. Arro­
gant man, with his confident schemes and plans, must learn 
through hard experience the humility that is appropriate to 
one who is utterly dependent on another.
The drift of the Spirit of God in his legal strivings 
with persons, has seemed most evidently to be, to make 
way for, and to bring to, a conviction of their absolute 
dependence on his sovereign power and grace, and universal 
necessity of a Mediator, by leading them more and more to 
a sense of their exceeding wickedness and guiltiness in 
his sight; the pollution and insufficiency of their own 
righteousness, that they can in no wise help themselves, 
and that God would be wholly just and righteous in 
rejecting them, and all that they do, and in casting them 
off forever . . .24
The frustrating period of "legal strivings" is God's presenta­
tion to man of an operational definition of the need that is 
felt in the initial awakening. The whole process of planning 
and searching for God is initiated by some perceived incon­
gruity between one's present state and a state of saving 
grace. Ye this need is what Edwards often called "motional"; 
it involves only a sort of intellectual, detached assent to a
Ibid., pp. 163-164. Edwards made this point most 
convincingly in an early, important sermon, "God Glorified 
in the Work of Redemption, by the Greatness of Man's Depen­
dence upon Him, in the Whole of It." In Dwight, ed., Works 
pp. 1 49-1 62.
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proposition. The need felt by a person who has striven and 
struggled and failed utterly is far more profound than this.
It is a need that is felt in the viscera and documented with 
the data of his own wretched experience. Like Abigail 
Hutchinson, all awakened seekers after grace must acknowl­
edge that the absolute corruption of their hearts is such 
"that the sin which she brought into the world with her was 
alone sufficient to condemn her."2"’ The need to obtain 
grace is thus transformed into a need to receive it; all 
human plans must be relinquished in favor of God's Plan.
The discovery of God always comes on God's terms.
After the awakened person concludes that he cannot 
save himself, he lays his fate at God's doorstep. The fran­
tic phase of proactive seeking gives way to patient, reactive 
waiting.
. . . a general hope arises that some time or other God
will be gracious, even before any distinct and particular 
discoveries of mercy; and often they then come to a con­
clusion within themselves, that they will be at God's 
feet and wait his time, and they rest in that, not being 
sensible that the 5pirit of God has now brought them to 
a frame whereby they are prepared for mercy.26
This is the "frame" of mind in which, as Edwards put it,
"gracious discoveries . . . are given.
But what kind of "frame" is it that leads to important 
"discoveries," such as when one discovers "mercy"?^ Edwards
^ Faithful Narrative, p. 193.
^  Ibid . , pp. 1 69-1 70.
27Ibid., p. 1 71 .
^®At various times Edwards referred to the essence 
of conversion as "mercy," "the divine and supernatural
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didn't know, and James and Starbuck, 160 years later, could 
only say that converts usually "relax" just before the con­
version experience.
What then must the person do? "He must relax," say Dr. 
Starbuck— "that is, he must fall back on the larger 
power that makes for righteousness, which has been well­
ing up in his own being, and let it finish in its own 
way the work it has begun. . . . The act of yielding, in
this point of view, is giving one's self over to the new 
personality, and living, from within, the truth of it 
which had before been viewed objectively."
. . . To state it in terms of our own symbolism:
When the new center of personal energy has been sub­
consciously incubated so long as to be just ready to open 
into flower, "hands off" is the only word for us, it must 
burst forth u n a i d e d . 29
Information-processing theory describes such a "frame," or
what Starbuck calls "the act of yielding," as one in which
information is processed in parallel.30 One relaxes his
characteristic planning and executing and lets his focus of
attention wander into the emotionally-laden pandemonium at
the fringes of his stream of consciousness. Under certain
circumstances, for instance, an individual may relinquish his
plans for those of another, as in hypnosis, or the result
may be some other kind of trance state in which information
from the unconscious and the environment bombards the person
31in no apparent logical sequence. Many aspects of trance
light," "divine love," "grace," and "a vital, indwelling 
principle."
29
William James, Varieties. p. 175. James quotes 
from Edwin D. Starbuck, The Psychology of Religion (London,
1901), p. 115.
^°5ee above, Figure 10, p. 166, and pp. 163-167 for a 
discussion and model of parallel processing.
^  For an acute analysis of the trance state, consult
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phenomena are present in Edwards' detailed description of
Abigail Hutchinson's conversion. In the early phases of her
conversion experience," she saw nothing but blackness of
darkness before her." In the midst of her ordeal, "she almost
fainted" at the mere sight of "three persons who were thought
to have been lately converted." Finally, she "continued whole
days and whole nights in a constant ravishing view of the 
32glory of God and Christ." Clearly, Abigail had entered a 
"frame" or state in which conscious, goal-directed planning 
and depositing of information into rubrics and categories 
had given way to direct, emotional "ravishing" communication.
What is the result of relinquishing a plan or plans?
If the relinquishment is preceded by vigorous planning, as it 
clearly must for Edwards' converts, the result is often a 
creative insight, a new way of looking at things.^ Recall
5hor, "Generalized Reality Orientation," and "Three Dimensions 
of Hypnotic Depth," International Journal of Clinical and 
Experimental Hypnosis, 1 962, 1_0, 23-38. IMeisser has attempted 
to present trance phenomena in the language of information 
processing; see Cognitive Psychology, Chapter 11. See also 
Ernest R. Hilgard, "The Domain of Hypnosis: With Some Com­
ments on Alternative Paradigms," American Psychologist, 1973, 
28, 972-932, for a discussion of trance versus non-trance 
theories of hypnosis and the classic analysis by Martin Drne 
demonstrating the reality of "trance logic": "The Nature of
Hypnosis: Artifact and Essence," Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology. 1959, 58, 277-299.
^ Faithful Narrative, pp. 1 92-1 95.
33
□n trance and creativity see Stanley Kripper, "The 
Psychedelic State, the Hypnotic Trance and the Creative Act." 
In Tart, ed., Altered States, pp. 271-290. A very influential 
theory of the creative process is that of Graham Wallas. In 
his view, the process traverses four stages: preparation,
incubation, illumination, and revision. This theory is simi­
lar, in its basic aspects, to the cybernetic model and to 
Edwards' description of conversion. See Art of Thought (Lon­
don, 1 926).  a--
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that man, according to information-processing theory, is 
characterized by multiple processing: a sequential, conscious
train of thought and a parallel, most unconscious, emotionally- 
laden intruder. It is now common to attribute creative 
insights to a fusion of emotional, unconscious needs with 
logical, conscious considerations. It is here, and only 
here, that Edwards and information-processing theory part 
company altogether. For Edwards, the intrusions came not 
from some unconscious mind or from peripheral aspects of the 
environment but from his Calvinist God. Poets, scientists, 
muscians and artists make discoveries. To the converts of 
Edwards, however, "gracious discoveries . . . are given. "3^
When Jesus invited men to "seek and ye shall find," 
he had in mind, according to Edwards, a search that is 
incredibly arduous and complex. After God establishes some 
initial incongruity, after a person becomes awakened and con­
cerned about his spiritual estate, he is confronted with a 
problem which he cannot possibly solve. Unfortunately, he is 
unaware of his incompetence and his elaborate proactive plan­
ning and activity bring only frustration and anxiety. Finally, 
these frustrated, humiliated people give up as they are 
"brought to the borders of despair, and it looks as black as
midnight to them a little before the day dawns in their 
3 5
souls." They wait, quietly, desperate and hopeless, for the
34
Faithful Narrative, p. 171, my italics.
35Ibid.. p. 162.
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rays of an unknown sun to enlighten their minds. When the 
dawn comes, unexpectedly and in a lightening flash, their 
minds will be fundamentally altered by "gracious discoveries." 
This profound psychological alteration brought by spiritual 
"dawn" is the heart of Edwards' psychological system, and it 
is his explanation of this remarkable phenomenon that we shall 
now examine, armed with a few contemporary concepts.
Some Organizing Concepts: A Preface
to the Operation of the Spirit 
in Conversion
Reduced to its lowest terms, Edwards' view of con­
version condenses to a remarkably simple, though fundamental, 
alteration of the mind. In order to appreciate the impor­
tance of the psychological change wrought by conversion, how­
ever, it is necessary to understand the essential attribute 
of the Edwardsean mind: unity. In this section, therefore,
we shall make a brief, but vitally necessary, digression into 
Edwardsean mental mechanics. We will examine his transsumma- 
tive concept of mind much more thoroughly than we have thus 
f ar.
Thinking, feeling, and willing are not, in Edwards' 
view, isolated human activities which reflect a set of dis­
crete mental entities which are the "seat" of each. Augustine 
had been right. The mind is more like a New Worldmelting pot 
than an Did World ghetto. The constituents have lost their 
identity through intermarriage and the sharing of
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responsibilities. To Edwards, the most significant mental 
miscengenation is between reason and emotion. Man is a 
transsummative, rational-emotive unity, and it is this union 
which makes him appear disarmingly simple in theory, and 
hopelessly complex in practice.
Perhaps man's most characteristically "rational" 
activity would appear to be consciously weighing two or more 
alternative actions, and eventually choosing one over the 
others. From Edwards' day down to the present, those who have 
claimed that man has a "free will" have emphasized the impor­
tance of man's capacity for rational judgment and choice. Of 
course, if there is such a thing as an absolutely rational 
choice, or act, then Edwards' transsummative poisition is 
false. He had to prove, therefore, that
The will, and the affections of the soul, are not two 
faculties; the affections are not essentially distinct 
from the will, nor do they differ from the mere actings 
of the will and inclination of the soul, but only in the 
livliness and sensibileness of exercise.36
If he could demonstrate that every act of will, every rational 
choice, has an emotional component, he would effectively 
undercut any effort to treat them as independent "faculties." 
If willing and the affections always appear together, it is 
very misleading to consider them as anything other than com­
pletely integrated and unified.
Keep in mind that Edwards undertook to defend two 
extremely unpopular notions: the determination of "the will,"
 ^^ Affections. p. 97.
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and the fundamental importance of man's irrational capacities.
Faced with a very similar dilemma 150 years later, Freud's
strategy was first to ingratiate himself with a hostile
audience and then slowly and subtly destroy their basic 
3 7assumptions. Edwards followed the same strategy. Of
course, he agreed, men weigh alternatives and decide, without
coercion, the course of action they will take. If a man
decides to take a walk then, in one sense, his decision is
both free and rational.38 His motive, according to this
position is the physical object in view: the need to walk
or, perhaps, the attraction to walking. Thus far Edwards had
nothing threatening or objectionable to the Arminians; he
simply summarized their position.
Edwards never actually disagreed with the Arminian
analysis of will. Instead, he discarded it as superficial
and irrelevant. The rational or "free will" position failed
to notice a common denominator among the infinite number of
3 9"motives" that impell men to action. It failed to recog­
nize that
. . . the will is as the greatest apparent good is, . . .
that volition has always for its object the thing which 
appears most agreeable; it must be carefully observed,




On Edwards' re-definition of motive, see Haroutunian, 
Piety versus Moralism. pp. 220-229. On the same topic, but 
emphasizing the influence of Locke on Edwards' concept of 
motive, see Paul Ramsey, "Editor's Introduction" to Edwards' 
Freedom of the Will, pp. 47-64.
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to avoid confusion and needless objection, that I speak 
of the direct and immediate object of the act of volition; 
and not some object that the act of will has not an imme­
diate, but only an indirect and remote respect to.^U
In Edwards' view, the particular choice--to walk, talk, etc.,
is of secondary importance. Whatever the supposed goal, there
is an incontrovertible law of human nature which necessitates
a person to always choose that alternative which seems to
provide the greatest good or pleasure or least pain. There
are no exceptions. Thus,
. . . the will is determined by the greatest apparent
good, or by what seems most agreeable; because an appear­
ing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind, and the 
mind's preferring and choosing, seem hardly to be properly 
and perfectly distinct. 41
Paradoxically, man chooses between alternatives, but he has
no alternative other then choosing that which he likes. On
Edwards' level of analysis, therefore, man has no choice.
Unlike the conscious, considered choice of an "indi­
rect" object, the selection of likes and dislikes is usually 
made unconsciously. Edwards acknowledged that "reason," 
conscious choice, is sometimes instrumental in determining 
whether an abject appears agreeable or disagreeable. Often, 
however, it is not, as Edwards notes in a ponderous but sig- 
noficant restatement of the dilemma of St. Paul:
When it [reason] concurs with other things, then its 
weight is added to them, as put into the same scale; but 
when it is against them, it is as a weight in the oppo­
site scale, where it resists the influence of other 
things: yet its resistance is often overcome by their
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
204
greater weight, and so the act of the will is determined 
in opposition to it.42
"Other things" often determine a course of action. A choice
is made, an object is sought for its beauty or ugliness,
symmetry or asymmetry, harmony or discord, for its sweet
smell or pungent stench.43 Each of these, and an infinity of
"other things," aesthetic considerations, usually register,
if at all, as vague but vitally important feelings. Much
later, Freud would deal specifically with these emotionally-
laden "other things." Edwards was content merely to note
44
their existence and importance.
Like Freud, Edwards re-defined the usual concept of 
motivation. A motive is not that which is consciously 
desired or "in the view of the mind," as he often put it. 
Rather, a motive is a group of affectionate, emotional con­
siderations which either attract us toward or repell us from 
some "rational" alternative.^
We see the world of mankind to be exceedingly busy and 
active; and the affections of men are the springs of the 
motion: take away all love and hatred, all hope and
fear, all anger, zeal, and affectionate desire, and the 
world would be, in a great measure, motionless and dead; 
there would be no such thing as activity amongst mankind, 
or any earnest pursuit whatsoever.^
42
Ibid., p. 14B. Dn St. Paul, see above, p. 133.
43
See Will, pp. 145-146, for Edwards' list of reasons 
why objects appear agreeable or disagreeable.
44
This may have been what Perry Miller had in mind 
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Every human action is a complex mixture of reason and emotion. 
This simple fact represents to Edwards a kind of phenotypic 
expression of the underlying, genotypic, psychological 
reality.
I humbly conceive that the affections of the soul are 
not properly distinguished from the will, as though they 
were two faculties in the soul. All acts of the affec­
tions of the soul are in some sense acts of the will, 
and all acts of the will are acts of the affections.
All exercises of the will are in some degree or other, 
exercises of the soul's appetition or aversion; or which 
is the same thing, of its love or hatred. The soul 
wills one thing rather than another, or chooses one 
thing rather than another, no otherwise than as it loves 
one thing more than another; but love and hatred are 
affections of the soul: and therefore all acts of the
will are truly acts of the affections.47
Edwards made his point convincingly. All our plans and acts 
are in some measure a function of our likes and dislikes, 
love and hatred, of our own peculiar sense of what is beauti­
ful and what is ugly.
The Puritan and neo-Platonic churchmen from whom 
Edwards inherited the faculty psychology drew a psychological 
portrait of man that was theoretically complex but practically 
quite simple. A stimulus would be passively received and its 
resulting "phantasm" was said to leapfrog through a host of 
independent faculties until it reached a kind of executive 
faculty, "Reason." It could make its decisions independently 
of the affections. Man was thus seen as a piece of compli­
cated machinery whose conduct, however, was a rather simple 
function of the choices made by his rational faculty. In
^ 5ome Thoughts Concerning the Present Revival of 
Religion in New England, in Goen, ed., Great Awakening, dd. 
291-530, p. 297.
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spite of an ornate, byzantine mental arrangement, human 
thinking and behavior was rendered quite explicable and even 
predictable.^® Edwards, however, inverted this arrangement. 
His conception of the mind was starkly simple; he acknowl­
edged only understanding and will-affections, and then only 
as convenient fictions rather than physiological entities. 
Furthermore, by uniting the will and affections, the struc- 
turally-simple Edwardsean man emerges as one whose thinking 
and behavior is caused mostly by complex, uncontrollable, 
even unknowable unconscious emotional forces.
Thus far we have considered only what might be called 
experiential indices of Edwards' transsummative view of man. 
Since rational acts of will like planning, choosing, and act­
ing are motivated by emotional needs, then it may be inferred 
that man's mental structure is a rational-emotive unity. 
Edwards was not fond, however, of permitting his readers to 
make inferences. Readers, being sinful and corrupt, might 
not infer properly. He therefore undertook to analyze the 
precise nature of the relationship between the two mental 
functions (not structures) which he acknowledged, understand­
ing and will-affections.
When first focusing his microscope on the mind, or 
soul, itself, Edwards sound respectably traditional, except 
for the poverty of "faculties" and the integrated will- 
af f ections .
48
See Miller, Seventeenth Century, chapt. 9, "The 
Nature of Man."
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God has indued the soul with two faculties: one is that
by which it is capable of perception and speculation, or 
by which it discerns and judges of things; which is 
called the understanding. The other faculty is that by 
which the soul does not merely perceive and view things, 
but is in some way inclined with respect to the things 
it views or considers . . . either as liking or disliking,
pleased or displeased, approving or rejecting. This 
faculty is called by various names: it is sometimes
called the inclination: and, as it has respect to the
actions that are determined and governed by it, is called 
the will: and the mind, with regard to the exercises of
this faculty, is often called the heart.49
Some commentators have jumped to the hasty conclusion 
that this statement "proves" that Edwards was only a modified 
"faculty psychologist" who had honed Occam's razor to an 
uncommonly sharp cutting e d g e . ^  These misinterpreters have 
simply failed to read on and discover what Edwards had to say 
about the relationship between these "faculties."
Edwards distinguished between two kinds of under­
standing. A person can possess a "mere notional understanding,
wherein the mind only beholds things in the exercise of a 
51speculative faculty." This level of understanding, which 
implies a minimum of personal participation and involvement, 
is held by Edwards to be inadequate at best, and at worst 
representative of serious pathology. A person who refuses to 
get involved with the object of his attention, to take a 
position with regard to it, to experience it, has, according
49
Affections, p. 96 (Edwards' italics).
5°Cf. Fay, American Psychology, and Roback, History.
51
Affections. p. 272.
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52to Edwards, useless knowledge. It can never lead to con­
structive action because emotional involvement, absent in a 
"notional understanding," motivates the will. So-called 
"rationalists," therefore, those who seek to keep their emo­
tions in check, are guilty of denying a basic human function.
This useless "notional understanding" must be con­
trasted with the understanding which Edwards called "a sense 
of the heart."
I say a sense of heart; for it is not speculation merely 
that is concerned in this kind of understanding: nor can
there be a clear distinction made between the two facul­
ties of understanding and will, as acting distinctly and 
separately, in this matter. When the mind is sensible of 
the sweet beauty and amiableness of a thing, that implies 
a sensibleness of sweetness and delight in the presence 
of the idea of it: and this sensibleness of the amiable­
ness or delightfulness of beauty, carries in the very 
nature of it, the sense of the heart; or an effect and 
impression the soul is the subject of as a substance 
possessed of taste, inclination and will.53
Scholastic distinctions must be discarded in light of the
evidence. It cannot be denied, claims Edwards, that "he that
has perceived the sweet taste of honey, knows much more about
54
it, than he who has only looked upon and felt of it." "A 
sense of the heart" implies a simultaneous dispensation of 
heat and light: the receiving of information that is cared
about. Knowledge about and knowledge, in other words, are
52 For a modern and rather complete analogue to this 
aspect of Edwards' "Sense of the Heart," see Schactel's con­
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not equivalent. In the latter Edwards found evidence that 
man's psyche is meant to function as a fully-integrated, 
rational-emotive unity that transcends the artifical bounda­
ries which traditionally distort discussion of these aspects 
of human functioning .
Edwards had built his case for the singular impor­
tance of the affections. In all our plans and acts, in our 
basic understanding and perception of the world, emotional 
considerations play a vital role. But Man is a rational, 
reasonable creature, or so the argument ran among the more 
"enlightened" of Edwards' colleagues in an age that was 
eventually to be called the Enlightenment, or the Age of Rea­
son. In Edwards' view, however, man's rationality is only an 
illusion; a substratum of emotional needs determines every 
act we commit, every direction that we look, and every infer­
ence we make. The transsummative, multiple-processing hypoth­
esis could hardly have been presented more forcefully than 
this.
But why labor to the bone in order to demonstrate the 
superordinate significance of the emotions? What reason was 
there to construct an elaborate psychological theory that was 
virtually incomprehensible but apparently in opposition to 
nearly every "enlightened" view of the day? It was simply 
this: Edwards believed the affectionate outpourings of the 
Great Awakening represented a valid work of God and not a
^^□n Edwards and the integrity of the "self," see 
Delatte, Beauty and Sensibility, pp. 1-11.
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dance of lunatics, as some would have it. It was true that 
there had been many emotional excess which could hardly be 
interpreted as works of the Holy Spirit. Yet he resolutely 
refused to believe that the emotional blandishments were 
unnecessary, even harmful, artifacts. Emotion must be an 
integral component of coming to grace. Somewhere, far 
beneath the raving and ranting, the shouting, sweating, and 
speaking in tongues, Edwards thought he discerned a profound 
truth: "true religion, in great part, consists in holy
affections .
The entire psychological system of Edwards reduces 
to a justification for equating true religion with emotional 
involvement. He had said that man is a creature whose every 
act and ever perception is emotionally motivated, and that 
true understanding, therefore, consists in a sense of the 
heart— a total grasp involving not only speculative judgment 
but loving and/or hating. A person constructed in such a 
manner can come to know God, then, in only one way, with a 
total commitment of all his intellectual and emotional resources. 
Spiritual understanding is but a very special case of a sense 
of the heart.
Spiritual understanding primarily consists in this 
sense, or taste of the moral beauty of divine things; so 
that no knowledge can be called spiritual, and further 
than it arises from this, and has this in it. But secon­
darily, it includes that all discerning and knowledge of 
things of religion, which depends upon, and flows from 
such a sense.5/
5 6
Affections. p. 95; see also p. 101.
57Ibid.. p. 273.
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Both before and after conversion a person is 
attracted to that which he likes and repelled by that which 
he dislikes. He is "free" to consciously choose among alter­
natives but, at a deeper level, he must choose that which 
appears more attractive or lovely to him. Before conversion, 
due to his originally sinful nature, a person can have only 
a "notional understanding" of "divine things," at best. He 
does not love or relish God and the beauty of divine works in 
such a way that he can do no other. He needs, according to 
Edwards, to have his affections made more congruent with those 
of God Himself so that his thinking, perceiving, and acting 
more closely approximate the manner in which God might 
accomplish these tasks. This occurs, as we shall now see, 
during the "gracious discoveries" of conversion.
Operate; The Discovery of Divine Love
On the surface it would appear that the conversion 
experience has no analogue. It neatly divides a person's 
life into two discrete units; sinner and saint, dead and re­
born, lost and saved. In this before and after montage, 
spiritual weakness is miraculously transformed into spiritual 
strength. An individual may believe he is so fundamentally 
different after conversion that, like St. Paul, he changes his 
residence, his occupation, and even his name. These uniquely 
devastating effects of conversion, combined with its hypothe­
sized supernatural origins, have generally discouraged investi­
gation into the precise nature or essence of the event. Even
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the great James called off his investigation of conversion
far short of trying to isolate its essence.
If the grace of God miraculously operates, it probably 
operates through the subliminal door, then. But just how 
anything operates in this region is still unexplained, 
and we shall do well now to say good-by to the process 
of transformation altogether— leaving it, if you like, a 
good deal of a psychological or theological mystery— and 
to turn our attention to the fruits of the religious con­
dition, no matter in what way they may have been pro­
duced.58
How, it might be asked, can the mental operations of con­
version be explained when the mind, the conversional arena, 
can never be known directly, and the supernatural stimulus 
cannot be known at all? Edwards rushed in where James and
59most other psychologists of religion have feared to tread.
In his attempt to describe and explain the precise psychologi­
cal change incurred at conversion, Edwards culminated his 
courageous, profound, yet ultimately frustrating descent into 
cognitive psychology.
To Edwards, as well as most other Protestant theo­
logians, it was baldly obvious that sinners and saints behave 
differently. Edwards was merely re-stating what seemed to be 
an ancient truism when he drew the obvious conclusion from 
this .
□f course, many "faculty" psychologists offered 
opinions on conversion. These were hardly explanations, how­
ever. They usually stated merely that certain mythical 
entities ("faculties") had somehow been miraculously trans­
formed. The question, of course, is how does this occur; and 
how is it reflected in perception and behavior? Edwards 
addressed himself to all these questions.
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Hence it will fallow, that the sense of things of 
religion that a natural man has, is not only not to the 
same degree, but nothing of same nature with that which 
a true saint has.
The reason why natural men have no knowledge of 
spiritual things is because they have nothing of the 
Spirit of God dwelling in them.60
The converted person, he who has the Holy Spirit dwelling
within him, differs in some absolutely fundamental way from
the person who lacks the Spirit.
But wherein, exactly, lay the saintly psychological 
monopoly? How does the Spirit interact with the mind of the 
converted? Edwards usually refers to the presence of the 
5pirit in conversion as a "principle," "principles" or some­
times an "indwelling vital principle."6  ^ "There is some one 
holy principle in the heart," he said, "that is the essence 
and sum of all grace, the root and source of all holy acts of 
every kind."63 The establishment of the new principle is an 
affair of the heart, which is Edwards way of saying that it 
has something to do with the affections. Moreover, the 
emotional re-orientation represented by the spiritual princi­
ple is no simple usurpation by God of human functions.
Nothing in the mind is replaced, yet the entire mind is 
reorganized and given a new direction.63 Although he admitted
6°Treatise on Grace, ed. by Paul Helm (London, 1971),
p. 29.
Cf. Affections. pp. 200-207, Grace, and "Divine 
Light," for dozens of examples of Edwards' use of the term 
"principle. "
^ Grace. p. 40.
^ C f .  Affections, p. 206, and "Divine Light," p. 179.
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the vagary and inadequacy of his notion of "principle,"
Edwards left no doubt that it is a cognitive structure of 
some sort.
I use the word "principles," for want of a more determi­
nate signification. By a principle of nature in this 
place, I mean that foundation which is laid in nature, 
either old or new, for any particular manner or kind of 
exercise of the faculties of the soul: or a natural
habit or foundation for action, giving a person ability 
and disposition to exert the faculties in exercises of 
such a certain kind; so that to exert the faculties in 
that kind of exercises, may be said to be his nature. So 
this new spiritual sense is not a new faculty of under­
standing, but it is a new foundation laid in the nature
of the soul.64
The "natural habits or foundations" in the soul (or mind) are 
now commonly called cognitive structures or schemas.^ These 
cognitive constructs represent mental categories or rubrics 
which permit us to interpret and organize our experience. It 
seems clear that the Edwardsean "principle" accomplishes a 
fundamental alteration and organization of the experience of 
the convert.
The cognitive realignment accomplished by the indwell­
ing vital principle has an effect similar to reversing the 
poles on a magnet. Former attraction become repellant and 
vice versa. The magnet, like the convert, has no choice in 
the matter. After the reversal, the magnet interacts with the
^ Affections , p. 206.
^ F o r  a good general introduction to the concept of 
schemas and cognitive structures, see Ezra Stodtland and 
Lance Cannon, Social Psychology: A Cognitive Approach (Phila­
delphia, 1972), chapt. 1. A more technical introduction to 
the topic, but one which is more pertinent to the present 
discussion, may be found in Neisser, Cognitive Psychology.
pp. 286-292.
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world in a manner which is fundamentally different from before 
the change. For the convert, behavioral changes are a func­
tion of his new Image; his cognitive picture of himself and 
his place in the universe has changed. The ’’gracious dis­
coveries" of God's beauty and the love of Him are accompanied, 
quite literally, by the discovery of a world which seems 
startingly new. The world is now seen, as it were, through 
the eyes of God. In the following passage, one of the most 
significant psychological statements he ever made, we see 
Edwards struggling desperately to describe the psychological 
significance of the newness, the sense of creative discovery, 
inherent in conversion. The vital indwelling principle emerges 
as a principle of cognitive reorganization.
If grace be . . .  an entirely new kind of principle; then 
the exercises of it are also entirely a new kind of exer­
cises. And if there be in the soul a new sort of exer­
cises which it is conscious of, which the soul knew noth­
ing of before, and which no improvement, composition or 
management of what it was before conscious or sensible 
of, could produce, or anything like it; then it follows 
that the mind has an entirely new kind of perception or 
sensation; and here is, as it were, a new spiritual sense 
that the mind has, or a principle of new kind of per­
ception or spiritual sensation, which is in its whole 
nature different from any former kinds of sensation of the 
mind.6 6
The "new kind of exercises" imparted by the "principle" are 
thus interpretive and organizational exercises of the mind=
The discoveries of conversion, like all other creative dis­
coveries, consist not in the novel manipulation of the physical 
environment, but in mental reorganization of information.
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Like cognitive psychologists of all eras, Edwards 
was frustrated by the invisibility of the mind. Neither he 
nor his readers had a frame of reference with which to evalu­
ate a discussion of mental functioning. No one had ever seen,
nor would they ever see, a mind in operation, and certainly 
none had directly and objectively observed the operation of 
the Edwardsean "principle." When he attempted to describe 
the actual activity of the "principle," therefore, Edwards 
resorted to that historically unreliable but uniquely avail­
able device of cognitive psychologists— analogy. ^  In all the 
analogies which Edwards draws between the mysterious con­
version "principle" and familiar, observable phenomena, he 
stresses the fundamental nature of the change. Something in 
the essence, or the core of a convert is altered. He not only
acts and thinks differently than before, he literally is
different.
"The word of God," Edwards remarked "abides in the 
heart of a regenerate person as a holy seed, a Divine princi­
ple there, though it may be but as a seed, a small thing."
But, he reminds us, "the seed is a very small, part of the 
plant, and is its first principle. Edwards, of course, 
knew nothing of modern genetics but, if he had, he might have 
carried the analogy even further. The infusion of the divine 
"principle" is like giving a person a new set of genes. The
675ee above, pp. 133-134 and 136-137.
^ Grace. p. 32.
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"principle" represents no mere face-lift which gives the 
appearance of youth; the convert is literally transformed 
into a spiritual babe, vigorous, clean, and new. He is, as 
evangelists have long been found of saying, born again. In 
another place, Edwards referred to the principle as a "divine, 
supernatural spring of action" in which converts ". . . don't
only drink living water, but this living water becomes a well 
or fountain of water, in the soul, springing up into spiritual 
and everlasting life."^ In still another analogy, Edwards 
remarked: "The light of the Sun of Righteousness don't only
shine upon them, but is so communicated to them that they shine 
also, and become little images of that Sun which shines upon 
them."7*"* Converted persons are not like the parasitic planets 
which derive their energy from elsewhere, but rather they 
resemble something like comets, each containing the vital 
glow of the energy source which spawned it.
The conversion "principle" is utterly fundamental. It 
therefore must involve or influence the most basic aspects of 
man's nature. Recall that Edwards, a synthetic psychologist, 
held to the hypothesis of multiple processing: all human
thinking and action begins with the affections, with loving 
and hating. We see and do that which we like and avoid that 
which does not please us. The "principle" of grace, therefore, 
must accomplish a revolution in the affectional system, it 
must redistribute a person's deepest loves and hates. Further-
^ Affections. p. 200.
7°Ibid., pp. 200-201.
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more, since it is the Holy Spirit of God which is united to
the faculties of the soul," the basic motivating love of the
convert must, in Edwards' view, be redirected toward God and 
71all his works.
That principle in the soul of the saints, which is the 
grand Christian virtue, and which is the soul and essence 
and summary comprehension of all grace, is a principle of 
Divine love.72
Divine love, as it has God for its object, may thus 
be described. 'Tis the soul's relish of the supreme 
excellency of the Divine nature inclining the heart to 
God as the chief good.73
Whereas before the infusion of the divine light an individual
might be inclined toward card playing, drinking "frolicking,"
and other debaucheries, the heart of the reborn convert is
inclined toward God and Godliness. That is, he is necessarily
inclined. After conversion a person has a deeply-felt "sense"
of God's beauty; he must yearn for, relish, and love God
simply because he is now constructed that way. If we can
assume that God loves Himself and all His perfect works, then
a convert and God, according to Edwards, have similar tastes;
they organize their experience in a singular fashion.
Although the divine "principle" is passively received
from God, human mental activity, according to Edwards, is
normally an active and strenuous operation. The laborious
"exercises" which he postulates are now generally referred to
71 Ibid.. p. 2D0.
^ Grace. p. 40; Edwards' italics.
7^Ibid. , pp. 4 8 - 4 9 .
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as information processing— the sorting, selecting, and 
depositing of information into categories or cognitive struc­
tures— background processing. Each new experience is inter­
pretable only within the context provided by the cognitive 
background of past experience. Potential experience can never 
become actual until the appropriate cognitive structure has 
been created. Consider the following simple example of the 
importance of cognitive structures. You are asked to connect 
the following set of dots with four straight lines without 
lifting your pencil from the paper (Figure 14). Let us 
suppose that you try to solve the problem, fail repeatedly, 
and conclude that it is insoluable. You inform your neighbor 
of your difficulty and seek his sympathy. Instead of offering 
consolation, however, he takes your pencil and solves the 
problem with four deft strokes (Figure 15). You are amazed 
at your neighbor's brilliance until he tells you that he remem­
bered the solution for a psychology class he took years ago."^ 
Even after your amazement dissipates, however, you will still 
possess a fundamentally different view of the problem than you 
did before. You have discovered the areas outside the "dot 
box" which escaped your notice initially, and in any future
74This is a simple example of the Gestalt principle of 
"functional fixedness." Solving difficult problems often 
involves reorganizing the entire field, or gestalt; i.e., 
looking at the problem in a way which is fundamentally differ­
ent from the original approach. To the extent that one is 
incapable of such cognitive flexibility, he is functionally 
fixated. For applications of the principle to animal psy­
chology, consult Wolfgang KBhler, The Mentality of Apes (New 
York, 1925). For applicat ions to human problem solving, see
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Figure 14. The dot problem.
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Figure 15. Solution to the dot problem.
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encounters with the problem the solution will seem as obvious 
to you as it does to your neighbor. The addition of a cogni­
tive structure has opened up an entirely new, if trivial, 
realm of experience.
Cognitive structures are for structuring; they pro­
vide each individual with a conglomerate device for inter­
preting his raw experience. They permit each person, in other 
words, to construct his reality as he develops. Nowhere is 
this more apparent than in the mental development of early 
childhood. Jean Piaget, the Swiss psychologist-philosopher, 
has given scientific respectability and precision to a bit of 
folk knowledge which any parent can substantiate: young
children do not view the world as adults d o . ^  Many remark­
able discoveries— the acquisition of cognitive structures— are 
required before the child's reality becomes congruent, in its 
essential respects, with the reality of the adult. Two of 
Piaget's interpreters have summarized his position as follows:
The acquisition of a new structure of mental operations 
is a . . . form of learning which . . . Piaget feels, is
the only stable and lasting type. It is only when the 
child has the prerequisite mental structure to assimilate 
new experiences that true learning takes place, and the 
possibility to generalize to novel situations becomes 
feasible. In other words, genuine learning occurs when 
the child has available the necessary mental equipment to
Karl Duncker, "On Problem-solving," trans. by L. 5. Lees. 
Psychological Monographs, 1 945, 5_8, Whole No. 270.; N. R. F. 
Maier, "Reasoning in Humans. I. On Direction," Journal of 
Comparative Psychology. 1930, JMD, 115-143; and Max Wertheimer, 
Productive Thinking.
"^See especially Piaget's Construction of Reality.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
223
make use of new experiences. When the requisite cogni­
tive structure is present, he can learn from the world 
and come to understand reality; when the structure is 
absent, new experience has only superficial e f f e c t s . 76
When the child acquires some new "mental equipment," the 
mind's "exercises," as Edwards called them, will permit a 
new and exciting apprehension of a tired old world. Each 
time this occurs, and Piaget believes there are a number of 
these fundamental discoveries in each normal child's develop­
ment, the child's conception of the world moves one stage 
closer to that of the adult.
The acquisition of the "permanent object concept" is 
one of the most fascinating discoveries of early childhood.
If an adult places a cake in an oven, closes the oven door, 
leaves the kitchen, and perhaps even shuts himself up in 
another room, he has no doubt that the cake is still in the 
oven. It is a very simple matter to conjure up a mental image 
of a cake inside an oven. For the young child, however, 
objects do not seem to exist independently of his perception 
of them. Until a child attains the age of approximately 
twelve months, for instance, he will not search for toys which 
have been placed under a cloth. Once an object leaves his 
sight, it seems, it ceases to exist.
Piaget has carefully demonstrated a number of stages 
through which a child must pass before he acquires a mature
"^Herbert Ginsburg and Sylvia Upper, Piaget's Theory 
of Intellectual Development: An Introduction (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J., 1969), pp. 175-176.
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object concept somewhere between eighteen months and two 
years. The final, dramatic discovery in the object-concept 
sequence is illustrated by two of Piaget's daughters:
Lucienne, age fourteen months; and Jacqueline, age twenty 
months.
Lucienne is seated on a bed, between shawl A and cloth B.
I hide a safety pin in my hand and my hand under the 
shawl. I remove my hand closed and empty. Lucienne 
opens it at once and looks for the pin. Not finding it 
she searches under the shawl and finds it. . . .
But with a beret, things become complicated. I put 
my watch in the beret and the beret under pillow A (on 
the right); Lucienne lifts the pillow, takes the beret, 
and removes the watch from it. Then I place the beret, 
again containing the watch, under cushion B on the left; 
Lucienne looks for it in B but, as it is hidden too far 
down for her to find it at once, she returns to A.
Then, twice, I raise cushion B so that Lucienne sees 
the beret obviously containing the object; both times she 
resumes looking in B but, not finding the watch right 
away, she returns to A! 5he searches even longer in A 
than in B after having seen the object in B!77
At this stage the infant is incapable of inference; he cannot
infer movement of an object which he cannot see. The existence
of the object, therefore, is still dependent on the child's
perception of it.
Jacqueline is seated opposite three object screens, A, B 
and C (a beret, a handkerchief, and her jacket) aligned 
equidistant from each other. I hide a small pencil in 
may hand saying "Coucou, the pencil." The child had pre­
viously found it under A. I hold out my closed hand to 
her, put it under A, then under B, then under C (leaving 
the pencil under C); at each step I again extend my closed 
hand, repeating, "Coucou, the pencil." Jacqueline then 
searches for the pencil directly in C, finds it and 
laughs.78
"^Piaget, Construction of Reality, pp. 76-77; also 
quoted in Ginsburg and Opper, Piaget's Theory, pp. 62-63.
"^Piaget, Construction of Reality, pp. 79-80; also 
quoted in Ginsburg and Opper, Piaget's Theory, pp. 65-66.
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The child inferred that the object was moved from A to B to C , 
even though she did not see it move. Like an adult, Jacqueline 
formed a mental image of the object. For her, the pencil 
exists independently of her direct perception of it.
Every child eventually learns that there is some kind 
of a real permanent world out there. We may never know whe­
ther any noise is made by a falling tree in a vacant forest, 
but we know that trees can indeed fall even if no one is pre­
sent to record the event. We can imagine it. The discovery 
of object permanence does not alter the raw information con­
tained in Piaget's moving watch or pencil, but the acquisition 
of this cognitive structure revolutionizes the manner in which 
the information is organized and interpreted. This profound 
discovery significantly and irrevocably alters the life of 
each child.
Edwards claimed that the infusion of the "principle" 
of divine love led the mind to a "new sort of exercises" 
which permit a person to perceive things he has never seen 
before. Yet the world itself changes little; conversion is 
intrapsychic. The "gracious discoveries," like the acquisi­
tion of the permanent-object concept, cause a person to 
refocus his attention and reorganize familiar information.
For infants, a plastic and ephermeral world becomes solid and 
stable. For Edwardsean converts, Godly beauty and truth are 
eagerly received into their appropriate, valid, and newly 
acquired categories.
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Persons after their conversion often speak of things 
of religion as seeming new to them; that preaching is a 
new thing; that it seems to them they never heard preach­
ing before; that the Bible is a new book: they find there
new chapters, new psalms, new histories, because they see 
them in a new light.79
We see, think, and act, according to Edwards, so as 
to maximize our pleasure and minimize our pain. Although 
much human activity is rational, conscious, and goal directed, 
we are always attracted to that which we love and repelled by 
that which we hate. This is the essence of the transsummative 
hypothesis— man is a rational-emotive unity. The "vital, 
indwelling principle," a new cognitive structure or principle 
of mental reorganization, is rooted ultimately in a reorienta­
tion of the emotions. A convert thinks, and acts, and views 
the world differently because he feels differently; he is 
drawn by his love of God inexorably toward Godliness. When 
this occurs, Edwards says that God is apprehended with a 
"sense of the heart," with the total commitment of his com­
bined rational and emotional resources. He takes a closer 
look at some things which formerly did not interest him, and 
he is amazed at what he finds. This is the essence of most 
discoveries.
Test2: Evaluating the Validity of the
Conversion Experience
After traversing the initial stages of the conversion 
sequence the concerned seeker quite naturally wishes to know
“^ Faithful Narrative, p. 1 81 .
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whether his "experience" has been a genuine conversion or a 
melancholic trauma or even a work of the devil. He reverts 
to what Edwards calls "reason," or sequential goal-directed 
thought, as he attempts to evaluate the validity of what he 
hopes has been a true conversion.
The evaluation of conversion validity presents some 
extraordinary difficulties which do not arise in most feed­
back loops. In the familiar nail-hammering example described 
in chapter three, for example, one need only look at the nail 
to determine if the head of the nail is flush and the goal has 
thus been achieved.®^ Anyone with fair eyesight and a modicum 
of manual dexterity can make a speedy and more or less grace­
ful exit from the loop. Unlike hammering a nail, however, a 
valid conversion is, in Edwards' view, strictly a cognitive 
phenomenon. The mental realignment resulting from a conver­
sion obviously cannot be observed directly, and therefore it 
must be inferred indirectly from external signs. Unfortunately, 
estimating changes in hypothetical constructs like "mind" or 
"cognitive structures" is a risky business.^ The uncertainty 
of dealing with rarified mental entities is enough, under cer­
tain circumstances, to transform anyone into a modified behav- 
iorist. If, for example, my daughter has been scolded for
®^See above, pp. 155-157.
^  On the definition of "hypothetical constructs," and 
the difficulty of using them in explanations, see Kenneth 
MacCorquodale and Paul E. Meehl, "On a Distinction between 
Hypothetical Constructs and Intervening Variables," Psvcho- 
loqical Review. 1 948, 55_, 95-1 07.
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wrongdoing and then tells me of her love for me, I might ask 
her to "prove it" by exhibiting some behavior which can be 
interpreted as a function of an internal essence, Love.
But what are the signs of a valid conversion? 5ince 
Edwards viewed the cognitive alteration in conversion as 
fundamentally a revolution in the affections, an individual's 
emotional responses probably contain the most important 
insights into his experience. In particular, Edwards believed 
that the "sense of the heart" was most reliably exhibited in
what he called "religiou s affections" or "holy affect.ion.
". . . There is no true religion," he claimed, "where the:
is no religious affectio n . " ^  The surest sign that a con-
version is valid , then, is an emotional outpou:ring of lovi
God and godliness.
The equation between valid conversion and the affec­
tions did not, however, provide the ultimate, or even a use­
ful, criterion against which conversions might be measured.
It merely focused attention on the affections by contending 
that in the absence of "raised affections," or emotional 
intensity, a conversion cannot have occurred. Yet it was 
obvious to all but the most rabid enthusiasts that the pres­
ence of emotional disturbances hardly guaranteed the presence 
of the Holy Spirit. People become emotionally aroused for 
many reasons, most of which are unrelated to conversion or 
even to religion. Sex, guns, food, earthquakes, politicians
^ Affections, p. 120; see also pp. 100-124.
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and thousands of other things are all capable of raising the
affections to an extraordinary degree. So, it appeared, are
fanatical ministers, as the infamous Rev. James Davenport
vividly demonstrated one evening in July, 1741:
Divers women were terrified and cried out exceedingly.
When Mr. Davenport had dismissed the congregation some 
went out and others stayed; he then went into the broad 
alley [aisle], which was much crowded, and there he 
screamed out, "Come to Christ! Come to Christ! Come 
away!" Then he went into the third pew on the women's 
side, and kept there, sometimes singing, sometimes pray­
ing; he and his companions all taking their turns, and the 
women fainting and in hysterics. This confusion continued 
until ten o'clock at night. And then he went off singing 
through the streets.83
That God should operate in such a fashion was, to Edwards,
unthinkable. Raving and ranting are no sure signs of grace.
Bizarre episodes like those involving Davenport, in fact,
merely discredited all raised affections. ". . . false
religion," said Edwards, "consisting in the counterfeits of
the operations of the Spirit of God . . . tends greatly to
84wound and weaken the cause of vital religion . . ." There
was a desperate need, in other words, to distinguish between 
the affections.
There are false affections and there are true. A man's 
having much affection, don't prove that he has any true 
religion: but if he has no affection it proves that he
has no true religion. The right way, is not to reject all 
affections, nor to approve all; but to distinguish between 
affections, approving some and rejecting others; separating 
between the wheat and the chaff, the gold and the dross, 
the precious and the vile.85
^^The Diary of Joshua Hempstead, of New London, Con­
necticut (New London, Conn., 1902), p. 379; quoted in Goen, 
"Editor's Introduction," p. 52.
®^"True Grace Distinguished from the Experience of 
Devils." In Dwight, ed., Works, Vol. 6, pp. 232-261, p. 259.
85Affect ions, p . 121.
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A set of decision rules was needed which could establish a 
causative link between the essence of conversion— the 
restructuring of the mind— and its behavioral and experiential 
indices— certain aspects of emotional arousal.
The Calvinist hell is an awful place, and most New
Englanders believed it to be the eternal residence of the
unconverted. One could not sleep peacefully until he was sure
that his alleged conversion was valid. Until the feedback
from his own conversion experience was absolutely congruent
with some criteria, there would be no exit from the conversion
loop. Often, Edwards believed, the minister must provide the
final assurances through a favorable interpretation of that
affectional feedback.
Many continue a long time in a course of gracious exer­
cises and experiences, and don't think themselves to be 
otherwise; and none knows how long they would continue 
so were they not helped by particular i n s t r u c t i o n .^6
It was impossible to instruct people concerning the state of 
their immortal soul, however, until a checklist of observable 
holy affections had been constructed. Until the affections 
were distinguished, the minister could offer only moral sup­
port to tormented but hopeful parishioners. "Particular 
instruction" to an aspiring convert without particular instruc­
tions for the minister would constitute an irresponsible and 
dangerous game.
Although certainly less important than the removal of 
the tortuous anxiety associated with individual conversions, a
^ Faithful Narrative, p. 175.
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set of signs, or rules, would also help make life more ful­
filling for the ministers. Edwards and his "New Light" 
colleagues were in the business of bring souls to Christ; 
that was, in theory, their primary function.^ While each 
individual in the congregation agonized over the state of his 
own soul, the minister was often right beside him, lamenting 
his own inability to tell his parishioner the joyous words he 
desperately wanted to hear. Even Jonathan Edwards, the tall, 
pale, thin-lipped, epitome of ruthless Puritanism yearned to 
relax and celebrate the accomplishment of his goal: salvation
for members of his congregation.
Yet I should account it a great calamity to be deprived of 
the comfort of rejoicing with those of my flock when there 
seems to be good evidence that those that were dead are 
alive.88
Edwards, like his "flock," was in an uncomfortable situation. 
What would it be like to labor so long and hard and have no 
true converts? He needed "the comfort of rejoicing" over the 
fruits of his labor and God's mercy, and for this he needed 
"good evidence," which might be obtained only after the affec­
tions had been distinguished. Only then could he exit from 
his own ministerial loop (Figure 16).
In the period of the Great Awakening (ca. 1736-1746), 
therefore, a set of criteria for evaluating the validity of
®"^This was especially true in Northampton, where 
Edwards' grandfather and predecessor in the pulpit had been 
conducting revivals, or "harvests," for fifty years. Stoddard's 
relationship to Edwards' psychological views is dealt with, in 
a peripheral fashion, by John E. Smith, "Editor's Introduction," 
pp. 57-60, and more specifically by James G. Blight, "Solomon 
Stoddard."
^ Faithful Narrative, p. 176.
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the conversion experience was needed for a variety of rea­
sons. Many people thought they had been converted but they 
needed to know for sure. Conscientious evangelical ministers, 
like Edwards, also needed to be sure, lest they mislead an 
unwitting soul into hell. Edwards, in addition, had a unique 
interest in distinguishing between holy and spurious affec­
tions. He was the acknowledged leader and spokesman of a 
group of minister-theologians who sought to defend a middle 
position against rationalists led by Charles Chauncy of
Boston, on the one hand, and fanatical enthusiasts like 
89Davenport on the other. Both sides needed to be shown that
the acceptance of emotion as the core of religious experience
90need not degenerate into animal-like excesses.
Edwards' initial task was to demonstrate that valid, 
reliable, and observable signs of conversion are theoretically 
possible. For this assignment, he was well armed with his 
transsummative doctrine: " . . .  all acts of the will," he
91said, "are truly acts of the affections." Human functioning
□ther important "New Lights" were Gilbert Tennet 
and Jonathan Dickinson, both of New Jersey. An analysis of 
their views may be found in Sweet, Revivalism in America, 
and excerpts from their writings are in Heimert and Miller, 
Great Awakening.
90
The religious aberrations of the awakening were 
catalogued by Charles Chauncy in his Seasonable Thoughts on 
the 5tate of Religion in New England, a Treatise in Five 
Parts (Boston, 1743). Two thirds of this large book (424 
pages) is devoted to the documentation of seizures, faintings, 
etc., resulting from New Light preaching. See Caustad, Great 
Awakening in New England, pp. 80-101; Goen, "Editor's Intro­
duction," pp. 80-83; and Miller, Jonathan Edwards, pp. 165-195.
Some Thoughts. p. 297; see also Affections, p. 96, 
and Will, pp. 141-148.
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consists in a unified rational-emotive process which begins 
with conscious and unconscious feeling and culminates in goal- 
directed, volitional activity. Conversion, reduced to lowest 
terms, is the fundamental reorientation of the affections;
God and godliness is loved and relished above all else. A 
direct, immutable, and instantaneous causative sequence 
begins, therefore, with the infusion of the Divine Light in 
conversion (Figure 27). The convert loves Divine things, 
conceptualizes the world differently, and finally he thinks 
and behaves in a saintly fashion. Most assuredly, for 
Edwards, there must be visible evidence of conversion which 
can be traced directly to the invisible essence of the pro­
cess: the reorientation of the affections, the apprehension
of God with a "sense of the heart." Nervous New Englanders 
could breath a temporary sigh of relief.
What is the nature of this evidence, then, which
allows one to label certain affections as holy and others as
spurious? Edwards elaborated the distinctions between the
affections twice, once during the heat of the Awakening in
the Distinguishing Marks (1741), and again shortly after the
spiritual furor had subsided in the Religious Affections 
9 2(1746). A summary of the reliable evidence of conversion
92 Of course, many of Edwards' other treatises and 
sermons are concerned with this problem; cf. Grace and True 
Grace Distinguished. The Distinguishing Marks and Religious 
Affections, however, are devoted almost entirely to the syste­
matic distinction between the affections.
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Figure 17. Edwards' conception of the psychological 
sequence in conversion.
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TABLE 4
RELIABLE MARKS AND SIGNS OF A 
VALID CONVERSION
"Distinguishing Marks1
1. Raised esteem of Jesus Christ as Son of God and Saviour 
of the world.
2. Turning away from corruptions and lusts to the righ- 
tiousness of God.
3. Increased regard for Holy 5cripture.
4. Minds are established in the objective truths of 
revealed religion.
5. Genuine love for God and man.
"Positive Signs"
1. Influences and operations on the heart are spiritual, 
supernatural, and divine.
2. The Divine is loved for itself.
3. An appreciation of the moral excellency of divine things.
4. The mind is enlightened, rightly and spiritually to 
understand divine things.
5. A certainty of divine things.
6. A sense of evangelical humiliation.
93 All the "distinguishing marks" and "negative 
instances" in Tables 1 &, 2 are adapted from Goen, "Editor's 
Introduction," p. 54. All the "positive signs" and "negative 
signs" in these tables are taken directly from the Affections.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
237
7. A change of nature.
8. Meekness and mercy.
9. A Christian tenderness of spirit.
10. Beautiful symmetry and proportion.
11. The higher the affections are raised, the greater the 
longing that they be increased.
12. The exercise and fruit of Christian practice.
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TABLE 5
UNRELIABLE MARKS AND SIGNS OF 
A VALID CONVERSION
"Negative Instances"
1. The work is carried on in an unusual or extraordinary 
way.
2. 5trong effects are produced in the body.
3. A "great deal of noise about religion" is occasioned.
4. Lively impressions are induced on people's imaginations.
5. The work is promoted too much by the influence of exam­
ple .
6. Imprudent and irregular conduct.
7. Errors in judgment and "delusions of Satan."
8. Professed converts falling into scandal.




3. "Talking of the things of Religion."
4. Persons did not contrive affections.
5. "Texts of scripture are remarkably brought to mind."
6. An appearance of love in the affections.
7. Many kinds of affections.
8. The affectionate joy seems to follow a certain order.
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9. Persons are much engaged in worship and church duties.
10. Much praising and glorifying God.
11. Confidence in the validity of the conversion experience.
12. Godly, charitable behavior.
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is presented in Table 4, while the potentially spurious evi- 
94dence is found in Table 5.
Most of these "signs," "marks," and "instances" are 
derived from scripture and from orthodox Puritan commentary. 
Theologically, Edwards' position on conversion evidence is 
quite unexceptional. Psychologically, however, his dis­
cussion of the indices of a valid conversion is most peculiar. 
As tools for evaluating the truth or falsity of conversion, 
the lists are utterly worthless. In the first place, the 
distinguishing marks and positive signs are so vague and sub­
jective that they are innocuous. How high, for instance, does 
esteem of Jesus Christ have to be raised (first distinguishing 
mark)? How tender is a Christian tenderness of spirit (ninth 
positive sign)? Even if it is granted that all the reliable 
marks and signs are true, that is they occur if and only if 
they are accompanied by a valid conversion, their importance 
is still restricted to theological disputation and Biblical 
interpretation. There is virtually no way for an aspiring 
convert to measure the extent to which his experience approxi­
mates a valid conversion because no rules or criteria are 
provided. Edwards has, in other words, provided what today 
might be called an untestable theory. There is no common
94 Edwards seems to have derived these lists chiefly 
from I John 4:1 and from Thomas Shepard's The Parable of the 
Ten Virgins (London, 1660). For an analysis of the marks, 
see Eoen, "Editor's Introduction," pp. 52-56. On the signs 
in the Affections see Smith, "Editor's Introduction," pp. 24- 
43, and pp. 53-57 for a discussion of Shepard's influence on 
Edwards. On Shepard and the signs in the Parable, consult 
Michael McGiffert, God's Plot: The Paradoxes of Puritan
Piety (Amherst, Mass., 1972), pp. 3-32.
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ground where theoretical criteria and data can meet. In 
science, of course, untestable theories are inadmissable, but 
then Edwards was no scientist. An eighteenth-century Cal­
vinist did not test the claims of his God. The ultimate 
result of arid theorizing was much the same for Edwards, how­
ever, as it is for the modern scientist. Scientists tend to 
ignore theories which have no behavioral referents. Like­
wise, a thoughtful, aspiring convert would be forced to turn 
elsewhere for a more useful, if less eloquent and well- 
reasoned, method for evaluating his experience. In the 
absence of testable criteria he would proably ask his minister 
or perhaps even his friends for a simple "yes" or "no."^
A second difficulty with Edwards' marks and signs lay 
in the confounding of reliable and unreliable evidence. It 
might well be the case that the negative instances and signs 
could act as imperfect vehicles for the expression of the 
positive marks and signs. If a person experiences an 
increased regard for Holy Scripture (third distinguishg mark), 
for example, he is very likely to make a great deal of noise 
about religion (third negative instance). And certainly the 
exercise and fruit of Christian practice (twelfth positive 
sign) includes Godly, charitable behavior (twelfth negative 
sign). Without question, Edwards had demonstrated that 
"there are undoubtedly sufficient marks given to guide the
9 5
This is precisely the approach taken by many of 
Thomas Shepard's parishioners; see George Selement, ed., The 
Confessions of Thomas Shepard
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9 6church of Gcd in this great affair of judging of spirits."
The "church of God," however, is an abstraction which is 
spared paralyzing anxiety concerning its immortal soul. For 
the worried constitutents of that church, Edwards' categories 
did little to assist them in their evaluation of the validity 
of their conversions. He had demonstrated that holy affec­
tions can, in theory, be distinguished from polluting arti­
fact. Unfortunately, Edwards did not provide instructions 
for accomplishing this delicate distillation in practice.
His hands were tied, as he would have it, by the 
Devil. The Evil One played a vital role in Edwardsean psy­
chology, for it was he who effectively frustrated any attempt
97to successfully evaluate the validity of a conversion.
That "he can't imitate divine operations in their nature" was 
98small consolation. All other aspects of conversion, those 
which are susceptible to introspective analysis and observa­
tion, can be flawlessly reproduced by the Evil One. "First," 
Edwards pointed out, . . the devil can counterfeit all the
saving operations and graces of the Spirit of God . . . those
effects of God's Spirit which are special, divine and sancti- 
99fying." Like God himself, the devil can infiltrate a person, 
96Marks, p. 228.
" A f t e r  his fall from heaven, the devil was alleged 
to have retained most of his former powers because, as 
Edwards put it, "sin destroys spiritual principles but not 
the natural faculties." (True Grace Distinguished, p. 237).
98
Affections. p. 159; Edward's italics.
" ibid. . p. 158.
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"possess" him, and produce any or all of the conversion 
effects that also follow the infusion of the Divine light. 
"Secondly," admitted Edwards, ". . . i f  Satan can imitate 
the things themselves, he may easily put them one after 
another, in such a certain order."'' ^  Progression through 
the conversion sequence, then, from need to seeking to des­
pair to apparent discovery is no guarantee of a valid con­
version. The devil can imitate the exact order as well as 
all the effects of a valid conversion. "Thirdly," Edwards 
concludes, "we have no certain rule to determine how far
God's own spirit may go in those operations and convictions
1 01which in themselves are not spiritual and saving." The
wheat and the chaff, alas, are inextricably mixed; the dis­
tinguishing marks and positive signs must be negated in order 
that the devil be paid his due.
Not all of Edwards' ministerial and theological 
colleagues were so pessimistic. For radical enthusiasts like 
Davenport, the overflow of emotion is evidence enough that the 
Lord is at work. To rationalists like Chauncy, conversion is
a much more reasonable enterprise, something like passing a 
1 0 2university examination. Edwards' peculiarly generous
 ^^ Ibid., p. 159; see also Edwards' most elaborate 
exposition of the devil's prowess in True Grace Distinguished. 
1 01
Affections, pp. 159-160; see also Some Thoughts, 
pp. 458-459, and True Grace Distinguished, pp. 323-254.
1 02
In an often-quoted passage Chauncy remarked, "an 
enlightened mind and not raised affections ought always to 
be the guide of those who call themselves men; and this in the 
affairs of religion as well as others things" (Seasonable
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respect for the ability of the devil to camouflage success­
fully the nature of religious experience is rooted in his 
transsummative doctrine and in his conception of the cogni­
tive principle contained in the divine light. In a true con­
version, he maintained, God's divine light illuminates every 
corner of the soul; the convert cannot doubt its divine ori­
gin .
When there is an actual and lively discovery of this 
beauty and excellency, it will not allow of any such 
thought as that it is the fruit of man's invention. This 
is a kind of intuitive and immediate evidence. They 
believe the doctrine of God's word to be divine, because 
they see a divine, and transcendent, and most evidently 
distinguishing glory in them; such a glory as, if clearly 
seen, does not leave room to doubt of their being of God, 
and not of men.103
Edwards is saying here that the truth of the light must be 
inferred immediately and be intuitively obvious— that is the 
test of its validity. The implication in this remarkable con­
tention is that if the inference is immediate, and the con­
vert concludes that the divine light principle which is fused 
with the mind _is true, then no further examination is neces­
sary J  ^  The decision rules contained in the Distinguishing
Thoughts. p. 327). It was Perry Miller, I believe, who first 
clearly demonstrated that Chauncy's psychological viewpoint, 
as shown in the above quote, does not refute Edwards, as it 
was meant to. Chauncy was an orthodox "faculty psychologist" 
while Edwards was not. It has since become fashionable to 
deride Chauncy for his inability to comprehend Edwards' true 
meaning; cf. Miller, Jonathan Edwards, pp. 175-185, Gaustad, 
Great Awakening in New England, chapt. 6, Goen, "Editor's 
Introduction," pp. 80-83. Historians might have spent their 
time better getting their own house in order. Who among us 
yet really understands what Edwards was trying to say?
^^Divine Light," p. 178.
^^Theologically, this position is quite ordinary; it 
corresponds to one of the five tenets of Calvinism contained
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Marks and the Religious Affections are therefore superfluous.
Recall that, according to Edwards, one can never be 
an objective, "rational” observer of his own experience or 
the behavior of another. This which appears beautiful or 
delightful must also, and immediately, be-perceived as true.
A "sense of the heart" implies that reason and the emotions 
are one. Thus, if the divine light is beheld in the way 
Edwards suggests, with a transsummative "sense of the heart," 
than no amount of negative feedback afterward is likely to 
convince the hopeful convert that his experience was invalid.
He knows he is saved. Furthermore, since we have also seen 
the devil can imitate every phase of the conversion sequence 
except the divine principle of cognitive reorganization, any 
rules for evaluating feedback from a conversion are useless 
for three reasons: (a) the data to which they apply may be
unaccountably spurious; (b) the event to which they apply is 
strictly cognitive and thus too private to be evaluated by an 
outsider; and (c) the event to which they apply is appre­
hended in such a way as to make it impervious to objective 
evaluation even by the person who has experienced it. If a 
person is not convinced totally and immediately that his 
experience was a valid conversion then, logically, he has not 
been converted. But even extreme confidence is insufficient. 
Edwards' eleventh negative sign is unmistakably clear on this.
in the Westminister Confession, namely irresistable grace. 
Psychologically, however, this doctrine has a number of 
remarkable and seemingly unarguable consequences.
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'Tis no sign that affections are right, or that they 
are wrong, that they make persons that have them, exceed­
ingly confident that what they experience is divine, and 
that they are in a good estate.105
The devil is quite capable of inducing a haughty confidence
even in the basest hypocrite.
Edwards faced a stark reality that was the product of 
his own ingenuity. He had conceived of man as a complex, 
dynamic being who is always motivated by an array of mostly- 
unconscious emotions. In order to transform the whole man, 
then, a true conversion must consist in an absolutely inward, 
cognitive, reorientation that is not subject to direct evalu­
ation. The existence of the new, divinely-oriented cognitive 
structure must always be inferred from signs which, unfortu­
nately, the devil can also produce. "The devil has special 
advantage," Edwards admitted, " . . .  with respect to the 
inward experiences of Christians themselves; and . . . with
respect to the external effects of experiences."”' ^  In his 
weaker moments he must have complained to his God that it was 
a grossly unfair advantage, unfair to hopeful converts and 
unfair to well-meaning ministers.
As an individual initiates his sequential, proactive 
evaluation of his conversion experience, he is confronted
in the Westminister Confession, namely irresistable grace. 
Psychologically, however, this doctrine has a number of 
remarkable and seemingly unarguable consequences.
1 05 Affections, p. 167; see also True Grace Distin­
guished, p. 245.
' ^ Some Thoughts, p. 458.
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Figure 1B. The Edwardsean "Decision" tree: The evaluation
of conversion validity using the first two "distinguisning 
marks."
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with an impossible task (Figure i B ). At every choice point
there is both a "yes" and a "no." This or that sign which he
has observed in his own experience may be a reliable index of
a valid conversion, and then again, it may not. "It is like
giving a man rules," said Edwards, "how to distinguish visi- 
1 07ble objects in the dark." It is impossible to reach a
conclusion concerning any apparent conversion, based strictly 
on the "evidence."
Edwards faced squarely the principal problem of all 
cognitive psychologists: the mind, the great organizer of
experience and action, is inscrutable. Contemporary cogni­
tive theorists, like Edwards, are necessarily interested in 
behavior, and with Edwards they believe that behavior is only 
a very rough and unreliable indicator of human functioning. 
Generative grammarians, for instance, distinguish between 
competence and performance. People are said to be far more 
competent in a language than their performance can ever indi­
cate. We can, in theory, construct an infinite number of 
grammatical sentences, the vast majority of which we have 
neither heard nor spoken before. This remarkable and uniquely 
human ability is usually attributed to transformational rules 
which are embedded in "deep structures" of the mind.^^
 ^^ Affections. p. 195.
 ^^ 5 e e  Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of 5yntax 
(Cambridge, Mass, 1965) and his much more readable Language 
and Mind, rev. ed. (New York, 1972). The postulation of airy 
constructs like "deep structures" irks behaviorists like 
B. F. Skinner. His behavioristic account of language may be
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If Jonathan Edwards had been a contemporary cognitive 
psychologist, he would probably have attached statistical 
probabilities to his distinguishing marks and positive signs. 
"If all behavioral and experiential indices are considered 
together," he might jargonize, "than the probability of an 
individual exhibiting all these traits without the presence 
of the divine light is less than one in a hundred." The 
devil would become the capricious chance factor, the inter­
vening, uncontrolled, but sometimes effective causative agent. 
In fact, Edwards was trying to accomplish a similar result.
In spite of his conviction that true religion is an inner
phenomenon, he knew about Anne Hutchinson and antinomianism,
1 09and about the Quaker "inner light." He knew how chaotic
those controversies were, with everyone deciding for themselves 
whether they had veen visited or not. How he must have wished 
to discover some way of discriminating true religion from 
false which has some specifiable reliability. His own set of 
valid criteria could not accomplish this because his ultimate 
dependent variable (entrance into heaven) was as inaccessible 
as his independent variable (presence or absence of the 
divine light). He could observe neither cause nor effect.
found in Verbal Behavior (New York, 1958). See also Chomsky's 
now classic, vituperative rebuttle to Skinner in Language,
- 1959, 35, 26-58.
1 09 On the "enthusiast" challenges to Puritan ortho­
doxy in the seventeenth century, see Emery Battis, Saints and 
Sectaries: Anne Hutchinson and the Antinomian Controversy in
the Massachusetts Bay Colony (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1962), and 
Perry Miller, Orthodoxy in Massachusetts (Cambridge, Mass.,
1 933).
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Edwards needed to know the unknowable. The manner 
in which he faced this predicament, over a frenzied period 
where the need became increasingly acute, is a case study of 
the interaction between an abstract psychological theory and 
social upheaval. In 1734, before the Great Awakening got into 
full swing, Edwards delivered and published his brilliant ser­
mon on "The Divine and Supernatural Light." In it he
110announced that he would "show what this divine light is."
This is clearly a misstatement of purpose; Edwards, in fact,
attempted to examine the effects of the divine light. These
effects, he noted in 1734, are purely cognitive.
. . . he unites himself with the mind of a saint, takes
him for his temple, actuates and influences him as a new 
supernatural principle of life and action . . . .  The 
Holy Spirit operates in the minds of the godly, by uniting 
himself to them, and living in them, and exerting his own 
nature in the exercise of the facuities.111
It was enough, at this point, to elaborate the principle cog­
nitive effects of conversion: the acquisition of "a sense
112of the lovliness and beauty of that holiness and grace." 
Although this "sense" would undoubtedly be reflected in 
"action," as Edwards called it, all that need be said about 
it is that it is "godly."
Edwards, and before him his grandfather Solomon 
Stoddard, had long urged that emotionalism was not an
1^°"Divine Light," p. 273.
1 1 1
Ibid., p. 1 74.
^  ^ Ibid., p. 177; Edwards' italics.
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113undesirable artifact in conversion. The sudden and com­
plete reorientation of a person's emotional system toward 
love of an awesome God is a shattering experience which might 
easily be accompanied by fainting, shrieking, and sweating.
By 1741, however, what had long been the rule in Northampton 
had spread and was engulfing all the American Colonies in 
turmoil. Davenport was laying seige to New England and
George Whitefield was preaching to enthusiastic thousands 
1 1 4from Maine to Georgia. Many envisioned the entire British
empire in America disintegrating in the spiritual smoke of 
burning religionists. It was in part to allay these fears 
that Edwards, the acknowledged leader of the new-light sup­
porters of the Awakening, produced the Distinguishing Marks.
It is a curious document, exceedingly confident in the 
beginning, but ending in apparent contradiction and confusion, 
□n the second page he stated his goal.
My design therefore at this time is to shew what are the 
true, certain, and distinguishing evidences of a work of 
the Spirit of God, by which we may proceed safely in 
judging of any operation we find in ourselves or see in 
others.115
Yet in his conclusion to this treatise, after carefully pre­
senting the distinguishing marks and negative instances, 
Edwards implicitly acknowledged his impossible dilemma. In
113 See this chapter, footnote 87.
1 1 4
The career of Whitefield is traced in Joseph 
Tracy's classic, The Great Awakening, and by Whitefield him­
self in Whitefield's Journals (London, 1960).
1 1 5
Marks, p. 227.
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order to achieve his stated goal, he would have to either
embrace an alternative system of psychology and conception
of conversion or, alternatively, give false assurances to
hopeful converts. He admitted, finally, that "we must allow
the scriptures to stand good, that speak of everything in the
saint, that belongs to the spiritual and divine life, as 
116hidden." Though he adroitly chose not to emphasize the
point, he saw clearly that there are no marks of God's grace
which ordinary mortals can distinguish.
As leader of the supporters of the Awakening, Edwards
was in a difficult situation. He would do nothing to directly
dampen the fires of the Awakening. His intuition told him
that the "uncommon concern and engagedness of mind about the
things of religion is, undoubtedly, in the general, from the 
117Spirit of God." To the enemies of the Awakening, Edwards,
never any diplomat, was disarmingly blunt. He remarked 
matter of factly, as though it could be proven, that "Christ 
is come down from heaven into this land," and he reminded 
them of the Bible's clear warning that they who do not aid in 
the work of the 5pirit "should take heed that they ben't 
guilty of the unpardonable sin against the Holy Ghost.
In other words, opponents of the Awakening should count
116Ibid.. p. 285.
1 1 7
1 Ibid., p. 260.
1 1 8
Ibid.. p. 270 and p. 275.
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themselves among the unfortunate majority of humanity who are
destined for the eternal torments of hell. Qn the other hand,
he admonished preachers who were supporters of the Awakening
to practice "humility and self-diffidence, and an entire
119dependence on our Lord Jesus Christ." Thisds the most
important message in the Distinguishing Marks, though it 
appears as but a whisper next to the marks themselves.
"Trust my psychological analysis of the operation of the 
divine light," he might have said, "not in the reliability of 
the distinguishing marks." Yet he did not actually say any­
thing of the kind. The Lord should be given benefit of the 
doubt. He provided a number of distinguishing marks; all 
should pray earnestly that He grant His earthly disciples His 
power of discernment.
One of the basic postulates of Edward sear, psychology 
is that people selectively attend to that which please them 
and avoid that which appears painful. Edwards undoubtedly 
knew that hopeful converts and New Light ministers would focus 
their attention on the marks at the expense of his muted 
pleas for humility and moderation. In 1741, it seemed as if 
a new order might be at hand. Edwards himself had seen mem­
bers of the Enfield, Connecticut congreation shriek and faint
upon hearing one of his sermons, delivered in his usual calm,
1 20
deliberate manner. And when Whitefield addressed his
1 1 9 T i • IIbid., p . 277.
1 2 0
Rev. Eleazar Wheelock reported that "there was 
such a breathing of distress, and weeping, that the preacher
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Northampton congretation, it is recorded that even Edwards
1 21
wept uncontrollably from beginning to end. The devil
seemed to be in retreat. In his more sober moments, however, 
Edwards quietly offered the devil his profound respect. The 
preservation of his psychological system in the Distinguish­
ing Marks, the maintenance of conversion as an absolutely- 
cognitive event, represents nothing less than a courageous 
and grudging tribute to the power of the Evil One.
By 1746, the Great Awakening was over. The energy 
was spent, the millennium had eluded New England once again, 
and bitter controversy prevailed. God seemed to have for­
saken his flock when needed him most. Robert Lowell has 
transformed Edwards' bitter disappointment "after the sur­
prising conversions" into verse.
. . . At Jehovah's nod
5atan seemed more let loose amongst us: God
Abandoned us to Satan, and he pressed 
Us hard, until we thought we could not rest 
Till we had done with life. Content was gone.
All the good work was quashed. We were undone.
The breath of God had carried out a planned 
And sensible withdrawal from this land.122
was obliged to speak to the people and desire silence, that 
he might be heard." (Benjamin Trumbull, 'A Complete History 
of Connecticut, Civil and Ecclesiastical, 1630-1764. 2 Vols.
(New Haven, Conn., 1818), II, p. 145.
Whitefield ' s Journal's, p. 477.
1 22
"After the Surprising Conversions" originally 
appeared in Lord Weary's Castle (New York, 1944), and may 
also be found in David Levin, ed., Jonathan Edwards: A Pro­
file (New York, 1969), pp. 252-253. For overviews of the 
psychological, political, ecclesiastical, and theological con­
troversy which accompanied the Awakening, see Heimer, Religion, 
and Goen, Revivalism and Separatism in New England, 1740-1800. 2nd ed. (Hamden, Conn., 1969).
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From all the disappointment and charges and countercharges 
of enthusiasm, chicanery, and hard-heartedness, Edwards 
extracted one implication of overriding significance: men
are capable of distinguishing between charlatans and saints. 
There can be no final exit from the conversion loop. He pre­
sented the positive signs in the Religious Affections, there­
fore, not so much for their practical value, but rather to 
demonstrate that his psychological views are rooted in Holy 
Scripture.
. . . I am far from undertaking to give such signs of
gracious affections, as shall be sufficient to enable 
any certainly to distinguish true affection from false 
in others; or to determine positively which of their 3^ 
neighbors are true professors, and which are hypocrites.
F urthermore,
No such signs are to be expected, that shall be 
sufficient to enable those saints certainly to discern 
their own good e s t a t e . 124
Those in search of a manual which would help them evaluate
the validity of their conversion experiences nead not have
read on. Those who read on to the end of the Affections would
find a boldly-stated conclusion which had been only an
implicit assumption prior to the Awakening and a surreptitious
afterthought in the heat of that remarkable event: sainthood
is a purely cognitive phenomenon.
Christian or holy practice is spiritual practice; and this 
is not the motion of a body, that knows not how, nor when, 
nor wherefore it moves. . . .  To speak of Christian 
experience and practice, as if they were two things,
 ^^ Affections. p. 193.
1 24
Ibid.. p. 193.
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properly and entirely distinct, is to make a distinction 
without consideration or reason. Indeed all Christian 
experience is not properly called practice; but all 
Christian practice is properly called experience.125
All that is essentially Christian is the reorientation 'of the
mind toward love of the divine.^
If the Distinguishing Marks is Edwards’ tribute to 
the power of the devil in a time when God seemed to be roam­
ing the New England countryside, the Religious Affections is 
his acknowledgement of God’s awesomeness in a period of
apparent Godlessness. "God," Edwards entitled his first pub-
1 27lished sermon, "is glorified in man’s dependence." In the
Affections Edwards attempted to demonstrate the absolute 
nature and psychological basis of that dependence. The 
inscrutable, emotional mind of man is where the battle between 
the forces of light and darkness takes place. Medieval the­
ology thus becomes rooted in synthetic psychology. Man must 
depend on God’s benevolence not only for grace, but also for 
the assurance of grace. In Edwards’ view, ultimate causes of 
human behavior can never be known. One hundred fifty-four 
years after Edwards published his Affections. another American 
philosopher-psychologist brought this stark view up to date. 
William James, having glossed over his Calvinist heritage with
125Ibid., pp. 450-451.
126
Recall Joseph Haroutunian’s claim that Edwards was 
a "behaviorist" (see above, pp. 63-6 7 ). This must now appear 
as one of the greatest miscarriages of justice in all of 
American intellectual history.
127
For the complete title of the sermon, see this 
chapter, footnote 24.
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a veneer of Darwinian biology and Heraclitean philosophy, 
scoffed at the new experimental psychologists who promised 
to reduce the "science of mental life" to a few laws. The 
inevitable result of this flurry of optimistic activity, he 
believed, is profound ignorance. Thus he concludes his 
Principles:
No more . . . can we believe that the couplings of terms
within the mind are simple copies of corresponding coup­
lings impressed upon it by the environment. . . .
Even in the clearest parts of Psychology our insight 
is insignificant enough. And the more sincerely one 
seeks to trace . . . the steps by which as a race we may
have come by the peculiar mental attributes which we 
possess, the more clearly one perceives "the slowly 
gathering twilight close in utter night."128
Were Edwards capable of a small bit of sacriledge, it is safe
to predict that he would have uttered a hearty "Amen!" to
this assessment.
Exit: The Saintly Life
Edwards' inability to distinguish logically between 
holy and spurious affections did not prevent him from specu­
lating upon the earthly fruits of a valid conversion: the
saintly life. In fact, his view of sainthood may be extracted 
directly from the marks and signs. It would be possible, for 
example, to condense all the distinguishing marks and positive 
signs into a composite, abstract Edwardsean saint. This 
mythological saint would be pure, loving, humble, etc. A 
detached, completely analytic approach to Edwards' conception 
of the saintly life would, however, be lifeless and redundant,
 ^^ Principles. Vol. II, p. 688.
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and it would leave the utterly false impression that he
1 25
regarded sainthood as an unattainable abstraction. On the
contrary, to Edwards, every important aspect of sainthood was
embodied in his beloved wife Sarah. She was, as one scholar
has remarked, "the supreme example of heartfelt religion
experienced as ecstatic transport and lived in sober righ- 
1 30teousness." Edwards wanted to show once and for all that
"true religion, in great part, consists in holy affections," 
and that affectionate piety need not result in ranting
131enthusiasm but rather in a quiet, serene, saintly life.
In 1742, therefore, at the height of what he called the 
"enthusiastical season," Edwards presented Sarah (anony­
mously described as "a person) to the world in his treatise, 
Some Thought Concerning the Revival. T o  paraphrase 
Edwards' description of Sarah's spiritual life is self- 
defeating. He saw in 5arah the essence of the fruits of con­
version, and he described her concisely and with feeling.
Although the selection which follows needs little 
exegesis, some general points might be noted. First, Sarah
1 29
Such a conglomeration would be difficult to accom­
plish. John E. Smith has pointed out that Edwards never 
ranked the signs in order of their importance. It is impossi­
ble to determine, therefore, which signs, if any, can be 
omitted and which ones are crucial; see "Editor's Introduction," 
p. 24.
1 30
Goen, "Editor's Introduction," p. 68.
 ^^  Affections . p. 95.
^ ^ S e e  Goen, "Editor's Introduction," pp. 65-78 for 
an analysis of Sarah's narrative and its relationship to Some 
Thoughts, in which it appears.
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is intoxicated with God. While Edwards claimed that Sarah's 
direct, affectionate communication with God was accomplished 
"without being in any trance," a contemporary evaluation of 
Sarah's state of mind during her frequent swoons would 
almost certainly affirm that we was often in a trance. A 
second aspect of Sarah's saintliness, one which seems anti­
thetical to the first, is the improvement in her behavior 
and her increased efficiency. Finally, in spite of her 
assurance concerning her spiritual condition, she is exceed­
ingly humble.
. . . I have observed or been informed of, the follow­
ing things have[ing] been united: viz. a very frequent
dwelling, for some considerable time together, in such 
views of the glory of the divine perfections, and Christ's 
excellencies, that the soul in the meantime has been as 
it were perfectly overwhelmed, and swallowed up with 
light and love and a sweet solace, rest and joy of soul, 
that was altogether unspeakable; and more than once con­
tinuing for five or six hours together, without any 
interruption, in that clear and lively view or sense of 
the infinite beauty and amiableness of Christ's person, 
and the heavenly sweetness of his excellent and trans­
cendent love; so that (to use the person's own expres­
sions (the soul remained in a kind of heavenly Elysium, 
and did as it were swim in the rays of Christ's love, like 
a little mote swimming in the beams of the sun, or streams 
of his light that come in at a window; and the heart was 
swallowed up in a kind of glow of Christ's love, coming 
down from Christ's heart in heaven, as a constant stream 
of sweet light, at the same time the soul all flowing 
out in love to him; so that there seemed to be a constant 
flowing and reflowing from heart to heart. The soul 
dwelt on high, and was lost in God, and seemed almost to 
leave the body; dwelling in a pure delight that fed and 
satisfied the soul; enjoying pleasure without the least 
sting, or any (so far as the judgement and word of a per­
son of discretion may be enjoyed in each single minute 
of the whole space, which was many hours, was undoubtedly 
worth more than all the outward comfort and pleasure of 
the whole life put together; and this without being in any 
trance, or being at all deprived of the exercise of the 
bodily senses: and the like heavenly delight and unspeak­
able joy of soul, enjoyed from time to time, for years
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together; though not frequently so long together, to such 
an height: extraordinary views of divine things, and
religious affections, being frequently attended with very 
great effects on the body, nature often sinking under the 
weight of divine discoveries, the strength of the body 
taken away, so as to deprive of all ability to stand or 
speak; sometimes the hands clinched, and the flesh cold, 
but senses still remaining . . .133
. . . the thoughts of death and the day of judgement are
always exceeding sweet to the soul. This resignation is 
also attended with a constant resignation of the lives 
of dearest earthly friends; and sometimes when some of 
their lives have been imminently threatened, often 
expressing the sweetness of the liberty of having wholly 
left the world, and renounced all for God, and having 
nothing but God, in whom is an infinite fulness.
These things have been attended with a constant sweet 
peace and calm serenity of soul, without any cloud to 
interrupt it; a continual rejoicing in all the works of 
God's hands, the works of nature, and God's daily works 
of providence, all appearing with a sweet smile upon them; 
a wonderful access to God by prayer, as it were seeing 
him, and sensibly immediately conversing with him, as 
much oftentimes (to use the person's own expressions) as 
if Christ were here on earth, sitting on a visible throne, 
to be approached to and converse with; frequent, plain, 
sensible and immediate answers of prayer; all tears 
wiped away; all former troubles and sorrows of life for­
gotten, and all sorrow and sighing fled away,excepting 
grief for past sins and for remaining corruption, and 
that Christ is loved no more, and that God is no more 
honored in the world, and a compassionate grief towards 
fellow creatures; a daily sensible doing and suffering 
everything for God for a long time past, eating for God, 
and working for God, and sleeping for God, and bearing 
pain and trouble for God, and doing all as the servide of 
love, and so doing it with a continual, uninterrupted 
cheerfulness, peace and joy. "Oh how good," said the per­
son once, "is it to work for God in the daytime, and at 
night to lie down under his smiles!" High experiences 
and religious affections in this person have not been 
attended_with any disposition at all to neglect the neces­
sary business of a secular calling, to spend the time in 
reading and prayer, and other exercises of devotion; but 
wordly business has been attended with great alacrity, as 
part of the service of God: the person declaring that it
being done thus, 'tis found to be as good as prayer.
These things have been accompanied with an exceeding con­
cern and zeal for moral duties, and thal all professors 
may with them adorn the doctrine of God their Saviour; and
Some Thoughts, pp. 331-332.
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an uncommon care to perform relative and social duties, 
and a noted eminence in them; a great inoffensiveness of 
life and conversation in the sight of others; a great 
meekness, a gentleness and benevolence of spirit and 
behavior; and a great alteration in those things that 
formerly used to be the person's failings; seeming to be 
much overcome and swallowed up by the late great increase 
of grace, to the observation of those that are most con­
versant and most intimately acquainted: in times of the
brightest light and highest flights of love and joy, 
finding no disposition to any opinion of being now per­
fectly free from sin . . . but exceedingly the contrary:
at such times especailly, seeing how loathsome and 
polluted the soul is, soul and body and every act and word 
appearing like rottenness and corruption in that pure and 
holy light of God's glory: not slighting instruction or
means of grace any more for having had great discoveries; 
on the contrary, never more sensible of the need of 
instruction than now. And one thing more may be added, 
viz. that these things have been attended with a particu­
lar dislike of placing religion much in dress, and spend­
ing much zeal about those things that in themselves are 
matters of indifference, or an affecting to shew humility 
and devotion by a mean habit, or a demure and melancholy 
countenance, or anything singular and superstitious.134
Almost all of Edwards' writing is didactic. Even in 
his descriptions of parishioners, in his comments on the 
tragic autobiography of his son-in-law, Rev. David Brainerd, 
and in this lively narrative of Sarah's life style, Edwards'
135primary purpose is always to provide a convincing argument.
The accuracy of his portrayal of Sarah is, therefore, far 
less important than the point he wished to makeJ The point 
was simply this: the exit from a valid conversion, the saintly
pp. 339-341 .
"Reflection on the Pro­
ceeding Memoirs." In Memoirs of the Rev. David Brainerd 
(Vol. X of Dwight, ed., Works), pp. 414-452.
 ^"^Whitef ield, however, confirmed Edwards' evaluation 
of his wife. So impressed was Whitefield that he asked the 
Lord to send him a wife like Sarah (see Whitefield's Journals, 
p. 477). "
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life, consists in an optimum balance between irrationality
and rationality or what generations of Puritan thinkers had 
1 37
called piety and intellect. Unlike the ornate systems of
his scholastic forbears and descendents, Edwards' transsum- 
mative doctrine made no absolute distinction between the 
irrational, or emotional, and the rational. They are only 
relative terms, aspects of the same unified process. The 
Christian life is, therefore, somewhat like the swing of a 
well-oiled pendulum in an old grandfather clock. One gathers 
insight and strength in direct, emotional communication with 
God and then applies the fruits of his religious experience 
in his day-to-day activities. ^  Edwards chose Sarah, she in 
whom "the affections and high tramsports are . . . Pure and
unmixed, and so well regulated," to effectively illustrate 
his point."' ^  The earthly reward associated with a valid 
conversion, then, is a life of worldly mysticism. The saint,
13 7See Stow Persons, American Minds (New York, 1958) 
for a good discussion of this traditional Puritan dilemma.
^ T h i s  sort of cognitive style implies an easy oscil­
lation between parallel and sequential processing. Neisser 
believes this is the essence of creativity (Cognitive Psy- 
chology, pp. 302-305). Most investigators in the field in 
creativity agree that the creative person is one who achieves 
a balance between relaxed playfulness and daydreaming on the 
one hand, and highly-motivated, goal-directed activity on the 
other; cf. Rogers, On Becoming a Person; Kris, Psychoanalytic 
Explorations; Abraham A. Mawlow, Toward a Psychology of Being 
2nd ed. (New York, 1968); and Cynthia Wild, "creativity and
Adaptive Regression," Journal of Personality and Social Psy­
chology, 1965, 2, 161-169. Stripped of its Calvi nist theology 
then, the Edwardsean saintly life is a creative, "self- 
actualizing" life.
^ ^ Some Thoughts, p. 341.
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conversion, then, is a life of wordly mysticism. The saint, 
in the words of a famous mystic, is "in the world, but not of
Summary: The "Personal Narrative"
To conclude and summarize this chapter, we shall
listen to Jonathan Edwards interpret the events surrounding
his own conversion. We shall introspect with the thirty-six
year old pastor as he reflects on the youthful experience
which changed his life. For the "Personal Narrative,"
Edwards' backward glance into his memory was clearly made
1 41through synthetic psychological spectacles. The entire
account is organized around transsummative and cybernetic 
principles. At least that is the position taken here. I 
have used the "Personal Narrative" for the same reason that 
Edwards described Sarah's life in such detail: to substan­
tiate an argument by making concrete a point which might 
otherwise remain unconvincingly abstract. The point here is
1 40 This is the advice given in the "Nasrudin" stories 
of George Gurdjieff; cf. Robert Ornstein, The Psychology of 
Consciousness (San Francisco, Calif., 1972).
^ ^ T h e  so-called "Personal Narrative" of Edwards first 
appeared in Samuel Hopkins' The Life and Character of the 
Late Reverend Mr. Jonathan Edwards (Boston, 1765). This bio­
graphical classic has recently been reprinted in Levin, Jona­
than Edwards: A Profile, pp. 1-06. All references to the
"Personal Narrative" are to this edition. For a textual 
history of the "Personal Narrative," and a comparison of it 
with similar colonial documents, consult Daniel B. Shea, 
Spiritual Autobiography in Early America (Princeton, 1968).
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that the synthetic principles that I have attributed to 
Edwards were so deeply embedded in his thinking that he saw 
his own life in those terms. He turned those common denomi­
nators inward onto himself and, not surprisingly, he found 
that his life also could be reduced to them.
While at college Edwards was much caught up in dis­
plays of religion and religious activity.
I used to pray four times a day in secret, and to spend 
much time in religious talk with other boys; and used to 
meet with them to pray together. I experienced I know 
not what kind of delight in religion. My mind was much 
engaged in it, and had much self-righteous pleasure; and 
it was my delight to abound in religious duties. . . .
But in process of time, my convictions and affections 
wore off; and I entirely lost all those affections and 
delights, and left off secret prayer, at least to any 
constant performance of it, and returned like a dog to 
his vomit, and went on in ways of sin.
Indeed, I was at some times very uneasy, especially 
toward the latter part of the time of my being at college. 
'Till it pleas'd God, in my last year at college, at a 
time when I was in the midst of many uneasy thoughts about 
the state of my soul, to seize me with a pleurisy; in 
which he brought me nigh to the grave, and shook me over 
the pit of hell.142
In vivid language, Edwards here describes the origin and 
development of a spiritual need. He perceived a vast incon­
gruity between his actual "estate" and the converted condi­
tion which he once thought he had but now earnestly desired.
It was the conviction of his own worthlessness that 
led him to act decisively.
1 42
"Personal Narrative," p. 24.
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. . . I was brought wholly to break off all former
wicked ways, and all ways of known outward sin . . .  I 
made seeking my salvation the main business of my 
life.144
Edwards' "inward struggles" reached a conclusion of sorts one
day as he was reading scriptures.
As I read the words, there came into my soul, and was as 
it were diffused thro' it, a sense of the glory of the 
Divine Being, a new sense, quite different from any 
thing I ever experienced before.145
This diffusion, "a wonderful alteration in my mind," refers,
of course, to the reorientation of the affections accomplished
time, discovered God and apprehended him with a "sense of the
heart," with spiritual understanding and holy affections. "I
had then and I have often since," Edwards remarked, "not only
1 47a conviction, but a delightful conviction." Whereas before
he had only what he usually referred to as a "notional" under­
standing of the Divine Being and Divine Love, he now had "an 
inward sweet sense of these t h i n g s . H e  had discovered 
the divine psychological principle. This principle, like all 
significant insights, is grasped with a transsummative sense 
of the heart; it lodges not merely in the brain but also, to 
use Housman's metaphor, in the pit of the stomach. You can 
feel it, and as in any important creative discovery, the
1 44t, . , Ibid.,> P* 25
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feelings may run amok. If the conversion is a true one, how­
ever, raving and ranting are holy affections— a function of 
being overwhelmed by a delightful sense of divine love.
Edwards tells us virtually nothing of the conditions 
surrounding that first remembered insight except that it 
occurred while reading the Bible. It is quite likely, how­
ever, that it happened within the context of the habits of 
study, prayer, and meditation that he maintained throughout 
his adult life. Samuel Hopkins, Edwards' student, friend, 
and first biographer, tells us something of his study habits.
He commonly spent thirteen hours a day in his study. His 
most usual diversion in summer was riding on horseback 
and walking. He would commonly, unless diverted by com­
pany, ride two or three miles after dinner to some lonely 
grove, where he would dismount and walk a while. At 
which times he generally carried his pen and ink with him, 
to note any thought that should be suggested, which he 
chose to retain and pursue, as what promised some light 
on any important subject.149
The solitary walks in the woods, utterly alone and after a
meal, must have helped him to clear his mind of distractions,
to relax, and to wrestle with the theological problems which
consumed him. This method of obtaining insights which might
shed "light on any important subject" must have been very
successful. One of the famous legends surrounding Edwards
has him returning from his trips into the woods, his coat
covered with little notes which he had pinned to i t . ^ ^  Like
1 AQ
Life and Character, p . 40
15°Cf. Robert Lowell's poem, "Jonathan Edwards in 
Western Massachusetts," In Levin, ed., Jonathan Edwards; A 
Profile, pp. 253-256.
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the poet Housman, Edwards worked long and hard to solve prob­
lems that interested him, but resorted to reactive walking 
and waiting for insights that failed to come in the study.
Edwards also used his forest excursions for the more 
serious business of caring for his soul and conversing with 
God.
□nee, as I rid out into the woods for my health, Anno 
1737; and having lit from my horse in a retired place, as 
my manner commonly has been, to walk for divine contempla­
tion and prayer; I had a view, that for me was extra­
ordinary, of the Glory of the 5on of God . . . This grace,
that appear's to me so calm and sweet, appear'd great 
above the heavens.151
Solitary walking, therefore, appears to have been associated
with spiritual discoveries and insights as well as mundane
ones. Edwards' "first conversion," as he called it, may well
have occurred in a solitary, wooded setting. Whether it
actually did or not is not crucial. The important point is
that Edwards' narrative of his own life, combined with Hop-
kin's description of his master's habits, confirm a basic
Edwardsean principle. Man must plan to seek God, Edwards
often contended, but he must eventually forsake his arrogant
proactive attitude in order to passively accept the gracious
discoveries in conversion.
Edwards' conversion experience altered his cognitive 
perceptual apparatus; he began to view all things differently 
than he ever had before.
After this my sense of divine things gradually 
increased, and became more and more lively, and had more
1 51
"Personal Narrative," pp. 35-36.
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of that inward sweetness. The appearance of everything 
was altered; there seemed to be, as it were, a calm, 
sweet cast, or appearance of divine glory in almost every­
thing . . .  in the sun, moon, and stars; in the clouds, 
and blue sky; in the grass, flowers, trees; in the water, 
and all nature; which used greatly to fix my m i n d . 152
This is clearly an insight of epic proportions. "All nature,"
which formerly perplexed and intrigued the young Edwards, was
u • .• 153now seen in a new, harmonious, perspective.
As proof of the validity of his conversion, Edwards
offered a bit of his altered behavior which seemed to be an
obvious function of his cognitive reorganization.
I used to be a person uncommonly terrified with the 
thunder: and it used to strike me with terror, when I
saw a thunder-storm rising. But now, on the contrary, 
it rejoiced me. I felt God at the first appearance of a 
thunderstorm.154
Edwards believed that, following his conversion experience,
he perceived nature more in the manner of God himself. He
"felt God" in thunderstorms rather than merely engaging in
detached discourse on God's awesome power. He felt it and
his reaction was, uncontrollably, "to sing or chant forth my
meditations; to speak my thoughts in soliloquies, and speak 
1 55with a singing voice." He could at last state, "I felt
then a great satisfaction as to my good estate" because, as 
he often argued, no man can argue with his affections,
1 52 T, . , ~7Ibid., p . 27 .
1 53
In his earlies known writings Edwards was fasci­
nated by nature; cf. "Qf Insects." In Dwight, ed., Works. 
Vol. I, pp. 23-28.
 ^^ "Personal Narrative," pp. 35-36 .
 ^^  Ibid., p . 28.
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regardless of their origin."' The main business of his life 
could not turn from seeking his own salvation to helping 
others to seek theirs. The plan which had structured his 
behavior for so long could now be discarded.
The "Personal Narrative" does not, as I stated 
earlier, constitute "objective" evidence for Edwards' syn­
thetic theory. It was written after his psychological views 
were mature,and there is simply no way to determine the 
extent to which the memory of his youthful conversion is 
distorted by the rigid categories of maturity. It does pro­
vide, however, the most concrete, vivid, and readable example 
of what Edwards labored most of his adult life to say. It 
is his most personal attempt to convey his synthetic view of 
man and man's relationship to God's universe.
1 56 T, . , noIbxd.. p . 2 8.
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CHAPTER VI
FROM JONATHAN EDWARD5 TO WILLIAM JAMES:
A SKETCH OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL JOURNEY
The purpose of this essay, as stated in the first 
chapter, is to provide an "oasis of coherence" around the 
psychological theory of Jonathan Edwards. The achievement of 
this goal is contingent upon the fulfillment of two separate 
but related tasks: an explanation of what Edwards said and
meant and the insertion of Edwards' thought into a historical 
scheme of psychology that can accomodate him. At best, my 
"oasis" must remain only half coherent because this study is 
almost totally restricted to the decoding of Edwards' psy­
chology. Discussion of the "synthetic tradition" in the his­
tory of psychology has been concerned only with demonstrating 
that the transsummative and proactive-reactive themes have 
somehow persisted for a long while. In this final chapter, 
however, I would like to offer some suggestions concerning 
the development of American psychology between Edwards and 
James as a way of providing a thread of continuity between 
the "nebulous colonial days," as Roback referred to them, and 
the modern period in American psychology.
In keeping with the "experimental" nature of this 
study, alluded to in chapter one, the current chapter may be 
said to contain "suggestions for future research." For this
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study of Edwards is only a bare beginning, although I hope 
it demonstrates the utility of applying a contemporary model 
of synthetic psychology to Edwards. We shall now examine the 
fate of Edwards' psychology, chiefly the disintegration of 
his transsummative doctrine, and in so doing suggest that 
the history of American psychology before William James can 
be a vital topic when viewed through the synthetic model.
The Decline and Fall of Edwards'
Transsummative Doctrine
It its day, the Edwardsean transsummative doctrine 
was both too sophisticated and too threatening to attract 
many devotees. It simply did not make sense to deny the 
efficacy and freedom of willing. Furthermore, the notion of 
a totally unified rational-emotive cognitive process could 
not be assimilated by Puritan thinkers who, in good scholas­
tic fashion, were proud of their "reason" and suspicious of 
their "affections." Whatever influence Edwards had on psy­
chological thought in America before James, therefore, 
largely concerned the notion of will: its identity and its
freedom. Many of Edwards' contemporaries gazed in scholastic 
stupefaction and/or Arminian disbelief at the implications of 
Edwards' position on the will. We have seen that if a man is 
restricted by what Edwards called "natural necessity" he is 
not free. A man is not free to leap over a tall tree because 
certain natural restrictions prohibit it. But what of the 
situation in which nature does not seem to prohibit the execu-
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tion of an act; cannot one choose between alternatives?
Edwards replied that, indeed, choices are made, butthose
1
choices are themselves determined by "moral necessity."
Though a man may consciously choose to act in a given manner, 
that choice is a function of man's universal adherence to an 
underlying hedonistic principle. Men are constructed such 
that they must choose that which they perceive to be the most 
pleasureable or least painful. That perception, in turn, is 
the result of the unified rational-emotive process of cog­
nition. What appears to consciousness to be willful volition 
is what modern psychologists might call a pre-determined 
response to a perceived stimulus. The infusion of grace in 
the conversion experience thus becomes a reorientation of the 
affectionate component of cognition such that human perception 
coincides with God's perception.
So logical and forceful were the arguments of Edwards 
that, given his transsummative assumptions concerning a "sense 
of the heart," his conclusions seemed inevitable to most of 
his contemporaries. The only aoparent way to counter Edwards 
successfully was to reject those assumptions. This approach 
was taken by numerous individuals who were outraged by 
Edwards' assertion that man is, to a large extent, an irra-
2
tional creature who has no free will. One of the first to 
1 Will, pp. 1 56-1 62.
^Excellent treatments of the early controversy over 
Edwards' notion of the will may be found in Gaustad, Great 
Awakening in New England, and Miller, Jonathan Edwards.
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adopt this strategy was Charles Chauncy of Boston. He
resorted repeatedly to the traditional disjunctive faculty
psychology in order to buttress his attempt to reassert that
man is a reasonable being, and to establish thebelief in an
3
independent and sovereign will. Somewhat later, 5amuel West 
proposed a tri-partite division of the faculties into per-
4
ception, propension, and volition. Perception and propension 
(the affections) were both said to be externally determined, 
while volition was held to be free. For evidence West 
appealed to consciousness. We are, he stated, "Conscious, 
that many things take place in consequence of our acting . . .  ^
West rejected any underlying hedonistic principle to which our 
choices might be attributed. Thus, by approximately 1800, 
man was held by certain "liberals" like Chauncy and West to 
be both primarily rational and free. These conclusions were 
made passible by the apparently unwitting dismantling of 
Edwards' transsummative cognitive process into the semi- 
independent operation of a number of segmented faculties. It 
was far easier to defend the freedom of the will when it could 
be assumed, using data from consciousness, that an independent 
will does indeed exist, and may operate independently of the 
affections.
3
See especially Chauncy's Seasonable Thoughts.
4
Essays on Liberty and Necessity (Boston, 1793).
5
Ibid., p . 26.
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Any doctrine of free will, irrespective of its psy­
chological underpinning, was bound to be objectionable to an 
orthodox Calvinist. In fact, West's doctrine of free will 
appears to have had little direct influence on American theo­
logical psychology, which was being written at this time pri­
marily by Calvinists. Though in some respects West was far 
ahead of his time, he was laboring under the handicap of try­
ing to establish freedom of the will in an era which, due to 
the pervasive influence of Edwards, the very existence of an 
independent will was questioned. The alleged superficiality 
of West's appeal to consciousness was soon enthusiastically 
exposed by exponents of Calvinist orthodoxy who upheld God's 
sovereignty and man's absolute dependence upon Him.^
The transsummative doctrine remained a problem, how­
ever, even after absolute omnipotence was once again attrib­
uted to the Calvinists' God. It was especially troubling to 
Asa Burton, a Yankee parson from Thetford, Vermont."^ Burton
Chief among this group were Jonathan Edwards, Jr. 
and Nathanael Emmons. Contrasting interpretations of their 
positions and importance may be found in Frank H. Foster, _A 
Genetic History of the New England Theology (Chicago, 1907), 
and Haroutunian, Piety Versus Moralism. Foster characterizes 
Edwards, Jr. and Emmons as villians responsible for the demise 
of the will in American thought, while Haroutunian emphasizes 
the continuity between their views and those of Edwards. On 
the whole, Haroutunian offers a much more balanced account.
"^Burton's one and only, but very important, book is 
Essays on Some of the First Principles of Metaphysicks,
Ethicks, and Theology. Intro, by James G. Blight (Albany,
N.Y., 1973). (1824) Burton's book, and those by Tappan,
Upham, and Taylor referred to below are filled with direct 
and indirect references to Edwards. In fact, as Herbert 
Schneider has demonstrated, during the period 1770-1860, Ameri­
can philosophers and theologicans spent much of their pro-
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appears to have been the first thoroughly deterministic 
Calvinist to quarrel with Edwards' arrangement of the facul­
ties. Like Chauncy and West, he does not seem to have under­
stood Edwards' peculiar, transsummative use of the term 
"faculty"; he thought Edwards'two "faculties" should be 
increased to three. In most respects, however, Burton fol­
lowed Edwards. With Edwards he maintained the distinction 
between natural and moral necessity that made Edwards so 
unpopular among those who were dedicated to demonstrating the 
existence of a free will. "Were it not for moral necessity," 
he contended, "liberty would rest on an uncertain foundation. 
For sometimes we might will as we wish, and sometimes we might 
not."^ The implication is that the strongest motive is that 
which is perceived as providing the greatest pleasure or 
least pain. There is not freedom of willing, for Burton, in 
the sense that there are acts which are not motivated by one's 
subjective estimate of the potential pleasure or pain that 
can be derived from them.
Adherence to such a deterministic doctrine did not 
lead Burton to the fatalistic position that human choices are
fessional energy engaging in a "psychological critique of 
Edwards." This critique, claims Schneider, provided the 
impetus for the rise of Mental Philosophy in America.
The important outcome for philosophy of this psycho­
logical critique of Edwards was not the argument for free 
will or the defense of orthodoxy, but the founding of a 
faculty psychology and of an appeal to introspection. This 
method of approach to "mental philosophy" dominated at 
least two generations of philosophers, created a new "sci­
ence," and profoundly affected the course of academic 
studies in philosophy (History of American Philosophy, 2nd
ed . , _ New Yotk, 1 962, p. TUT). --------  ------------
The American psychology which preceded James, then, was in 
large measure an attempt to deal with the difficult psychology 
of Edwards.
Bibid.. p. 126.
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inconsequential. On the contrary, like most Calvinists, he 
felt compelled to show that man is a "moral agent," i.e., 
capable of actions which might be considered right or wrong 
in an absolute sense. In this way man could be held responsi­
ble for his acts and justifiably rewarded with everlasting 
grace or punished with everlasting damnation. In his psy­
chological explanation of moral agency, Burton made his most 
significant departure from Edwards and his most important 
contribution to the development of faculty psychology in 
nineteenth-century America. Edwards had said that there is 
an intellectual and an affectionate component to every per­
ception, hence to every resulting action. Burton countered 
by formulating a system of three independently-functioning 
faculties: understanding, taste, and will. Based upon the
introspective evidence of consciousness he proposed that the 
understanding perceives, the taste feels, and the will acts. 
Taste, a term which Burton claimed to have originated and 
which he used interchangeably with "heart" and "affections" 
was designated as the seat of moral agency. In an important 
passage he held that
Feeling is the spring of action. If a moral agent were 
deprived of the faculty of taste, and were as incapable 
of pleasure and pain as material bodies are, he would be 
as inert as they.9
It is obvious that Burton did not mean to re-establish man's
rationality or free will. Man is essentially moved by his
"taste." In addition, "the will is only an executive faculty.
9Ibid.. p. 58.
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It is no more than a servant to the heart, to execute its 
pleasure."^ Burton retained his Calvinistic determinism and 
the Edwardsean emphasis upon the affections. His system of 
independent faculties, unlike those of Chauncy or West, was 
strictly a function of his dependence upon the date of con­
sciousness.
Burton's notion of tast, however, is wholly contrary 
to Edwards' transsummative doctrine. Though Edwards spoke of 
the "faculties" of understanding and will, he was trying to 
describe a completely unified, indivisible, perceptual-cogni­
tive-motivational process. Burton, on the other hand, no 
longer speaks of a unified mind. In his system there are 
three independent faculties, each with its own province within 
which it is sovereign. In a strictly functional sense, there 
is little difference between the views of Edwards and Burton. 
All human acts, they would have agreed, are a function of 
often unknown affectionate desires. Yet structurally, Burton 
imposed an organizational scheme on the mind that Edwards 
never intended. The deterministic, transsummative unity of 
Edwards was replaced by the equally deterministic but dis­
junctive "common sense" view of Burton. The change was subtle 
but significant. Burton's faculty of will was not free in 
the "liberal" sense, but it had been isolated and given well- 
specified functions. Burton's relationship to the problem of 
the will in pre-Jamesian American psychology is represented 
in Figure 19.
 ^^ Ibid., p . 91 .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
278
Early American Puritanism 
Scholastic: many faculties;
will bound by other 
faculties.
Locke (1690)






Founding of an American 
faculty psychology of 
consciousness.
N. Taylor (1859)
An independent will 
which is free.
Burton (1824)
Three sovereign faculties: 
understanding, taste, and will. 
Will absolutely bound by taste.








American Academic Psychology 
to James (1890)
Figure 19. The problem of the will in pre-Jamesian 
American psychology.
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The significance 'of Burton's elaboration of an 
acceptably deterministic tri-partite arrangement of the facul­
ties may be illustrated via an analogy with Descartes' separa­
tion of mind and body, Descartes' well known dualism held 
that mind and body are utterly different but interactive 
entities. LaMettrie, however, then applied Descartes' per­
suasive description of automata to man, and was left with the 
first modern vision of man as a thoroughly me cl-ran is tic organism. 
Burton also emphasized the interactive nature of two inde­
pendent constructs: will and taste. Soon after the appear­
ance of his Essays, however, psychological thinkers influenced 
by him and by the like-minded Scottish school, cut the trans­
summative, Edwardsean knot which was said to bind under­
standing, will and feeling. They held that the will of man 
is free. Without the dichotomy provided by a deterministic 
Calvinist like Burton, it is unlikely that there would have 
been a knot to cut, just as LaMettrie's mechanism would have 
been inconceivable without the earlier believeable dualism of 
Descartes.
Burton may have found independent support for his 
views in the writings of the early members of the "Scottish 
1 1School," especially Reid. The Scots, with their hard- 
headed appeals to common sense and consciousness would have
^Burton's Essays, though not published until 1 824, 
appear to have been written much earlier, in the period 1800- 
1804. Reid's Intellectual Powers (1705) and Active Powers 
(1788) were known in America by 1B00, thus they could have had 
some impact on Burton.
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found an appreciative audience in Burton, whose "common
sense" repeatedly told him that the understanding and the
will, as he understood Edwards' use of those terms, were not
the only faculties. The extent of the Scottish influence on
Burton is difficult to assess, since he provides no references
and he states in his introduction that the Essays are more a
function of "his own powers" than of "the English, Scotch,
1 2French, and German authors." This claim must, however be 
contrasted with his naive realism, appeals to common sense, 
and his frequent use of the data of consciousness to prove 
that his particular tri-partite division of the faculties was 
the correct one. By the time Burton wrote his Essays, Reid 
had already developed these three characteristics into corner­
stones of the emerging Scottish 5chool.
Burton's attempt to integrate Edwardsean psychology 
with the data provided by his own consciousness appears to 
have had two important consequences. First, after the "will" 
had been extricated from the affections and understanding of 
Edwards, it was a relatively small step for others to dissolve 
the link of moral necessity which was said to render the will 
merely an executive faculty. This was accomplished princi­
pally by Nathaniel Taylor in whose curious Calvinism the doc-
1 3trine of the freedom of the will triumphed. A second result 
of Burton's efforts was what Schneider has called "the founding
1 2 rEssays. p . 3 .
1 3
Lectures on the Moral Government of God, 2 Vols.,
(New York, 1859).
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1 4of a faculty psychology of consciousness." Soon after the 
publication of Burton's Essays a number of textbooks appeared 
which expounded the new three-faculty psychology. The most 
influential of these volumes, by T. C. Upham and H. P. Tappan, 
reveal the considerable influence of Burton.^
It is clear that Burton was a transitional figure in 
pre-Jamesian American psychology. One foot was rooted deeply 
in the past; psychology for Burton was still of little 
intrinsic interest. Rather he considered it useful primarily 
because "he who knows himself correctly may have just con­
ceptions of G o d . " ^  Despite the undeniable theological focus 
of the Essays, Burton was also breaking new ground. His per­
sistent appeals to common sense and to the data of conscious­
ness was to be reinforced by the Scottish position which was 
to dominate in America throughout much of the nineteenth 
century. His tri-partite arrangement of the faculties seemed 
more reasonable to Calvinists of his era than did the mysteri­
ous transsummative unity of Edwards. His system of faculties 
was adopted and his "will" was declared to be free. Asa Bur­
ton helped upon the door, to a greater extent than he ever 
would have wished, for the development of a view of man's 
mind which was vastly different from that which preceded him.
1 4
Herbert 5chneider, History, p. 207.
^ T .  C. Upham, A Philosophical and Practical Treatise 
on the Will (Portland, Pie., 1 834), and H. P. Tappan, A Review 
of Edwards's "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will" (New York, 
1838).
1 _
E s s a y s , p . 7.
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The overthrow of the transsummative doctrine, initi­
ated by Asa Burton, led to the "age of American scholasti­
cism," to textbooks in mental and moral philosophy which 
expounded a Sears-catalogue approach to psychology. Faculties
were piled on top of faculties until the systems became quite 
1 7unwieldy and sterile. John Locke was temporarily forgotten 
and in his place came two new psychological imports, the 
Scots and Kant, both of which were interpreted as proponents 
of independent faculties in the mind. The re-emergent domi­
nance of the disjunctive psychologycaused the transsummative 
doctrine to die a temporary death, or at least to go under­
ground. The will (a noun) was certainly not held to be bound 
by or integrated with the affections. The innocent contention 
of Burton, a Yankee Calvinist who couldn't understand some 
subtle Edwardsean distinctions, was transformed into an emanci­
pation proclamation for the will, and a numerically impressive 
array of other faculties. It was against this "spiritualist" 
psychology, as James called the disjunctive, faculty approach, 
that he directed some of his sharpest barbs in the first 
chapter of the Principles. On the so-called faculty of memory, 
he remarked:
For why should this absolute god-given Faculty retain so 
much better the events of yesterday than those of last 
year, and, best of all, those of an hour ago? Why, again, 
in old age should its grasp of childhood's events seem 
firmest? Why should illness and exhaustion enfeeble it?
Why should repeating an experience strengthen our recollec­
tion of it? Why should drugs, fevers, asphyxia, and
^ A  survey of this often, but not always, dreary lit­
erature may be found in Schneider, History, pp. 193-216.
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excitement resuscitate things long since forgotten? If 
we content ourselves with merely affirming that the facul­
ty of memory is so peculiarly constituted by nature as 
to exhibit just these oddities, we seem little the better 
for having invoked it, for our explanation becomes as 
complicated as that of the crude facts with which we 
started. Moreover there is something grotesque and 
irrational in the supposition that the soul is equipped 
with elementary powers of such an ingeniously intricate 
sort. Why should our memory cling more easily to the 
near than the remote? Why should it lose its grasp of 
proper sooner than of abstract names? Such peculiarties 
seem quite fantastic; and might, for aught we can see _a 
priori, be the precise opposites of what they are.18
The same sort of argument might have been directed at any or 
all of the faculties. James' analysis was actually an infor­
mal epitaph because, as he put it, "the faculty does not exist 
absolutely, but works under conditions; and the quest of the
19conditions becomes the psychologist's most interesting task." 
The experimental lab was to become the arena where those con­
ditions were investigated.
The Proactive-Reactive Doctrine and 
American Functionalism
A second result of the replacement of Locke by a 
conglomerate of nativistic theorists was the apparent endorse­
ment and refinement of the proactive-reactive principle beyond 
that which even Edwards could go. Edwards, of course, drew 
his data almost exclusively from conversions, and we have 
seen that he viewed the process as an- oscillating give-and- 
take relationship with the Holy Spirit. In following Augustine
 ^^ Principles. pp. 2-3.
 ^^ Ibid . , p . 3.
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down the proactive-reactive path, Edwards offered a subtle 
but significant departure from the traditional Puritan con­
cept of the "reflex" and from Lockean sensationalism. 
Although gracious discoveries, in Edwards' view, are indeed 
given to the convert, the result is a radical transformation 
of an active, constructive mind. B. P. Bowne, a nineteenth- 
century faculty psychologist in goad standing, offered a 
typical application of the Edwardsean, proactive-reactive
principle to all human perception.
. . . by an entirely mysterious world-order, the speaker
is enabled to produce a series of signs which are totally 
unlike [the] thought, but which, by virtue of the same 
mysterious order, act as a series of incitements upon the 
hearer, so that he constructs within himself the corres­
ponding mental state. The act of the speaker consists in 
availing himself of the proper incitements. The act of 
the hearer is immediately only the reaction of the soul 
against the incitement . . . All communion between finite
minds is of this sort . . . Probably no reflecting per­
son would deny this conclusion, but . . . what is thus
true of perception of another's thought is equally true 
of the perception of the outer world in general . . .
Nervous signs are the raw material of all knowledge of 
the outer world according to the most decided realism.
But in order to pass beyond these signs into a knowledge 
of the outer world, we must posit an interpreter who shall 
read back these signs into their objective meaning. But 
that interpreter, again, must implicitly contain the mean­
ing of the universe within itself; and these signs are 
really but excitations which cause the soul to unfold 
what is within itself. Inasmuch as by common consent the 
soul communicates with the outer world only through these 
signs, and never come nearer to the object than just such 
signs can bring it, it follows that the principles of 
interpretation must be in the mind itself, and that the 
resulting construction is primarily only an expression 
of the mind's own nature. All reaction is of this sort; 
it expresses the nature of the reacting agent, and knowl­
edge comes under the same h e a d . 20
^Bordon P. Bowne, Metaphysics (New York, 1 882), pp. 
407-410; quoted in James, Principles, I, pp. 219-220.
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This is one aspect of the faculty approach that James thor­
oughly endorsed.
Some sort of signal must be given by the thing to the 
mind's brain?, or the knowing will not occur— we find as 
a matter of fact that the mere existence of a thing out­
side the brain is not a sufficient cause for our knowing 
it: it must strike the brain in some way, as well as be
there, to be known. But the brain being struck, the 
knowledge is constituted by a new construction that occurs 
altogether _in the mind. 21
In fact, the proactive-reactive principle was a funda­
mental assumption of American "Functionalist" psychology,
It was the Functionalists who emphasized that the mind serves 
an adaptive function: it intervenes between environmental
stimulation and resultant behavior. Man receives information 
from the environment, the functionalists held, but the pre­
cise nature of that information is determined, in part, by 
active goal-oriented selection. The historical analysis of 
the Functionalist school has suffered from an oddly schizoid 
approach. It is at once held to be peculiarly American but 
distinctly European in origin: a pragmatic American applica­
tion of Hegel's dialectic, Brentano's doctrine of intentio-
22
Functionalism, however, was never a tightly-knit 
school like Structuralism or Gestalt. The most important 
interpreter of Functionalism is Edna Heidbreder; see Seven 
Psychologies, pp. 152-253, and "Functionalism," in Mary Henle 
et al., eds. Historical Conceptions of Psychology (New York, 
1973), pp. 276-285.
^^Heidbredder seems to view- Functionalism this way; see 
Ibid.; see also Boring, History, pp. 508-517 and 550-583.
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be denied that Dewey came to psychology via Hegelian phi­
losophy and that James drew heavily upon Brentano and Darwin, 
it must now be recognized that they were also the inheritors 
of an American functional tradition which can be traced to 
Edwards. A discussion of the precise nature of the manner in 
which the functional, proactive-reactive position may have 
been transmitted to Dewey, James, and the other "Function­
alists" is well beyond the scope of this essay. That impor­
tant continuity exists between Edwards and the "Function­
alists," however, is beyond doubt. For starters, one need 
only consult the organizational scheme of James' Varieties 
of Religious Experience, a work in which Jonathan Edwards is 
quoted more often than any other single author. In chapters 
6-13 James takes us on a conversional journey from the per­
ception of evil ("The Sick Soul"), to the depths of despair 
("The Divided Self), to "Conversion," to "5aintliness.
A schematic of James' view is presented in Figure 20. Except 
for James' characteristic lack of concern over absolute cri­
teria for the validity of conversion, The Varieties can 
elicit an eerie de ja vu if one has previously read Edwards' 
Religious Affections. Indeed, American psychology has been 
there before, before Darwin, before Wundt, and before the 
psychological laboratory moved from the church pew to the
24While The1 Varieties is the only volume in which 
James refers directly to Edwards, the Principles is also per­
meated with the proactive-reactive view. A particularly 
charming and persuasive‘illustration is James' famous "Romeo 
and Juliet" example (I, pp. 6-7).









Figure 20. William James' proactive-reactive conception of 
conversion.
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university closet.
Edwards and James would both have agreed with
Neisser’s proposal that beauty is neither in objects nor in
25
the eye of the beholder, but in the mind. It can hardly be
denied, they claim, that man reacts to stimulation. His
reaction, however, consists in proactively selecting aspects
of the stimulation which are relevant to his purposes, and
combining the information contained in the stimulation with
that in memory to construct his own reality.^ Man in an
inherently and basically creative organism. According to
Jonathan Edwards, the "gracious discoveries" given in true
conversion permit a convert to create a reality which is
remarkably congruent with the reality. James would not go
this far,and I know of no contemporary psychologist who would
take such a metaphysical leap of faith. Our era, like James',
is not an age of faith, but rather it is one of skepticism.
The rigorous methods which have emerged from such skepticism
have yielded a grasp of mental activity which may appear
surer than that of Edwards. But then, of course, it should
because our reach is so much shorter. Compared to Edwards,
modern psychologists must appear as psychological amputees
27pursuing, as we do, the "art of the soluble." Edwards' art 
^ Cognitive Psychology, p. 3.
^ S e e  Figure 9, p. 165, for a pictorial representation
of the proactive-reactive principle operating on both inner 
and external sources of information.
27
This well-worn phrase has been popularized by P. B. 
Medawar in The Art of the Soluble (London, 1967).
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this alone is all the significantly separates the psychology 
of Jonathan Edwards from that of James and from most modern 
cognitive psychology.
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